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"One example has been given to me by a general practitioner of a girt, unmarried, and, 
therefore, one of the minority of cases of illegal abortion, who came to him about two or 
three months ago, said she was pregnant, and that she wished to have her pregnancy 
terminated...She said to him that she had come because of the Bill "ƒ believe that I have 
grounds under that", she said He told her, "I happen to know the sponsor of the Bill I have 
looked at the Bill and do not think that under it you have grounds. " He talked to the girl and 
put her in touch with people who could help her. Her pregnancy is now going through in the 
normal way. It does not follow that because women desire termination it will automatically 
be carried out. If we can manage to get a girl such as that into the hands of the medical 
profession, the Bill is succeeding in its objective. If the Bill had not been before Parliament, 
if the girl had thought that what she sought was something illegal and was not to be talked 
about, and had, therefore not gone to the doctor, she might have had the baby after nine 
months of great anxiety: she might, as often happens have taken some substance, or have 
inflicted some injury upon herself which might have aborted the baby, admitted her to 
hospital to take up time in a gynaecological bed, and, possibly, have left her with a 
permanent injury. Worse than that, she might have been driven to the desperate situation of 
committing suicide. Worst of all, she might have been among the statistics of the average of 
30 women a year who die of operations at criminal hands. None of those things happened, 
because she thought she would get a good hearing from that doctor. If the Bill encourages 
that kind of climate, it will have been worthwhile.
1 David Steel, on presenting his Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill (which was to 
become the Abortion Act) for its third reading in the House of Commons, H.C. Deb. Vol. 750, 
Col. 1349, 1967 (13 July).
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CHAPTER 1: REGULATING ABORTION: 
CONTROLLING WOMEN?
"Conscious activity to control human fertility is as intrinsic to the social being of human 
groups as the activity to control and organize the production of food What changes over 
time and from one social context to another is who controls fertility, under what conditions, 
through what means, and for what purposes"1.
"The rights and interests of the mother emerge, not now solely concerned with her protection 
from unsafe abortions, but instead also with her autonomy and ability to determine what 
should happen to her body. This development has marched hand in hand with the emergence 
of a strong medical profession and with the phenomenon of science-based medicine...Until 
Parliament or the European Court of Human Rights intervenes, the supremacy of the English 
medical profession, coupled with its increased (and continually increasing) ability to provide 
safer and less risky abortion procedures, have resulted in the legal acceptance of the 
medicalization of abortion "2 .
"Many members of the medical profession have traditionally been at the forefront of the 
family planning movement. They have pioneered a great deal of what has been achieved so 
far. However, other members of the medical profession provide serious obstacles to
reproductive choice. Being the recipients of high levels of education, and considering 
themselves guardians of scientific knowledge concerning reproductive choices, so many of 
them resent decisions and activities which are carried out beyond their control This 
resentment is often reflected in their opposition to approaches for service delivery which 
involve the community or enable other health-care providers to carry out procedures which 
have traditionally been performed by medical doctors"3.
1 Petchesky (1984a; 25).
2 Grubb; (1990; 156, 157).
3 Dr Halfdan Mahler (1993; 26).
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In the 1960s, women’s movements across Europe claimed the abortion issue as their own, 
with the key contention that the question of who controls female fertility is a political one, 
involving fundamental choices as to the position and role of women within society (see 
Dahlerup; 1986). Control o f access to abortion services was seen as an attempt to exercise 
control over women’s sexuality and fertility and to enforce certain roles and life-style choices 
(reflecting particular moral assumptions). Access to safe, legal abortion on demand was 
advanced as a prerequisite for the full and equal participation of women in society, for as 
Madeleine Simms of the first British reforming group, the Abortion Law Reform Association, 
put it: "no true state of equality can exist for women in a society which denies them freedom 
and privacy in respect of fertility control" (1981; 183).
The feminist claim that the regulation of abortion is intrinsically linked to attempts to control 
women is not so easily sustained in the Britain of today as it was in that of pre-1967. The 
1967 Abortion Act provided that a pregnancy may be legally terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner where two doctors certify the existence of certain circumstances: either 
that the continuance of pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or 
of injury to her physical or mental health, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
that there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped4. Since 1990, a time limit of twenty- 
four weeks has applied with exceptions allowing abortion after that time where termination 
is necessary to prevent grave, permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the 
woman; or continuance of a pregnancy threatens the life of the woman; or there is substantial 
risk that if the child is born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to 
be seriously handicapped. The existence of these circumstances under the Abortion Act is a 
matter for the judgment o f medical professionals. Over the past twenty-five years doctors’ 
interpretation of the Abortion Act has become gradually more liberal and access to safe, legal
4 The text of the Abortion Act, in its original form and as amended by s. 37 of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, is set out in appendices 1 and 2 respectively. The 
Act was never extended to Northern Ireland, where the regulations governing the provision 
of abortion are still very restrictive (see chapter 5 below, p.105).
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abortion services has, as a result, greatly improved.
Indeed, it seems that despite the efforts of the anti-choice groups, abortion is gradually 
slipping off the British political agenda. After repeated attempts to reform the law, the 
regime introduced by the Abortion Act was put again to the vote in Parliament in 1990, and 
the status quo it had established was largely endorsed. Currently the fiercest debates are 
waged not around the issue of whether women should have the right not to become mothers, 
but rather around how they must act once they have chosen maternity. Media attention and 
political debate seem focused not so much on abortion as on whether children should be 
fostered by lesbian/male gay couples or parents of a different ethnic origin to their own; the 
problems of single parent families; the use of reproductive technologies such as IVF to assist 
‘undesirable’ (old, lesbian, poor, single, morally unsuitable) women to have children or 
whether such technology should be used to allow women to have children of a different ethnic 
make-up. Moreover, the responsibility owed to children is extended ever backwards through 
pregnancy, with more attention paid to the woman’s conduct when pregnant5. And this 
discourse of ‘responsible parenting’ is not confined to women - rather the establishment of 
the Child Support Agency illustrates its extension to men (albeit that male responsibility is 
conceived of primarily in terms of a duty to contribute financially). In comparison, abortion 
increasingly seems a ‘non-issue’ with a status quo as regards access to abortion services 
firmly established and largely accepted.
The apparent depoliticisation of abortion in Britain paints quite a different picture from that 
which can be seen in the USA. There, it is not unknown for doctors working in abortion 
clinics to arrive at work wearing bullet proof vests6 and the availability of safe legal abortion 
hangs in the balance or, better, hangs like a pendulum, liable to swing violently as a result 
of fine shifts in the composition of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the fact that the justices
5 Here there is also an overlap with abortion in terms of heated discussion as to the rights 
and wrongs of foetal sex selection (Morgan; 1988) or the abortion of handicapped foetuses: 
the ‘responsible mother’ is one who wishes to give birth to a healthy child, who accepts 
certain constraints on her conduct in order to do so, and will abort a foetus should it prove 
to be ‘defective’ (McNally; undated).
6 See The Guardian, 9 May 1994. This follows the shooting of an abortion clinic doctor 
by an anti-choice activist.
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are political appointments, and the significance their position on abortion will have for the 
President’s choice, enhances the construction of abortion as a matter of politics. The fiery 
rhetoric of American radical feminist writers such as Andrea Dworkin (1983) and Catharine 
MacKinnon (1983a, 1983b, 1990) seems to gain some credence when the regulation of 
abortion is so explicitly a political matter. For MacKinnon:
"the availability of abortion frames, and is framed by, the extent to which men, worked out 
among themselves, find it convenient to allow abortion - a reproductive consequence of 
intercourse - to occur. Abortion will then, to that extent, be available" (1983a; 28).
"[W]hen convenient to do away with the consequences of sexual intercourse (meaning 
children), women get abortion rights. Women can have abortions so men can have sex...In 
this light, the theme of the laws of sexual assault and reproduction is male control of, access 
to, and use o f women" (1990; 1300-1).
In MacKinnon’s account, the state and law are seen as profoundly implicated in perpetuating 
male control over women. They are wholly pervaded by male power: their foci and 
uppermost objectives are seen as essentially male rather than capitalist or class-based and they 
oppress women through a legitimation and enforcement o f the male view of the world7. The 
regulation of abortion forms a central part of this picture.
MacKinnon’s analysis has been much criticised within the United States8, but it transfers still 
less happily to the English context. In England and Wales, I will argue, abortion has 
increasingly shifted from the political ‘public’ realm into the ‘private’ sphere, where it is 
constructed as a matter for the discretion of the medical profession. This recodification as 
a technical problem to be discussed by experts, which has become increasingly clear in recent 
years (see especially chapters 6  and 7) has defused the most fierce debates around it. It 
seems that a status quo has been established, and those who continue to kick against it - be 
they pro- or anti-choice - are cast as marginal extremists. Given the current state of provision
7 "The demarcations between morals and politics, the personality of the judge and the 
judicial role, bare coercion and the rule of law, tend to merge in women’s experience. 
Relatively seamlessly they promote the dominance of men as a social group through 
privileging the form of power - the perspective on social life - feminist consciousness reveals 
as socially male" (1983b; 655-6).
8 For a critical response to MacKinnon’s early writings on abortion, see especially Joffe 
(1984) and Petchesky (1984).
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of abortion, if abortion is still a political issue then this political dimension is increasingly 
well concealed.
In the pages that follow, 1 will examine some aspects of the regulation of abortion in England 
and Wales from 1967 onwards. The thesis which I will seek to sustain has several 
interconnected strands. I will argue that abortion has been constructed as primarily a medical 
matter to the occlusion of other accounts and perspectives. This has had a substantial impact 
on the law which, in the last thirty years, has moved from a system of criminal prohibition 
to a decentralised network of medical control. The médicalisation of its regulation has led 
to an apparent depoliticisation of abortion, defusing political conflict and controversy 
surrounding it. However, despite this appearance of depoliticisation, abortion remains very 
much a political issue: the regulations governing its availability are underpinned by quite 
specific, discernable values which reflect particular attitudes to women and a clear value 
judgment as to who should control female fertility. Further, the regulation of abortion 
continues to serve as a focal point for the deployment of power over women. I will contend 
that whilst the médicalisation of abortion law has had substantia] benefits for ensuring 
women’s access to abortion services, it also poses substantial problems for that access, and 
that these have been inadequately addressed.
To support this thesis I will examine some particular sites and modes of the operation of 
power in the regulation of abortion. My focus will be on law, yet it will be broader than 
many previous legal analyses of the regulation of abortion. First, I take law to be more than 
a series of rules and judgments. Law is also a privileged site for dispute and contestation, 
and an "authorised discourse" with a significant influence on popular opinion (Eisenstein; 
1988; 4, Smart; 1989,1990a; Gordon; 1984; 109). It is crucial to think in terms of the values 
which underpin the law and which are perpetuated through it. Secondly, I wish to place more 
emphasis on medical regulation (and the interaction between the medical and legal regimes). 
Typically discussion of the regulation of abortion has begun with a study of the law. Medical 
practice, if discussed at all, is considered as a secondary level of control, determined by this 
framework. On the contrary, it seems to me that in practice law follows medical
MriüiiaMÜl l U l l J k
6
developments, adopting and adapting norms and standards which have evolved at this level9. 
This is seen repeatedly: in the 1967 Abortion Act, the 1990 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act and throughout the relevant jurisprudence. In this sense, it will be seen that 
medical norms have ‘colonised’ legal regulation, and a focus on medical practice and medical 
control, as it is operated at this local level, is essential for an adequate understanding of how 
access to legal abortion is regulated. Consideration of medical practice is also relevant in 
that, as will be seen below, problems of access to abortion currently seem to lie more at this 
level, than at the level of legal prohibition.
I will begin this analysis, in the next chapter, with some consideration of the statute which 
partially decriminalised abortion in Britain, the 1967 Abortion Act. I will argue that the 
regulations introduced by the Abortion Act cannot be adequately understood in abstraction 
from a context of gendered power relations. In chapter 2, then, I will look at the motivation 
underlying the partial décriminalisation of abortion in 1967 and locate it within a general shift 
towards ‘governmentality’ and the subtle, more decentralised operations of power detailed by 
Foucault (1979a). In an analysis of the reasons for which abortion was decriminalised in
1967 ,1 will question the accuracy of the received representation of the Act as a ‘permissive’ 
piece of legislation. Rather than being seen as a loosening of power and the carving out of 
a greater free space for female reproductive autonomy, I will argue that the Act should be 
understood as a "taking charge of life" and consequent adoption of more continuous, 
regulatory and corrective mechanisms (Foucault; 1979b; 143-4). The Act is a landmark in 
the médicalisation of the law, and shows the close relationship between such médicalisation 
and the institution of a network of medical control over women.
It is important, however, that the Abortion Act should not be understood just as part of a 
general (genderless) shift towards a different mode of government. In chapter 3, I indicate 
the importance of viewing this reform within a context of gender, outlining the clearly
9 Currently, it is perhaps possible to see this same process even more clearly in those 
countries which have recently decriminalized, or are in the process of decriminalizing 
abortion. In Belgium for example, the recent décriminalisation of abortion has legitimised 
long-standing medical practices (Marques-Pereira, 1993, Berer; 1993; 38). Likewise, the 
Swiss law looks set to be reformed on the basis of medical developments (see Rey; 1994).
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gendered constructions of the woman seeking abortion which underlay the reform and 
justified the need and suitability o f the particular strategy of power which was brought to 
bear. The very nature of the ‘peripheral subject’ (the woman seeking abortion) to be 
regulated, legitimates and grounds the need for medical control and supervision over her. 
Thus, while the reform may be seen within this general movement toward ‘governmentality*, 
it is necessary to remember that this describes a broad brush stroke which maps a multiplicity 
of interconnecting fine techniques o f control which operate to construct different (gendered) 
subjectivities.
I then move, in chapter 4, to a consideration of the ‘operational context’ of the Abortion Act - 
the level of medical regulation. The Act is seen to have carved out and legitimated a broad 
area for the free exercise of medical discretion. Here I take a closer look at the workings of 
medical practice in the case of a request for a termination, in order to determine whether and 
how one can see power as being deployed over women. Here, I rely on the work of medical 
sociologists such as Kathy Davis and Ann Oakley. 1 argue that although there is clearly an 
increasingly liberal attitude within the medical profession towards requests for terminations, 
the regulation of abortion remains nonetheless a site which provides a particular opportunity 
for the deployment of power over women. I argue that the relationship between a doctor and 
a woman approaching him/her for a pregnancy termination is pervaded with power. The 
patient approaches the doctor as a lay person to an expert, (s)he is the object o f knowledge 
which the doctor must locate within a medical framework, to understand, to classify and to 
treat. This perceived need for medical control is reinforced when the patient is a woman, and 
even more so when she is a woman seeking abortion. With regard to abortion, I will identify 
four analytically distinguishable operations of power, which I call technical control, decisional 
control, paternalistic control and normalising control.
In the following two chapters, I shift the focus to the interaction between the legal regulation 
and this "contextual’ medical regime. Here the appearance of depoliticisation resulting from 
médicalisation of abortion law is thrown into relief. In chapter 5 I take a fresh look at some 
of the relevant decisions which the British courts have made in this area. What becomes clear 
is the tremendous respect and deference for medical opinion, and an unwillingness on the part 
of judges to ‘second-guess* or supervise the exercise of medical opinion under the Abortion
Act. Abortion is constructed as a medical event and the doctors’ power to define is accepted 
and reinforced, with other accounts pushed to the margins. This depoliticises the judicial 
decision which can be legitimated with reference to scientific truth. Judges intervene only 
to correct excesses or substantial departures from ‘good medical practice’ (a standard 
determined by the medical profession) in such a way as to legitimate the normal run of such 
practice. Whilst judicial reluctance to interfere with medical discretion has, in other areas of 
law, led to infringements of women’s bodily autonomy and provoked feminist criticism, it is 
here seen to have worked to the advantage of women seeking to terminate a pregnancy. For 
example, women have been protected from claims for injunctions to restrain abortions brought 
by their sexual partners or parents10. I argue that this highlights a peculiar difficulty of the 
situation which feminists face with regard to the medical control o f abortion. The principled 
arguments against such control (and its implicit paternalism), are in conflict with 
considerations of the practical and concrete benefits it has provided (and the security which 
it may continue to give) on the level of entrenching and extending women’s access to 
abortion services. However, I hope to show that whilst doctor and woman acting in 
conjunction are relatively well protected from outside challenge, it may be that women are 
less well protected within the medical relationship itself.
The same tension regarding the medical control of abortion emerges equally clearly in chapter 
6 , where I move on to consider the most recent statutory development regarding abortion: s.37 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. A most significant feature of the 
Parliamentary debates surrounding the reform is their near complete médicalisation and the 
marginalisation of other knowledges or ways o f structuring dispute. Thus it seems that whilst 
the pro-choice movement has been successful in fending off the various attacks made on the 
1967 Act, ground may have been lost with regard to popular assumptions about abortion 
(Science and Technology Sub Group; 1991; 147). From this point the agenda becomes set 
within an essentially medical framework and the issue o f what is at stake in abortion debates 
centre essentially around the medical development o f the foetus to the exclusion of broader 
social issues. Moreover, the acceptance of a medical framework further entrenches and
10 See Paton v Trustees of BPAS and another [1978] 2 All ER 987, C and another v S 
and others [1987] 1 All ER 1230, Re B (a minor), The Independent, May 22, 1991 (Family 
Division), discussed in chapter 4, below.
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legitimates the medical control of abortion and would stand against any initiative to claim 
decisional control for women.
In chapter 7 I seek to illustrate some of these arguments through consideration of the decision 
to license the ‘abortion pill*, RU486, for use in Britain. Here I will examine both the debates 
surrounding its introduction (in and outside of Parliament) and the regulations introduced to 
control its use. The fact that RU486 was licensed for use in the UK with a minimum of 
public debate is again illustrative of the extent to which abortion has become viewed as a 
primarily medical phenomenon and the resulting depoliticisation. In the United States, the 
introduction of RU486 has been a far more explicitly political matter, with importation of the 
drug restricted under Presidents Bush and Reagan. On his election to the presidency, one of 
Bill Clinton’s very first actions was to lift this import ban: a highly symbolic gesture. In 
Britain, on the other hand, the drug was licensed with a minimum of controversy and media 
attention, but within a framework of medical control which is even tighter than that required 
for surgical terminations. Emphasising again that the depoliticisation is only apparent, I will 
also argue that what debate occurred concerning the introduction of RU486, although played 
out in a largely medical rhetoric, can only be understood within the context of a struggle over 
the control of abortion (and female fertility). Likewise, only fears regarding who will control 
abortion can explain the stringent regulations introduced to govern the drug’s use. Also 
important here is some consideration of how drugs like RU486 may help to redefine abortion, 
or to challenge commonly held assumptions about it, and how they may put back onto the 
agenda the perceived links between technical and other forms of medical control.
In my concluding chapter, I will attempt to draw together the strands of my argument in order 
to offer some thoughts on the implications of the médicalisation of abortion law. One tension 
which will run through my thesis is an awareness that médicalisation has simultaneously 
brought both advantages and disadvantages. Whilst helping to secure women’s access to the 
provision of abortion services, it will also be seen that most of the problems which women 
now face in obtaining such services relate to matters of medical control, rather than legal 
prohibition. This, of course, poses the problem of how feminists are to respond to 
médicalisation and medical control.
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A Note on PowerfControl11
Before going on to the main body of my argument, I would like to pause for a moment to 
specify what I intend by ‘power', an infamously elusive and slippery concept (Lukes; 1992;
1 ) and to say a few words about the theoretical basis for the arguments that I want to make. 
In particular, as I hope to derive some insights from the work of Michel Foucault, it is 
appropriate to provide a (brief) idea of his work on power and how I will be using it.
Foucault rejected a view of power as nothing more than command or prohibition deriving 
from certain central loci such as the state. Rather he argued that modern society is 
characterised by the spread of a more productive, disciplinary form of power which provides 
procedures for training and coercing bodies, by way of hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgment and the examination. The diffusion of various disciplinary mechanisms throughout 
the social body is synonymous with the formation of what Foucault calls ‘the disciplinary 
society’12. Behind the formally constituted egalitarian juridical framework of modern 
society, Foucault identifies a foundational network of micro-powers or disciplines. The 
formal legal and political structures of the society are seen to be predicated upon relations of 
power which both guaranteed a ‘submission of forces and bodies’, yet evade and undermine 
the formally constituted juridical limitations on the exercise of power. The operation of 
power here becomes increasingly closely related to the formation of knowledge. This is 
related to the disciplinary transformation of institutions into apparatuses within which methods 
for the formation and accumulation o f knowledge began to be employed as instruments of 
domination: modern society is a "society of normalization, a society governed less by legal 
rights than by the authority o f the human sciences" (Foucault; 1980b; 107).
Seen in this light, the recasting of abortion as a matter for medicine acquires a particular
11 I will use the words power and control interchangeably.
12 As Barry Smart points out the concept of disciplinary society should not be understood 
as referring to the realisation of a programme for a disciplined and orderly society, but to the 
diffusion of disciplinary mechanisms throughout the social body, to the process by which the 
disciplines eventually constituted a general formula of domination (1988; 91).
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significance. Science * and especially medicine - has a special role in justifying a particular 
type of power, and making its exercise seem logical and neutral (Foucault; 1980b; 107). 
Scientific knowledges can legitimate and depoliticise, providing grounds for making what 
might otherwise be an inherently political decision seem neutral or commonsensical. 
Medicine has played a pivotal role in establishing and legitimating the techniques essential 
to such power: it is within medical knowledge that the individual first became knowable as 
such and it is by identifying individual anomalies medically that the technologies of bio- 
power are in a position to supervise and administer them. Within medicine, the operation of 
power becomes justified by the patient’s own ‘best interests’. Medicine and medical 
knowledge occupy an important place in several of Foucault’s studies. In Madness and 
Civilisation, he notes the entry of the medical personage who utilises surveillance and 
judgment, and who is a pivotal figure in the arrangement which inaugurated the emergence 
and development* of a medical knowledge of the mind as an almost autonomous branch of 
knowledge. Later, The Birth of the Clinic reveals the formation of the individual’s body as 
an object of scientific medical examination and analysis. Although these works predate 
Foucault’s explicit consideration of power, he later tells Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale 
Pasquino that: "[w]hen I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking 
about, in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power?” (1980c; 115).
In his 1979 Tanner lectures, Foucault linked his ideas on disciplinary forms of power with 
the increasing governmentalisation or "governmentality” of Western society from the 
eighteenth century onwards. He argued that the same style of analysis which had been used 
to study techniques and practices addressed to individual human subjects within particular, 
local institutions could be addressed to techniques and practices for governing populations of 
subjects at the level of a political sovereignty over an entire society. These links between the 
macrophysics and microphysics of power developed his earlier idea of ‘biopower’: the 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations (1979b; 140-1). Methods of power and knowledge here "assumed 
responsibility for the life processes and undertook to manage them” (1979b; 144). In these 
lectures, Foucault describes forms of power exercised over subjects as members of a 
population, within which issues of individual sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect 
with issues of national policy and power. Through statistics, the phenomenon of population
was shown to have its own regularities, such as birth and death rates, characteristic ailments, 
age profiles, social groupings and so on, knowledge of which allowed it to be ‘managed* 
more efficiently. Government became more ‘pastoral* with a concern for the welfare of the 
population and a range of new tactics and techniques of power emerged. Implicated here are 
social welfare programmes which, in aiming to provide for basic individual needs, instigate 
new, decentralized modalities of control, which operate through state-sanctioned experts 
(social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, child care experts, teachers and so on). These are 
empowered to function as ‘parallel judges* able to dispense justice at the local level, after a 
close and minute examination of the individual case in hand. Political problems are thus 
recast in the neutral language of science, and then are debated and managed by specialists. 
Power is legitimated here by expert knowledge, and operates through surveillance, 
normalisation and judgment with the individual constructed as a subject for study and 
observation. Power develops at the micro level of such practices and is subsequently 
colonised, extended, overlaid and entrenched by more global forms of domination such as 
law. The regulation of abortion can, 1 hope to demonstrate, be usefully viewed as one site 
within such a broader network of control.
CHAPTER 2: THE ABORTION ACT (1967):
A PERMISSIVE AND LIBERATORY REFORM?
"Britain has been magnificently hypocritical, maintaining that in general abortion is wrong, 
but fitfully turning a blind eye when the law is interpreted so as to allow abortion for a 
variety o f reasons...the result has been to squeeze the law so hard, and make it look so 
ridiculous, that reform of some kind is now in sight The authorities * inability to stop illegal 
abortion brought the law into contempt for a hundred years..."}
7 i]t is generally accepted that the law relating to abortion is widely disregarded, and that 
stricter enforcement would be difficult, and not necessarily a deterrent when women are 
desperate, and prepared, if no help is available, to operate upon themselves with instruments 
or drugs. Legal sanctions do little more than provide an abortionist with incentives to avoid 
detection, and so drive the offence underground to an extent where a small fragment of 1 per 
cent of abortionists is detected. On the other hand illegal abortion is associated with deaths 
counted in hundreds each year, and causes ill-health and serious damage to many women. 
Modest estimates of illegal operations range between 50,000 and 100,000 annually, and the 
figure of a quarter of a million has authority. It may appear that the present law drives 
abortion into the most undesirable and dangerous channels, without eliminating it".1 2
1 Paul Ferris (1966; 14).
2 Bernard Dickens (1966; 165).
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1. INTRODUCTION: A PERMISSIVE REFORM?
"The 1960s saw a tidal wave of permissive indulgence, homosexual as well as heterosexual. 
One-parent families, a huge boom in contraceptives, a crusade for sexual indulgence in 
whatever form, became accepted" (Morgan in Thompson; 1993; 137).
According to Benjamin Disraeli: "permissive legislation is the characteristic of a free people" 
(Davies; 1975; 13). It seems to me that this citation from Disraeli may provide a useful 
heuristic device for outlining the argument which I wish to make in this chapter. I will claim 
that it is the logic of this statement which also underlies our received understanding of the 
Abortion Act. If Disraeli is to be believed, then it seems self-evident that the restriction of 
criminal controls over abortion introduced in 1967, was characteristic of a newfound freedom 
for women. However, it seems to me that in Disraeli’s statement, as in this account of the 
Abortion Act, freedom emerges as no more than a space for action created by the absence or 
limitation of repressive (criminal) legislation. One is free only in the sense of being free from 
one particular manifestation of (repressive) power which emanates from the state; other forms 
of power are ignored and no room is left for analysis of the quality or type of freedom which 
one may exercise. The opening citation taken from a speech of David Steel, taken from the 
Parliamentary debates leading to the introduction of the 1967 Act, reveals another aspect o f 
its introduction - the médicalisation of the regulation of abortion, the desire to bring women 
seeking termination into contact with doctors, and a more subtle, decentralised form of power.
Here, however, I am perhaps getting ahead of my argument, and before going any further, I 
should set out in more detail exactly what I mean by ‘permissive’. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines permissive as: "[hjaving the quality of permitting or giving permission; that 
allows something to be done or to happen; not forbidding or hindering. In modern use freq.: 
tolerant, liberal, allowing freedom, spec, in sexual matters; freq. in phr. permissive society." 
A permissive measure is thus one which permits or tolerates certain behaviour, which limits 
the potential of external bodies to intervene in the life of an individual to correct or to punish 
certain acts, especially in sexual matters. Further, here I am taking permissive as having the 
more specific meaning of describing something which loosens control over sexuality and 
reproduction, and which contributes to the constitution of a ‘private’ sphere where sex (and 
its potential reproductive consequences) can be enjoyed free from external interference, 
regardless of the (lack of) procreative intention of the participants. The aim of this paper will
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be to assess how far the Abortion Act fits within this definition, and thus how far it can be 
seen as heralding a newfound freedom for women.
In this chapter I will use the more expansive definition of power to which I alluded in chapter 
1. This view sees power not merely (or even primarily) as a repressive force deployed by 
various central institutions, but rather as diffuse, productive and capillary, as a "complex 
strategical situation", or omnipresent "multiplicity of force relations" (Foucault; 1979b; 92-7). 
One particular benefit of this model is that whilst not denying the existence of central loci of 
power, it redirects attention away from centralised and legitimate forms of power and focuses 
more on techniques which have become embodied in local, regional material institutions 
(Foucault; 1980b; 97), here particularly on medical practices. My aim here is not be to deny 
the importance o f the state - indeed a central focus of the analysis of this chapter will be the 
mapping of state attempts to gain control over abortion. However, I do want to oppose the 
idea that power derives from the state. As Michel Foucault has said:
"the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power.Jn 
a certain way all forms of power relation must refer to it...not because they are derived from 
it;,..rather because power relations have come more and more under state control...that is to 
say elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state 
institutions" (1982; 224).
The Abortion Act represented a liberalisation of the draconian terms of ss. 58 and 59 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (see below, pp. 19-20). It took English statute law 
from a near total ban on the performance of abortions, to a system whereby terminations 
might be performed in certain circumstances given the approval of two doctors. Hence it 
would seem self-evident that tht  Abortion Act must be seen as a permissive measure and one 
which was liberatory for women, in the sense that it decreased repressive criminal controls 
and hence facilitated a greater degree of individual (especially female) autonomy in sexual 
and reproductive matters. Henceforth, it seems, a woman would be guaranteed a greater 
degree of privacy, autonomy and freedom in her decision to terminate a pregnancy. The vast 
majority of commentators have accepted this interpretation (Lapping; 1970, Hindell and 
Simms; 1971, Davies; 1975), which fits neatly with a prevalent tendency to assume a rather 
linear notion of progress with regard to the law. In such a perspective, masculine bias in law 
is seen as a kind of lingering anachronism: something which has been gradually eroded and
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(so the story goes) which will continue to be worn down, until the day that perfect 
equality/gender neutrality is achieved. Such a vision accords with a broader, often unstated 
view of society, and state power within that society - society is not (yet) perfect, but it is 
gradually getting better, the standard of living is always rising, people are healthier and 
wealthier than they were in the past, and the individual is gradually accorded more rights and 
more liberty as s/he achieves more protection from infringements into her/his private life. For 
an analysis o f the Abortion Act, this rather linear concept could only state the Abortion Act 
to be an advance, albeit one which did not go far enough: the point is now to extend it. For 
example, Madeleine Simms writes:
"the 1967 Abortion Act was a half-way house. It handed the abortion decision to the medical 
profession. The next stage is to hand this very personal decision to the woman herself' 
(Simms; 1985; 94).
Moreover, this vision of the Abortion Act as a permissive measure fits neatly into a powerful 
and dominant story which has been told about the late 1960s in the UK. The latter half of 
the ‘Swinging Sixties’ are remembered not only for their permissive social mores, but also 
for the influence of these values on social policy, and the introduction of increasingly liberal, 
permissive legislation and humanising reform. A Labour government, headed by Harold 
Wilson, was voted into power in 1964, and having secured a larger majority of seats in 1966, 
it embarked on a substantial programme of social reform. The voting age was lowered to 18
(1969), divorce was made easier (1969), access to contraception was facilitated (1967), the 
death penalty was largely abolished (1965-9), a more liberal attitude was taken towards the 
censorship of plays (1968) and homosexuality was decriminalised, albeit in very restricted 
circumstances (1967). Some commentators have described these reforms in extravagant 
terms. Christie Davies (1975), for example, assesses such measures as signalling a shift to 
a new and more permissive Britain. The reform of the legislation governing abortion was a 
central piece of this programme1 and the dispute over abortion reform was cast in this light,
3 Although the Abortion Act results from a Private Member’s Bill introduced by a young, 
Liberal MP, David Steel, it is clear that it could never have succeeded without Government 
help. This was provided, firstly in the form of drafting assistance and, secondly more 
importantly, the granting of extra Parliamentary time. Between 1952 and 1967 there had been 
five previous attempts to reform the law (sec footnote 9 below), all of which had been talked 
out and failed for lack of time.
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becoming constructed as a contest between enlightenment and obscurantism. The Abortion 
Act was heralded as the victory of ‘forward looking minds over the prisoners o f the past’4, 
as a crucial step in the process of women’s emancipation5, and as a permissive measure 
which liberalised, humanised and modernised the previous law. Christopher Price, one of the 
reformers’ whips, claimed that the Bill had come forward because of the pressure of public 
opinion, due to
"millions of women up and down the country...saying, ‘We will no longer tolerate this system 
whereby men lay down, as though by right, the moral laws, particularly those relating to 
sexual behaviour’"6.
This construction of the Abortion Act as permissive has provided the basis for both the liberal 
approbation and the conservative criticism which greeted its passing. Conservative fears of 
the likely result of the liberalisation of abortion law were expressed as long ago as 1939, 
when the Birkett Committee (an inter-departmental committee appointed by the Minister of 
Health) had concluded that abortion should be available only on medical grounds. To provide 
it at the woman’s request would only aggravate the disturbing trend of the decline in the birth 
rate and "prove an added temptation to loose and immoral conduct" (Brookes; 1988; 125). 
The Act has thus been seen as a measure which promotes promiscuity7. This sentiment was
4 The first Abortion Law Reform Association conference found that abortion was not a 
struggle between women and men, but between "the prisoners of the past and forward looking 
minds" (ALRA Conference, 15 May, 1936, in Brookes (1988; 95)).
5 H.C. Deb Vol. 750 Col. 1372, 1967 (13 July). Here again the Abortion Act seems to 
fit in with other contemporary measures. The Matrimonial Property Act laid down that 
women’s work whether inside or outside of the home should be considered as a contribution 
towards buying the family assets, when they came to be divided on divorce. The Equal Pay 
Act (1970), introduced by Barbara Castle during her time as Secretary of State for 
Employment and Production, laid down the principle of same wages for same work. The 
Divorce Act (1969) established the right of a couple to have a divorce after two years apart 
where both partners wanted it, or five years’ separation where one partner did not agree. The 
Family Planning Act (1967) provided for the provision of family planning facilities on the 
NHS.
6 Price, H.C. Deb Vol. 750 Col. 1372, 1967 (13 July).
7 In introducing her (failed) reform bill in 1965, Renée Short to explicitly refutes any 
correlation between liberalisation of abortion and an increase in promiscuity. H.C. Deb. Vol. 
714, Col. 254, 1965 (15 June). However, many MPs still voiced connections between the
m
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still very much present in the late 1960s. In his book, The Nameless, published the year 
before the Abortion Act was passed, Paul Ferris wrote:
"one often meets the feeling that abortion, like contraception, is the thin end of a decadent 
wedge, a dangerous device to make sex easy for all. The trouble with protectives (says this 
argument) is that they can be bought by promiscuous bachelors as well as by prudent 
husbands. Similarly, even those who favour a more liberal attitude to abortion may be 
inhibited by the thought that any conceivable system short of one founded on explicit moral 
sanctions, can be used by tarts as well as by tired housewives" (1966; 10-11).
The Lamp Society of Bebington issued a broadsheet which contained the following text:
"WANTED: for loitering with intent to murder innocent, unborn Children, a black-hearted 
monster going by the name of Abortion Bill, and last seen in the House of Commons where 
it was harboured, supported and assisted by a large number of M.P.s...If this Bill is not 
defeated it will be the beginning of the end of traditional Christian morality in this country. 
It will be followed by attempts to make divorce easier than at present and to legalize 
homosexuality - even to the extent of legal homosexual ‘marriages’. There is no doubt 
whatever that once Abortion becomes legal there will be moves on foot for the sterilization 
of the unfit, and the killing of the sick and old and the socially useless..." (cited in Hindell 
and Simms; 1971; 89).
Liberals, however, welcomed the perceived permissive character of the reforms. Brian 
Lapping purports to identify a common theme running throughout a great many of the 
"civilising measures" introduced during these years: the right to privacy. He writes that
"[t]he Abortion and Family Planning Acts sought to ensure the right to privacy of a man and 
a woman who chose to make love. If they did not want to seek the public acknowledgement 
and approval of their conduct, called for by having a baby, these new measures helped to 
protect their privacy" (1970; 218).
One precision which must be made is that it is necessary to distinguish between the aims o f 
the legislation and its effects in practice. Although in the course of the thesis it will become
two, e.g. William Deedes, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1092, 1966 (22 July). John Corrie who 
introduced a Bill to try and restrict the Abortion Act criticised the National Abortion 
Campaign (which defended the 1967 Act) asserting that: "[t]here is an organization called 
NAC who want the law even more promiscuous than it is now." (The John Corrie Special, 
Radio Clyde, 15 July 1979 in Feminist Review, 1980; 66).
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evident that there is a wide gulf between these two levels, I would contend that on both to 
view the Abortion Act as a permissive measure which decreases the deployment of power over 
women is a partial vision. In this chapter and the one which follows it, I shall be focusing 
on the aims of the legislation; in subsequent ones, I will go on to assess how the regime 
which it foresees operates in practice. Here, I will give an account of the partial 
décriminalisation of abortion in the UK in the 1967 Abortion Act, and to examine the 
arguments expressed in favour of reform. I will begin by (briefly) sketching the background 
to the Abortion Act by way of an overview of the development of the law and medical 
practices until 1967 (section 2), before going on to an assessment of the reasons presented 
for reform - the problems that the Act aimed to address (section 3). My claim here is that 
tht  Abortion Act was actually a measure which was largely motivated by a desire to facilitate 
a closer control over the ‘private’ sphere, rather than one which sought to delineate a space 
for autonomous female action. In a third section, 1 take a fresh look at the form of the 
regulation which the Abortion Act introduces in the light of the preceding analysis (section
4), before going on to present some tentative conclusions (section 5).
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW UNTIL 1967: "A REFORM WHOSE
TIME HAD COME"8
a) Statute law
Abortion was an area where reform seemed long overdue. Inside and outside of Parliament, 
there was widespread desire for change and modernisation. Indeed in the 15 years preceding 
the introduction of the Abortion Act 1967, there had been no fewer than five parliamentary 
initiatives aiming at reform9. The Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, which governed 
the regulation of abortion, was widely criticised as anachronistic and archaic. It provides that:
s.58 Every woman being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage shall
8 This is how Madeleine Simms of the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) 
described iht Abortion Act (1985; 83).
9 The attempts at reform were introduced by Joseph Reeves MP (House of Commons, 
1952); Lord Amulree (House of Lords, 1954); Kenneth Robinson (House of Commons, 1961); 
Reneé Short (House of Commons, June 1965); Lord Silkin (House of Lords, November 1965). 
For more discussion of these initiatives, see Dickens (1966; 123-31).
unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use 
any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to  
procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully 
administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty 
of felony...
s.59 Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing, or any 
instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used o r 
employed with intent to procure any poison or other noxious thing, or any instrument or thing 
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or employed with intent 
to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanour...
These sections contained no time limit, made no distinction between abortions early and late 
in pregnancy10 and contained no explicit exception for therapeutic abortion. A time limit 
was later read into the Offences Against the Person Act by virtue of the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act, 1929. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act had not been introduced in order 
to deal with abortion. Rather it was intended to close a legal loophole, revealed in a 
observation by Talbot J. at Liverpool Assizes11, whereby the killing of the foetus/baby in the 
actual process of being born was covered neither by the Offences Against the Person Act 
(which foresaw an offence only where miscarriage was procured) nor by the law of murder. 
Thus, where a baby was killed during the process of (spontaneous) birth, but before being 
fully separated from the body of the pregnant woman, no offence was committed. The Infant 
Life (Preservation) Act introduced the offence of child destruction, s . l ( l )  prohibiting the 
destruction of a child capable of being born alive, making an exception only for the case 
where its destruction was carried out in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life o f
10 Previously English law had distinguished between abortion before and after quickening. 
This had been the position in common law, and was enshrined in statute in the first statute 
regulating abortion, LordEUenborough's Act 1803, which made abortion a felony in the case 
of abortion after quickening, but only a misdemeanour where it occurred before quickening. 
The distinction was removed by the Offences Against the Person Act, 1837, which established 
the substantial form of the modern law (see Smith and Hogan; 1988; 366). Quickening was 
the point at which the foetus was believed to become ensouled i.e. when the soul entered the 
body. It also marked the point when the woman might feel the first stirring inside her. 
Quickening was believed to occur at around 12 weeks, although this was believed to be 
earlier for a male foetus than a female one.
11 Cited by Lord Darling in the House of Lords debate, see Grubb (1990; 149).
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the pregnant woman12. The Act included a rebuttable presumption that this capacity for life 
was acquired at 28 weeks o f gestation. This limit was read into the Offences Against the 
Person Act (and later the Abortion Act) as prohibiting abortion after this time, except where 
the additional requirements of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act were also fulfilled13.
b) Medical practice and jurisprudence
However, access to legal abortion prior to 1967 was not so restricted in practice as it might 
appear from a reading of the statute. Medical practitioners had long had some room for 
manoeuvre in the prescription and performance of abortions and the decision in R vBourne 
(1938)14 had given explicit judicial approval to the exercise of medical discretion for 
therapeutic terminations. Dr Bourne had aborted a girl of fifteen who had been raped by a 
group of soldiers. Rather than basing his case on an appeal* to humanity, he defended hfmself 
on grounds of good medical practice, asserting that the girl’s mental and physical health might 
have suffered had the pregnancy continued. Macnaghten J., who presided over the case, 
linked the 1861 and 1929 statutes, and ruled that the burden rested on the crown to satisfy 
the jury that the defendant did not procure the miscarriage of the girl for the purpose of 
preserving her life. He reasoned that although these words were contained in the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act and not in the Offences Against the Person Act (under which Bourne was 
charged), that they were implied in the latter by the presence there of the word "unlawful" 
(which logically presupposed that in certain circumstances abortion must, on the contrary, be 
lawful). He told the jury that they should take a broad view of what was meant by preserving 
the life of the mother:
”[i]f the doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that 
the probable consequences of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman
12 This exception reflects the second purpose of the Act: to legalise the operation of 
craniotomy - crushing the impacted foetal skull, inevitably causing foetal death - which was 
widely practised to save the life of the pregnant woman before caesarian section became 
commonplace.
13 The Abortion Act and Infant Life (Preservation) Act were explicitly ‘uncoupled’ by 
s.37(4) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990). See chapter 6 for more 
discussion of this reform.
14 [1938] 3 All ER 615.
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a physical and mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor, w h o , 
in those circumstances, and in that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose o f  
preserving the life of the woman."15
In 1948, R v Bergmann and Ferguson16 clarified this decision. Here, the judge held that it 
was not relevant whether Dr Ferguson (the psychiatrist who had certified the need fo r  
termination) held a correct opinion as to the existence of such grounds for termination, so  
long as it was honestly held. This was emphasised again by R v Newton and Stungo:
"use of an instrument is unlawful unless the use is made in good faith for the purpose o f  
preserving the life or health of the woman. When I say health I mean not only her physical 
health but also her mental health. But I must emphasise that the burden of proof that it w as  
not used in good faith is on the crown"17.
Thus, as long as the doctor acted in good faith, therapeutic abortion was legal. Indeed, even 
before the Bourne judgment, it is clear that abortions had been performed by doctors fo r  
therapeutic purposes, according to criteria established by themselves (Keown; 1988; 78). 
Provided that practitioners abided by professional ethics, there seems to have been little risk  
of prosecution18. A 1884 report in The Lancet commented that the strongest evidence should 
be forthcoming before a doctor was brought to account for carrying out the operation or even 
for the death of his patient, for "[e]ven if a medical practitioner is known to have procured 
abortion, the presumption is that it was done in the legal exercise of his calling" (in  
Francome; 1986; 19).
The combination of a climate of social reform with very restrictive legislation (and w ide 
variation in medical interpretation of it) formed the backdrop for the introduction of the 1967
15 [1938] 3 All HR 615 at 619.
16 [1948] 1 Brit Med J. 1008
17 [1958] Crim LR 469; [1958] 1 Brit Med J. 1242.
18 The bringing of a case against Dr Bourne should not really be seen as an exception to 
this as he actively courted his prosecution, informing the police of the operation himself and 
inviting them to arrest him (Bourne; 1962). Of the four doctors involved in the other two 
cases mentioned above, the only conviction who was clearly acting outside the terms of what 
was accepted to be good medical practice (see chapter 5, pp. 105-9 on these cases).
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Abortion Actt which decriminalised the operation of some abortions when authorised and 
performed by qualified medical practitioners.
3. THE NEED FOR REFORM
I have argued above that the Abortion Act has been widely represented as a permissive 
measure. Having also given a brief account of the development of the law, I will here argue 
that the aims o f the legislation were not primarily permissive (i.e. the law did not aim to 
provide more space, free from external intervention, where women could exercise sexual and 
reproductive autonomy). I will not attempt to provide a unitary account of the motivations 
of all who sought reform. The Abortion Act represents the outcome of struggles between 
different groups expressing competing interests and opinions. It is important not to deny the 
agency or the vital role of the women’s campaign groups - such as Abortion Law Reform 
Association - who fought for reform. However other factors were also important, and some 
of these have already received some consideration from other writers. In particular, attention 
has been paid to the influence of medical groups (Keown; 1988), the contribution of illegal 
abortions to high figures of maternal mortality, concern and sympathy for the situation of 
women facing unwanted pregnancy, an unequal application of the law (with a thriving private 
sector in the provision of abortion) and the lack of a well organised opposition19. However, 
like much interest group analysis, frequently accounts have posited state and law as neutral 
sites for struggle. Here, I want to achieve a shift of balance or focus between these different 
factors: in particular I want to also introduce consideration of a government interest in 
managing the social problem of abortion, and in bringing under control a situation of 
widespread illegality and de facto female resistance to the law. Below I group the 
motivations for reform which I believe to have been the most important into two major 
categories - factors relating to a) the protection of medical discretion and autonomy and b) 
a desire to bring women out of the backstreets and into contact with their GPs. The former 
of these has already received some attention (see especially Keown; 1988) and so will be 
covered only briefly here. The latter has, I believe, been largely neglected.
19 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) was launched only on 11 
January, 1967 (Lovenduski; 1986; 52).
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a) Protection of Medical Autonomy and Discretion
A first category of concerns which influenced the development of the Abortion Act was the  
desire to entrench and protect medical autonomy and to delineate a space for the exercise o f  
medical discretion. Groups representing the interests o f the medical profession exerted 
considerable influence on the development of tht  Abortion Act (as indeed they have done w ith 
earlier and later abortion legislation)20. Keown notes that none of the major medical bodies 
opposed reform as such, but that the profession was firmly opposed to any reform which 
compromised clinical freedom either by taking the final decision out of the hands of the 
doctor or by specifying the indications for abortion too exactly (1988; 87). In the late 1960s, 
many prominent members of the medical profession were opposed to what they saw as the 
intrusion of the law into the sphere of medical power (i). Moreover, the situation of semi­
legality of many abortions left them in a position of uncertainty with regard to potential 
prosecution (ii). There were also feelings of anger and resentment amongst many that 
whereas some doctors desisted from performing any abortions, their colleagues in the higher 
echelons of the profession collected large fees for doing so (iii).
i) Restriction o f professional autonomy
There had long been resentment within the medical profession that the law should restrict 
their freedom to act in the best interests o f their patients. John Keown (1988) argues that the 
desire to protect professional autonomy was central to the position adopted by the various 
groups. This led medical profession to call for the law to ensure the elimination of abortion 
by untrained and ‘unskilled personnel’21 and to oppose any rigid codification of the 
indications for abortion which might lead patients to expect a right to termination where given 
circumstances were met (see below).
ii) Fear o f prosecution
There seems to have been very little real risk of prosecution of a qualified medical 
practitioner who performed abortions prior to 1967 so long as he/she acted in conformity with
20 Keown (1988) clearly shows this influence on the gradual statutory restriction of laws 
against abortion from 1803 to 1861, the shaping of the Abortion Act and its defence from 
subsequent threat of restriction.
21 See the 1966 report o f the Medical Women’s Federation (Keown; 1988; 95).
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medical procedure (see footnote 18 above). This was especially true after the case of R v 
Bourne had clarified the operation o f the law. As Hindell and Simms (1971; 14) relate, 
however, for the medical profession the law remained both fragile and ambiguous, granting 
only "a tenuous and ill-defined right to induce abortion"22. It was fragile in the sense that 
Bourne seemed to have carried the law far beyond the intention and the letter of the statutes, 
and because this decision was made in a lower court and might have been overruled if a case 
went to appeal. The law was ambiguous in that so much seemed to rest on whether the 
doctor could establish that he/she had terminated a pregnancy in good faith and that it was 
his/her honest opinion that unless he/she had done so the consequences would have been 
grave. Many practitioners remained reluctant to carry out terminations for fear of prosecution 
(Harvard; 1958, Ferris; 1966). Harley Street doctors would take precautions to ‘cover their 
backs’, obtaining a second opinion, normally from a psychiatrist who would testify to the 
effect of continuing a pregnancy on the woman’s mental health. Other less wealthy doctors 
would operate in semi-clandestinity. Their secrecy could be taken as a sign of bad faith and 
it was they who were more open to prosecution. Moreover, doctors were restricted from 
charging those fees they would have liked, given that to demand a very high fee might also 
be taken as a sign of bad faith (Ferris; 1966, Harvard; 1958; 609)23.
iii) *Legal\ private abortions 13
Large numbers of abortions of dubious legality were occurring in the private sector for those 
women who could afford them (Jenkins; 1960, Ferris; 1966, Greenwood and Young; 1976, 
Hindell and Simms; 1971). Francome notes that as long ago as 1880, some doctors were 
carrying out legal abortions on comparatively wide grounds (1986; 18). He estimates that in 
1966, 15,000 pregnancies were terminated in the private sector and 5,700 in the National 
Health Service (1986; 27). In her minority opinion to the Birkett Report, Dorothy Thurtle 
noted that it was not difficult "for any woman of moderate means to find a medical man 
willing to relieve her of an unwelcome pregnancy regardless of the state of her health" (in 
Brookes; 1988; 124). It seems that by the late 1960s, a ‘legal’ termination was available to
22 Royal Medical Association’s memorandum on therapeutic abortion (1966), cited in 
Hordern (1971; 9).
23 R v Newton and Stungo [1958] Crim LR 469; [1958] 1 Brit Med J. 1242.
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any woman who had a certain amount of persistence and the necessary 100 or so guineas to  
pay for one24. This provoked allegations of social inequality in the operation of the law 25. 
For example, introducing his own (failed) attempt to reform the law in 1961, K enneth 
Robinson said:
"[i]t is a perfectly simple matter for anyone who has sufficient money to get a pregnancy 
terminated today by a qualified medical practitioner on the flimsiest of medical grounds...This 
leads in the simplest possible terms to a situation in which there is one law for the rich a n d  
one law for the poor. If there were no other arguments for amending the law, I submit th a t  
is a very powerful one"26.
This perceived social inequality and failure to prosecute senior obstetricians a n d  
gynaecologists who collected large fees for performing terminations, also provoked resentment 
amongst their more junior colleagues. One doctor told the Birkett Committee that "patients 
for whom I have without difficulty refused to evacuate the uterus have had the operation 
performed in London" (Simms; 1980; 1).
b) Bringing W omen From the Backstreets to the G P’s Surgery 
i) Reducing maternal mortality
The major aim of the pressure group most active in pushing for reform seems to have been 
to bring some relief to the suffering of those women who experienced unwanted pregnancy. 
The formation of the Abortion Law Reform Association in 1936 had been provoked by the 
plight of women who had previously faced risky back street abortions, and who had often 
suffered serious physical complications as a result of having them27. Official estimates
24 Although the price could rise even higher than this. Ferris notes that: "where the 
surgeon considers that a woman, her husband or her lover can afford more, the fees go up. 
Hearsay puts them as high as £400 or £500, though the highest I heard anyone admit to w as 
£250 - ‘If they can afford to pay,’ he said, ‘I have no hesitation in jacking up my fee”' (1966; 
103).
25 For example, the telling title of Alice Jenkins’ (1960) book on abortion: Law for the 
Rich.
26 Robinson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 634 Col. 858, 1961 (10 February).
27 For an account of the formation of the ALRA, see Jenkins (1960), Hindell and Simms 
(1971), Greenwood and Young (1976) and Brookes (1988).
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showed that 35-40 women died each year as a result of botched abortions, but unofficial 
sources guessed at a far higher figure28. The partial decriminalisation o f abortion was thus 
an essential step in the progression towards a more enlightened, humane and sympathetic 
approach to the situation of women facing unwanted pregnancy and a recognition that, in 
certain circumstances, it is cruel and unreasonable to expect women to carry such a pregnancy 
to term. The Parliamentary debates preceding the introduction of the 1967 Act are littered 
with tragic examples of women who have died either during illegal abortions or as a result 
of being forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy, and who leave families behind them.
A particularly distressing account is given by Lena Jeger MP, who relates the story of an 
"honest young woman" who was refused a termination on the grounds that "she did not seem 
quite depressed enough". Forced to continue with the pregnancy, the woman’s depression 
following the birth of the child was so great that she killed it. She was sent to Holloway 
prison, and her other five children were put into care29. The desire to improve the situation 
of women facing unwanted pregnancy was not translated into a desire to give women greater 
autonomy, however. Rather, as is shown in the next chapter, these women were not seen as 
sufficiently stable or rational to make important reproductive decisions. Whilst the reformers 
believed that women seeking abortion had been wrongly stigmatised as criminals, they 
represented them as victims who needed help and guidance (see chapter 3).
The difficulty of legally terminating a pregnancy was implicated in the sustaining of high 
maternal mortality figures, which had consistently refused to improve in line with other health 
statistics. Indeed, by 1966 illegal abortion had become the chief cause of avoidable maternal 
death (Brookes; 1988; 133, Oakley; 1984) at a time when four women in a thousand died for 
reasons relating to maternity (Jenkins; 1960; 47). According to Mason (1990; 105), 
pathologists of the period taught that in cases of the unexpected death of a young woman,
28 Ferris reports the official annual death rate but argues that many death certificates were 
disguised to conceal abortions in order to protect the good name of the family (1966; 73-5). 
The Birkett Committee quoted figures of 411-605 deaths per year associated with abortion 
(this also includes non-criminal terminations). Dickens puts the number of deaths from 
criminal abortions in excess of 200 per year (Dickens; 1966; 113) and Williams hints at a still 
higher figure (1958; 194).
29 Jeger, H.C. Deb, Vol. 749, Col. 977-8, 1967 (29 June). Other examples will be found 
in the following chapter.
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pregnancy should be suspected until its existence was positively disproved30. Recognition 
of this problem was not new to the 1960s. As long ago as 1935, the first woman MP, L ad y  
Astor, had told the House of Commons that: "a high percentage of maternal mortality is d u e  
to attempted abortion...We, as a House of Commons and as a Nation, must face up to that fa c t 
today'* (Simms; 1980; i). An influential paper, published in the same year, reached the sam e 
conclusion:
"[ajbortion is increasing in frequency, and the chief factor responsible for subsequent 
morbidity and mortality is illegal interference with pregnancy, the interference being usually 
determined by poverty. The law has failed to prevent the self-induction of abortion, and th e  
problem, which is one of preventive medicine, must be reviewed from this aspect, 
consideration being given to the changed economic and social conditions of the present day" 
(Parish; in Simms; 1981; 175).
It was these same concerns for maternal mortality which had led to the establishment of the  
Birkett Committee in 1939. Its brief was:
"to inquire into the prevalence of abortion and the present law relating thereto and to consider 
what steps can be taken by more effective enforcement of the law or otherwise to secure the  
reduction of maternal mortality and morbidity arising from this cause" (Brookes; 1988; 
105)31.
ii) The threat to the family
The related threat to the family was another powerful argument for reform. Many examples 
are given in the Parliamentary Debates of cases where the family had suffered as a result o f  
losing the wife/mother who was its central focus and binding force. The abortion reformer, 
Joan Malleson wrote:
"it happens that with the invalidism or death of these mothers, the family disintegrates; for 
around their health and their capacity to tend the children the whole home revolves: and 
therefore these mothers are the very last who should be permitted to jeopardize their well-
30 Likewise, Francome relates that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, women o f  
childbearing age were routinely examined for a blue line on the gums which was indicative 
of lead poisoning (1984; 33, 1986; 19).
31 This followed directly from the 1937 Report on Maternal Mortality which had 
recommended the further study of various subjects including "abortion with special reference 
to the influence which it may exert on maternal mortality and morbidity and future 
childbearing" (Brookes; 1988; 105).
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being" (1938, cited in Jenkins; 1960; 37).
This loss of mother/wife might result from the woman’s death following unsafe, illegal 
abortion. It also might result from the suicide of the woman faced with an unwanted 
pregnancy (Jenkins; 1960; 76-7)32. Equally, the effective ‘loss’ of the mother might be 
caused by the additional strain which she faced in having another child - particularly a 
disabled one (see chapter 3, p. 56). The thalidomide tragedies of the early 1960s had 
contributed to the creation of a greater public sympathy for women seeking abortion. As Dr. 
John Dunwoody told Parliament:
"my belief is that in many cases today where we have over-large families the mother is so 
broken down physically and emotionally with the continual bearing of children that it 
becomes quite impossible for her to fulfill her real function, her worthwhile function as a 
mother, of holding together the family unit, so that all too often the family breaks apart, and 
it is for this reason that we have so many problem families in many parts of the country"33.
David Owen outlines the same problem - the woman facing an unwanted pregnancy is
"in total misery, and could be precipitated into a depression deep and lasting. What happens 
to that woman when she gets depressed? She is incapable o f looking after those children, so 
she retires into a shell of herself and loses all feeling, all her drive and affection"34.
iii) Back street abortions: a consistent flouting o f the law
Dickens concludes his (1966) book on abortion and the law with the assertion that: "the 
present law drives abortion into the most undesirable and dangerous channels, without 
eliminating it" (Dickens; 1966; 165). This is symptomatic of the widespread agreement which 
had been reached by the late 1960s, that the regulation of abortion was a failure. This was 
not measured entirely - or even primarily - in humanitarian terms, but rather in functionalist 
ones: the regulation was unpopular, ineffective and constantly flouted. As such, an important 
reason which was advanced for the partial décriminalisation of abortion in the UK was the 
need to take control of a situation where "the administration of the law has broken down
32 In the House of Lords Debates, Lord Strange argues that "nearly every woman in this 
condition [of unwanted pregnancy] would be in a state bordering on suicide." (Strange, H.L. 
Deb. Vol. 277, Col. 1235, 1966 (23 October).
33 H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Cols. 1098-9, 1966 (22 July).
34 Owen, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1115, 1966 (22 July).
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[and] it is neither respected nor obeyed"35. The Birkett Committee had reported in 1939 
that: "[w]e are satisfied that the law in this matter is freely disregarded among women of all 
types and classes." Speaking thirty years later to the House of Commons, Roy Jenkins, then  
Home Secretary, was in agreement. He argued that the present regulation was unable to deal 
with the problem. A décriminalisation would serve to bring unwanted pregnancy and abortion 
within the ambit of a medical control, where it might thus be more effectively monitored:
"the existing law on abortion is uncertain and is also, and perhaps more importantly, harsh 
and archaic and...is in urgent need o f reform...How can anyone believe otherwise when 
perhaps as many as 100,000 illegal operations per year take place, that the present law has 
shown itself quite unable to deal with the problem?...the law is consistently flouted by those 
who have the means to do so...it causes many otherwise thoroughly law-abiding citizens to  
act on the fringe, or perhaps on the wrong side of the law. As the Minister responsible fo r 
law enforcement, I believe that to be a thoroughly bad thing"36.
Illegal backstreet abortions were certainly not a new phenomenon. The British Medical 
Journal had reported in 1868 that in
"the more infamous quarters of London...clues...have been offered to us by persons who have 
reason to believe that, among the more abandoned classes of women, there exists a secret 
understanding as to the persons and places where abortion is practised as a daily trade" (in 
Francome; 1986; 16).
However, media reporting and the growth in public awareness had made it increasingly hard 
to ignore the occurrence of widespread illegal abortions. It was impossible to judge 
accurately how many illegal abortions per year were performed, but estimates ranged from
10,000 to 250,000 (Dickens; 1966; 73)37. Indeed, according to Jane Lewis, working class 
women viewed abortion as a natural and permissible strategy (1984; 17). The Birkett 
Committee found that
"many mothers seemed not to understand that self-induced abortion was illegal. They 
assumed it was legal before the third month, and only outside the law when procured by
35 McNamara, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1124, 1966 (22 July).
36 Jenkins, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Cols. 1141-2, 1966 (22 July).
37 The Birkett committee estimated 54,000 p.a. (Jenkins; 1960; 33), Hordern (1971; 2) 
says 120,000-175,000.
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another person" (cited in Lewis; 1984; 17).
Prosecutions for illegal abortions represented just the very tip of this iceberg38, with 
convictions numbering an average of around 50 per year (Williams; 1958; 192). The practice 
of prosecuting only the abortionist and not the pregnant woman was long established 
(Williams; 1958; 146)39. As with all ‘victimless crimes’, offences were hard to detect. The 
police were largely tolerant of the activities of abortionists unless they were forced to act - 
for example, if a woman died during or following an abortion (Simms; 1980; 5) or where she 
was brought to the hospital with serious complications such as a septic abortion or perforated 
uterus. From their point of view, abortion cases were time consuming and awkward, since 
the pregnant woman, who was generally required as a witness, was naturally reluctant to bring 
evidence against the abortionist who had relieved her of an unwanted pregnancy (Hindell and 
Simms; 1971; 37, Brookes; 1988; 133, Jenkins; 1960; 33-4). As one police officer related:
"it is gratitude to the person who has relieved them of an unwanted burden that keeps the 
victims of abortion silent. For this type of help, gratitude wells up in the heart to subdue 
every other sense. Even when dying they hug their secret gratefully, refusing to divulge the 
name of the person who has brought them to this impasse" (Williams; 1958; 190).
Moreover, the public were often unwilling to help with enquiries. David Steel, introducing 
the Abortion Act, gives the example of a 24 year old woman found dying in a North London 
street following an illegal abortion. He quotes from the Evening Standard:
.1 ' H
"[a]fter hearing from the police that they had been unable to find out where the abortion took 
place, the St. Pancras coroner said: *We are up against a blank wall of unwillingness to know 
and unwillingness to talk’".
Ferris cites several interviews with police officers who spoke of their reluctance to prosecute 
abortionists: one superintendent told him: "we know there’s lots going on, but we don’t
31
38 There were 62 prosecutions for illegal abortions in England and Wales in 1966, 28 of 
which resulted in prison sentences (Mason; 1990; 105) and 71 in 1967 (Cavadino; 1976; 63). 
As Glanville Williams (1958) points out, this represents less than one prosecution for every
1,000 criminal abortions.
39 See the case of R v Mills [1963] 1 QBD 522, [1963] 1 All ER 202, following R v 
Scully (1903) 23 NZLR 380. See also the case of Peake (1932) 97 JPN 353.
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prosecute unless w e’re forced to" (1966; 92). Ben Whitaker in his (1964) book, The P o lic e  
writes of the same phenomenon:
"some police, particularly in poorer areas, have a certain amount of sympathy for the a ltru is tic  
abortionist, and tend to ignore his activities unless some tragedy or trouble occurs" (D ick en s; 
1966; 77).
In the rare cases where charges were brought juries were unwilling to convict, probably a s  
a result o f popular sympathy with the plight of the woman.
Many of the backstreet abortionists commanded huge popular support, especially where th e y  
were known to have acted through sympathy for the woman rather than for pecuniary re a so n s  
(Ferris; 1966; 88, Simms; 1981; 179, Brookes; 1988; 140). Simms reports that the fu n e ra l 
of a well known abortionist, Dr Daniel Powell of Tooting was attended by women from a ll  
parts of the country. When Dr Powell had been prosecuted, his patients had collected th e  
money for his defence. One detective who had been on his trail for some years, said: "he w a s  
a great hearted and fearless man whose work was directed by the highest motives" (S im m s; 
1981; 173-4). Hindell and Simms (1971; 38-9) likewise relate the case of William T e lla m , 
who was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for carrying out illegal abortions in h is  
surgery. Instead of being regarded as a villain, Tellam was a kind of hero figure, a n d  
eighteen thousand people signed a petition asking for clemency in his case. Dora R usse ll, 
founder o f the Abortion Law Reform Association, wrote of his prosecution in The Guardian 
that:
"[o]ur inhuman and obsolete law against abortion has now claimed a fresh victim in one o f  
the best and ablest medical men practising in Penzance...It is tragic that even a sk ille d  
practitioner who comes to the help of women pregnant and desperate, is liable to disgrace a n d  
punishment" (Hindell and Simms; 1971; 39).
Brookes reports several other cases where patients collected petitions in support of d o c to rs  
convicted for performing abortions40.
40 10,000 patients signed in support of Dr Sumatapalage Gunewardene; 2,739 in support 
of Dr Charles Bikitsha; and 1,100 for Dr Hanratty (Brookes; 1988; 140-1).
33
In such a climate o f mass illegality and popular resistance to enforcement of the law, a partial 
and controlled decriminalisation of abortion had much support in Parliament. Even the 
staunchest opponents of the abortion agreed that some kind of reform was needed41. No 
doubt this was inspired in part by compassion for the plight of the woman, but more 
important was the clear need to bring this situation of widespread illegality and de facto 
female resistance under control. Steel, in introducing the second reading of his Bill, 
emphasised that: ”[w]e want to stamp out the back street abortions, but it is not the intention 
of the Promoters of the Bill to leave a wide open door for abortion on request"42. The 
Abortion Act aimed to abolish backstreet abortion by granting registered medical practitioners 
a legal monopoly on the termination of pregnancy (Keown; 1988; 159). This would install 
the medical profession as the gatekeepers or ‘parallel judges* who could grant or refuse access 
to termination according to how deserving an individual case was felt to be. Importantly, it 
would also enable abortion to be located in hospitals where it could be monitored, and make 
possible a system of registration whereby details of the woman and the reasons for allowing 
her abortion could be registered. Moreover, to decriminalise abortion in controlled 
circumstances would make it visible and enable its incidence to be mapped. ‘Liberalisation’ 
was thus proposed and accepted (at least in part) to bring under control a situation of mass 
illegality, and to ensure that the incidence of abortion might be more closely monitored.
4. THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF REFORM
The model of legislation adopted in the Abortion Act clearly reflects those aims which are 
discussed above. Tht  Abortion Act would a) permit women seeking termination to be brought 
under a closer medical control, b) safeguard medical autonomy and discretion, and at the 
same time c) render abortion visible and enable it to be monitored and mapped by way of a 
system of registration, and provisions regulating where terminations might be performed.
41 See Wells, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1080,1966 (22 July); Deedes, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, 
Col. 1091, 1966 (22 July); Hobson H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1132, 1966 (22 July); Braine,
H.C. Deb. Voi. 747, Col. 455, 1967 (2 June).
42 Steel, H.C. Deb Voi. 732, Col. 1075, 1966 (22 July).
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a) Bringing women under medical control
The Abortion Act is fundamentally underpinned by the idea that reproduction is an area f o r  
medical control and expertise and that the doctor is the most appropriate expert to deal w ith  
abortion. This reflects not merely a belief in his/her technical expertise, but also the notion 
that the doctor is in the best position to observe the woman, assess her needs and interests, 
and take charge o f  her situation (see chapter 4). Moreover, the doctor is seen as taking o n  
many of the pastoral functions previously associated with the priest: he is a guardian of th e  
social body and a bastion of moral values43. Peter Mahon M.P. reminds the House o f  
Commons that: "it would be as well if we applauded the work of some of these men to keep  
our homes and families and the country right"44. The Abortion Act accords clear m oral 
authority to the doctor, in that it is he/she who has the final decision regarding abortion. 
There is nothing commonsensical about the decision to grant such power to doctors (medical 
experts), when one remembers that the vast majority of abortions are desired for social rather 
than medical reasons. The power given to doctors here far exceeds that which would accrue 
merely on the basis of a technical expertise.
A very clear construction of the typical doctor appears within the debates which, as will b e  
seen in the next chapter, stands in strong contrast to the figure of the pregnant woman. T h e  
doctor is a male figure45 who is perceived as the epitome o f maturity, common sense46,
4 3 Th is function of the doctor as a source of moral authority is detailed by Foucault in 
both Madness and Civilisation and Birth o f the Clinic. In the former he notes that the 
introduction of the doctor into the asylum was based more on his moral authority than on his 
medical knowledge: "his absolute authority in the world of the asylum...insofar as, from the 
beginning, he was Father and Judge, Family and Law - his medical practice being for a long 
time no more than a complement to the old rites of Order, Authority and Punishment" (1989a; 
272, see also 1980d).
44 Mahon, H.C. Deb. Vol. 747, Col. 502, 1967 (2 June).
45 Doctors are referred to as "medical men", "professional medical gentlemen" and 
"professional men". They are always referred to as "he" within the 1966-7 debates. William 
Deedes notes that "the medical profession comprises a great diversity of men" Deedes, H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1092,1966 (22 July); and Jill Knight says that "the GP is a skilled man"
H.C. Deb. Vol. 747, Col. 482,1967 (2 June) See also, Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 931, 
1967 (29 June). Jenkin, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 967, 1967 (29 June); Hobson, H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 747, Col. 531, 1967 (2 June); Hogg, H.C. Deb. Vol. 747, Col. 946, 1967 (2 June).
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responsibility and professionalism. He is a "highly skilled and dedicated"46 7, "sensitive, 
sympathetic”48 member of a "high and proud profession"49, which acts "with its own ethical 
and medical standards"50 displaying "skill, judgement and knowledge"51.
It was hoped that mere contact with this responsible and reassuringly male figure might 
dissuade the woman from seeking to terminate a pregnancy - the need for an abortion often 
being posited here as a direct consequence of her own hysteria and derangement, rather than 
a rational decision reflecting a reasoned assessment of her concrete situation. The rule of the 
doctor would be one of responsible control52. This point is made repeatedly in the 
Parliamentary Debates, for example in my opening citation from the Bill’s sponsor, David 
Steel: "if we can manage to get a girl such as that into the hands of the medical profession, 
the Bill is succeeding in its objective"53. Steel picks up on this same argument in the 
Parliamentary debates at the time of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), where 
he relates that doctors have told him that they now have the chance to see women before they 
abort and to discourage them from doing so. One told him that:
"[o]ne of the effects of the 1967 legislation has been that people will come to his surgery and 
discuss abortion with him, whereas pre-1967 they would not have done so and he would have 
lost control of what was happening, and the patient might have ended up with a back-street 
abortion or going into a private clinic"54.
46 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 747, Col. 463, 1967 (2 June)
47 Mahon, H.C. Deb. Voi. 750, Col. 1352, 1967 (13 July)
48 Raglan, H.L. Deb. Voi. 274, Col. 591, 1966 (10 May)
49 Lyons, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1090, 1966 (22 July)
50 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 747, Col. 464, 1967 (2 June).
51 Hobson, H.C. Deb. Vol.747, Col. 531, 1967 (2 June).
52 For example, Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1076, 1966 (22 July); H.C. Deb. Voi. 
750, Col. 1348, 1967 (13 July); Owen, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1116, 1966 (22 July); 
Dunwoody, H .C  Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1096, 1966 (22 July).
53 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 750, Col. 1349, 1967 (13 July).
54 Steel, H.C.Deb. Voi. 171, Col. 210, 1990 (24 April).
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David Owen echoes the same sentiment later in the 1966-7 debates, noting that:
”[i]f we allow abortion to become lawful under certain conditions, a woman will go to h e r  
doctor and discuss with him the problems which arise...he may well be able to offer th a t 
support which is necessary for her to continue to full term and successfully to have a  
child"55.
The same argument also arises in the academic literature, with Glanville Williams asserting 
that:
"[a]n important medical result of legalizing abortion would be that it would enable the patient 
to take proper professional advice. It is, of course, always open to a doctor to dissuade h is 
patient from the operation by pointing out any harmful effects that he thinks it may have" 
(1958; 203-4)56.
The Abortion Act would serve to get women into the hands of the medical profession, w ho 
can take control of the situation.
b) Medical Autonomy
The law aims to protect medical autonomy and discretion rather than to grant substantive 
rights to the woman, even where she is in the most extreme circumstances envisaged by the 
reformers. The severely depressed mother of five, described by Lena Jeger (see p. 27 above), 
still would have no right to a termination. Rather, the regime introduced by the Abortion Act 
offers the qualified doctor (and only derivatively his/her patient) a valid defence against the 
Offences Against the Person Act for certain terminations, where these have been medically 
authorised and performed57. This is important in that the law serves to grant woman and
55 H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1116, 1966 (22 July). See also Steel; H.C.Deb. Vol. 732 
Col. 1076, 1966 (22 July). Bernard Dickens makes the same point as an argument for reform 
(1966; 133).
56 Compare this also with the remarks of Simone Veil, opening the debates which 
preceded the legalisation of abortion in France: "[although the bill before you takes into 
account an existing state of affairs, although it allows the possibility of termination o f  
pregnancy, this is the better to control it and, as far as possible, to dissuade women from it" 
(Allison; 1994; 231).
57 Thus, s .l( l)  provides that "a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law 
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two 
registered medical practitioners are of the opinion formed in good faith" [that certain
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doctor together some rights against the state, but grants the woman no right to privacy or 
autonomy vis-à-vis the doctor. The décriminalisation of abortion entrenched the doctors* 
control of abortion and marked the legal recognition of the era of the doctor as the ‘parallel 
judge* who could exercise power more quickly and effectively than a state-centred apparatus.
The clear desire to avoid giving any substantive rights to women is most clearly illustrated 
by the debates centring around whether the Abortion Act should carry a ‘social clause* 
(whereby the need for abortion might be established with regard to socio-economic factors), 
and a clause allowing abortion in case of rape or incest. Steel’s original Medical Termination 
o f Pregnancy Bill did carry such clauses, clause 1(c) allowing doctors to authorise abortion 
where: "the pregnant woman’s capacity as a mother will be severely overstrained by the care 
of a child or of another child as the case may be" and clause 1(d) where "the pregnant 
woman is a defective or became pregnant while under the age of sixteen or became pregnant 
as a result of rape".
These clauses were, however, opposed by all of the major medical bodies, who felt that 
women might interpret them to mean they had a right to demand abortions where the 
circumstances outlined were met (Keown; 1988; 87). For example, the Royal Medico- 
Psychological Association warned that:
"[sjpelling out in detail when a doctor should or should not have the right to induce abortion, 
even if the legislation is cast in permissive terms, would have the effect of introducing an 
element of coercion in the sense that in each defined situation the patient might reasonably 
expect the doctor to acquiesce and the role of the surgeon or gynaecologist would be reduced 
that of a technician carrying out an objectionable task" (Keown; 1988; 89)58.
As a result of pressure from medical groups, the two clauses were subsequently removed.
conditions are fulfilled].
58 See Keown (1988) for the same objections from all the other major medical bodies: the 
British Medical Association (90); the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (93); 
and the Medical Women’s Federation (95). That a doctor should not be forced to cany out 
a termination when he/she does not wish to do so is also enshrined in s4 of the Abortion Act 
which provides for the possibility of conscientious objection to providing treatment under the 
Abortion Act except when the operation is necessary to save the woman’s life or to prevent 
grave, permanent injury to her health.
It was argued that in case of rape or incest, abortion would already be available under o th e r  
provisions, notably the risk to the woman’s mental health. To remove the clause would m e a n  
that women would not feel they had an automatic right to termination in these circum stances, 
and would minimise the risk of their fabricating stories o f rape in order to qualify f o r  
abortion59. Hindell and Simms comment:
"David Steel, the medical profession, and the Government were propounding the view th a t  
the law must not be made too clear lest the public read it and began to demand their righ ts. 
Much better to leave it vague and fuzzy so that doctors would have total discretion in th e  
matter of abortion and so that patients would be unable to argue" (1971; 185).
The social clause was likewise removed and was replaced with a wording which, w h ils t 
allowing social and economic factors to be taken into account, made it absolutely clear th a t  
they should be evaluated by the doctor and not the woman herself. Thus, under s.l(2), th e  
doctor is now authorised in determining whether continuance of pregnancy would involve 
such risks to life or to mental and physical health as are specified in s .l( l)  to take account 
"of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment"60. This ensures th a t 
socio-economic factors are assessed only in so far as they are subject to assessment by a  
doctor and that the doctor, rather than the woman herself, thus remains the ultimate ju d g e  
even with regard to such factors.
c) The possibility to m onitor the incidence of abortion: notification and regulation o f  
premises where term inations might be perform ed
Another perceived advantage to the strict medical control was that abortion might be m ade 
more visible and hence more easily monitored and controlled. S.l(3) of the Abortion A c t
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59 The idea that the women might fabricate charges is put forward several times in the  
Parliamentary Debates (see chapter 3, pp. 60-2), and also in the Bukett Report which 
suggested that in a great number of cases, "girls and women made the allegation of rape 
falsely" (Brookes; 1988; 117).
60 Compare this to the formula put forward by the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists (RCOG) who suggested that the law might also provide that the practitioner 
could take into account such circumstances, whether past, present or prospective as were in 
the doctor’s opinion relevant to the physical or mental health of the woman or of the child 
if born (Keown; 1988; 92) and the joint report of the RCOG and British Medical Association 
which argued for a subclause which had almost exactly this wording (Keown; 1988; 97).
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provides that any treatment for the termination of pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital 
vested in the Minister of Health or the Secretary of state, or in a place approved by either for 
the purposes of the.section61. Henceforward, abortions would be performed only in hospitals 
or specially licensed premises. The Abortion Act also paves the way for a system where 
doctors might be made responsible for notifying the performance of abortions, so that their 
incidence might be better measured and recorded. Under s.2, there is a duty for the Minister 
of Health (or the Secretary of state for Scotland) to ensure that any practitioner who 
terminates a pregnancy must provide to the Ministry of Health (or Scottish Home and Health 
Department) "such notice of the termination and such other information relating to the 
termination as may be so prescribed". Under s.4(l) of the Abortion Regulations62, the 
operating practitioner is required to notify the abortion to the Chief Medical Officer, within 
seven days. This makes possible the yearly publication of statistics by the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), recording the number of abortions, reasons for 
performing them, the number of foreign women having abortions in the UK, the method of 
abortion, the number of weeks of gestation, whether women are married or single, how many 
children they have already, whether the abortions are performed on the NHS or in private 
clinics etc. Moreover, these statistics enable comparisons with similar foreign data. A ‘dark 
mass’ of unknowable female criminality is brought into the open and isolated in the bodies 
of individual women where it can be contained and controlled. The problem of abortion is 
changed from one of widespread and unquantifiable deviance, to one of isolated, identifiable 
and treatable individual deviants (see chapter 3).
5. CONCLUSIONS
'7 don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of 
power> and hence the analysis that must be made of them necessarily extend beyond the limits
61 S.l(4) provides that this restriction shall not apply when a registered medical 
practitioner is of the opinion, formed in good faith that termination is immediately necessary 
to save the life, or to prevent grave, permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman. S.l(3) was amended in 1990 to allow the relevant authorities to approve 
simultaneously a "class of places" for the performance of terminations where performed 
primarily by the use of medicines.
62 S.I. 1968 no 390, issued the same day as the Abortion Act came into force.
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o / i/ie state...because the state for all the omnipotence o f its apparatuses, is far from being 
able to occupy the whole field o f actual power relations, and further because the state can 
only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is 
superstructural in relation to a whole series o f power networks that invest the body, sexuality, 
the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth.” (Foucault; 1980c; 122).
In this chapter, I have marked a shift in the modality of state attempts to bring w om en 
seeking to terminate pregnancies under control. Here focusing on the aims of the Abortion 
Act, I have taken issue with the common representation o f that law as an essentially 
permissive measure which envisages a loosening of power over abortion, reproduction and  
(women’s) sexuality. In such a light, the Abortion Act has been seen as both interpretative 
and constitutive of the development of a private sphere where sex may be enjoyed free from  
public interference and regardless of the (lack of) procreative intention of the participants. 
I have challenged this representation in arguing that whilst the Abortion Act has undoubtedly 
facilitated women’s access to safer, legal terminations, it also represented a new way o f  
striving to reach a certain social and political end: notably to increase control over a situation 
of widespread illegality by implementing a more subtle deployment of power over women and 
a more efficient way of managing this ‘private sphere’ of sexuality. Women’s sexuality has 
in one sense been rendered more, not less, visible by the passing of the Abortion Act: in that 
their ‘private’ sphere of action is now open to extensive examination by doctors (as will be 
seen in chapter 4).
The problematisation of the connection between seemingly humanising reform and a 
loosening of power which has underpinned this chapter owes a debt to the work of Michel 
Foucault which I outlined in my introduction. Foucault has written that the reduction in penal 
severity in the last 200 years has long been regarded in an overall way as a quantitative 
phenomenon: "less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect, more ‘humanity’" (1991; 
16). He argues, however, that these changes are also qualitative in nature, representing a new 
- more efficient - strategy in the deployment of power. Foucault’s (1979a) work on 
‘governmentality’ details the emergence of ‘the population’ as the new target of government. 
This ushered in social welfare policies and new forms of control aiming less at sporadic and 
spectacular interventions, and more at a fine and continuous surveillance and modification. 
In this light, the Abortion Act can be seen as part of a shift in political rationality in the 1950s 
and 1960s, with reforming legislation reconstructing modes of control. An important aspect
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of the modem era, for Foucault, is the proliferation o f small-scale ‘legal* systems and 
"parallel judges" - of psychiatric and psychological experts, doctors, educationalists and 
members of the prison service - all fragmenting and sharing in the power to punish (1991; 
21).
It is my contention that the passing and subsequent operation of the Abortion Act can be 
viewed as part of this process. The Abortion Act undoubtedly served in one way to lessen 
a particular modality of direct state control over abortion, by taking certain terminations out 
of the ambit o f control of the criminal courts63. However, in the same process, indirect 
(medical) control was greatly enhanced and power was extended over the woman’s ‘private’ 
sphere of action. Through the Abortion Act, the doctors, as ‘parallel judges’, are officially 
accorded the power to judge the woman and then to decide whether she should have the 
possibility of an abortion, or whether she should be denied relief and made to face the 
‘punishment’ of being forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy. Within the regulations 
introduced by the Abortion Act, women are decriminalised in order to be pathologised64, to 
be judged not by the judiciary but by the ‘parallel judges’ of the medical profession. The 
partial décriminalisation of abortion corresponded with a finer deployment of power by way 
of a colonisation of existing lines o f medical control and a legitimation, entrenchment and 
extension of those lines. Further, there is an attempt to make use of these lines, by way of 
the notification procedure and the control of premises, to monitor the incidence of abortion65.
How far then is the Abortion Act a ‘permissive’ law? And, recalling Disraeli’s words that
63 Although, as has been seen above, attempts to prevent or control abortions by way of 
the criminal law had proved a visible failure.
64 See the following chapter for some examples of the way in which the figure of the 
woman seeking abortion is ‘pathologised’ and constructed as in need of medical control.
65 In terms of the effects of the legislation, it will be seen in subsequent chapters that this 
attempted colonisation of medical lines of control was in many ways unsuccessful. It seems 
likely that the notification procedure is not always taken seriously by doctors with significant 
under reporting of abortions performed, see Walsworth-Bell (1992) and Abortion Review, 
Winter 1992, no. 46. In particular, the judiciary are largely unwilling to police medical action 
under the 1967 Act (see chapter 5).
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"permissive legislation is the characteristic o f a free people", how far does it symbolise a new  
degree of freedom for women? There can be no doubt that the Abortion Act is a piece o f  
permissive legislation if "permissive" is interpreted to mean the carving out of a sphere o f  
freedom from direct and repressive criminal law controls. In this sense the Abortion A ct 
partially fits within the first part o f the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition: "having the  
quality of permitting or giving permission; that allows something to be done or to happen; 
not forbidding or hindering". The Abortion Act is thus permissive in providing doctors (and 
derivatively women) with the possibility to terminate a pregnancy without fear of prosecution. 
It does not permit women to terminate a pregnancy, however, rather it allows them to  
approach doctors to request such permission. Fitting the Abortion Act into the second part 
of the definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary is still more problematic: "in modern 
use freq.: tolerant, liberal, allowing freedom, spec, in sexual matters". The question which 
is then raised is how far and in what sense the Abortion Act gives women freedom in sexual 
(and I would add in reproductive) matters? This in turn raises a more fundamental question: 
what do we mean by freedom? Is freedom just the space left by the absence of restrictive 
criminal controls? The more expansive definition of power which I outlined in the 
introduction would imply an answer in the negative. It would point to the would need to take 
account of medical power over women within the ‘private’ sphere, and hence necessitate a 
closer analysis of the possible deployments of power at this level (as will be provided in 
chapter 4). If the Abortion Act is seen as representing not a lessening of control, but rather 
a shift in the modalities of control towards a finer means of deploying power, the kind o f  
freedom which women can exercise under it becomes more problematic, and in need o f  
further analysis.
CHAPTER 3: THE ABORTION ACT (1967) 
AND ITS ‘PERIPHERAL SUBJECT’
"ƒ believe that we must attempt to study the myriad o f bodies which are constituted as 
peripheral subjects as a result of power"1.
"There are women who suffer from illnesses, which...will..make her less able to bear the 
burdens of motherhood...There is the case of the woman who is in prison, serving a long term 
commencing between the beginning of the pregnancy and the time at which she will give 
birth. Obviously that woman is inadequate to be a mother of a child. There is the persistent 
offender, or the shop-lifter, and there is the mother who has in the past been found guilty of 
neglecting or ill-treatment of her existing children. These are some of the cases I have in 
mind. There is the drug taker or the alcoholic. I am sure the right reverend Prelate (the 
Bishop of Exeter) would not suggest that such a mother is a fit person to be in charge of 
children. There is the woman who already has a large family, perhaps six or seven 
children...There is the question of the woman who loses her husband during pregnancy and 
has to go out to work, and obviously cannot bear the strain of doing a full day’s work, and 
looking after a child. There is the woman whose husband is a drunkard or a ne 'er-do-well, 
or is in prison serving a long term, and she has to go to work. These are the cases I  have 
in mind”2.
1 Michel Foucault (1980b; 98).




In the previous chapter I argued that it is mistaken to view the 1967 Abortion Act as a w holly 
permissive piece of legislation, a lessening of control over women’s sexuality and fertility.
I suggested that it should rather be viewed within the terms of the movement towards 
governmentality described by Michel Foucault (1979). The Abortion Act was revealed as  
motivated, inter alia, by the state’s desire to take control of a situation of widespread illegality 
and to ‘manage’ the problem of unwanted pregnancy more efficiently. In this sense th e  
Abortion Act stood as an official recognition that abortion should be removed from the am bit 
of repressive criminal prohibition and relocated in the sphere of medical control. T h e  
modality of control adopted reflects certain assumptions of the nature of the deviance (and  
deviants) to be regulated: within this shift, I suggested, women seeking termination w ere 
decriminalised in order to be pathologised. In this chapter, this idea will be developed. M y 
concern will be to ‘flesh out’ the subject who is to be regulated through legislation dealing 
with abortion, to analyse how she has been constructed within law and how this construction 
serves to legitimate and perpetuate a certain model of control. This will serve to emphasise 
that although it is useful to locate Abortion Act within this general movement towards 
governmentality, it cannot be adequately understood without consideration of gender, a s  
clearly gendered constructions of the subject to be regulated (the woman seeking abortion) 
underpin the model of reform adopted.
Foucault has written that the individual is both an effect of power and an element of its  
articulation:
"[t]he individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a  
multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to  
strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prim e 
effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, com e 
to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vrs-d-vzs o f  
power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at 
the same time, or precisely to the extent of which it is that effect, it is the element of its 
articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" 
(1980b; 98).
The various discourses around the problem o f unwanted pregnancy (of which the law is one) 
have operated to construct a particular female subjectivity for the woman seeking termination
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which stands both as an instance of power (the production of a ‘true’ account o f her nature), 
and as a site for its exercise. This subjectivity is dynamic - the construction of the woman 
who would seek to terminate a pregnancy has not remained constant. Here, I will argue that 
the Abortion Act is clearly predicated upon a particular understanding of the nature of the 
woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy. It is one frozen moment in the development o f this 
subjectivity, and one which continues to have important effect today.
In analysing the way that the female subject is constructed in law, I concentrate on the 
debates leading to the introduction of the 1967 Act, as played out in Parliament. It is beyond 
the scope of this work to expiore the exact relationship between the content of Parliamentary 
debates, and the final text of a debated statute. To say that the law is the product of debate 
within Parliament is obviously simplistic, not least because any new bill is presented in draft 
form before ever coming under discussion (the text of the Abortion Act derives in large part 
from David Steel’s original draft of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill). Neither do 
1 seek to deny the impact of extra-Parliamentary groups - and in particular in this case, the 
Abortion Law Reform Association and the medical profession - on the formulation of statute. 
That this influence was considerable should be clear from the previous chapter. Rather, I 
content myself with a minimum assertion, that Parliamentary debates are in some way 
indicative of the predominant social discourses around the concept of woman which form the 
context within which the Abortion Act was conceived, and a slightly more ambitious 
suspicion, that more than this, the statements made by M.P.S in this context provide 
particularly important and powerful "telling instances" of this social and political discourse 
(Fitzpatrick; 1987; 120).
In this more ambitious sense, it seems to me that Parliament provides a particularly significant 
arena for debate. This is not merely because of the inevitable relationship between the 
debates and the formulation of statute. Further, what is especially significant about 
Parliamentary debates is that speakers are inevitably particularly aware that what they say 
(especially on a topic of popular interest such as abortion) will be recorded, read and maybe 
even reported in newspapers. As such, there is every incentive to speak to the spirit o f the 
times, to try to tap into and give voice to a broader popular morality. For example, I do not 
believe that all of those active in the debates shared the vision of those women seeking
1 UBUUUW
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abortion as somehow deviant and aberrant which I will discuss below. Madeleine Simms was 
a founding member of the Abortion Law Reform Association, which spearheaded the 
campaign for the décriminalisation of abortion. In 1971, in a book coauthored with Keith 
Hindell, she notes that the reformers did consider the situation of the ordinary woman who 
simply did not want to give birth, and that one wing of the reform movement did feel there 
was a need for abortion for all on request. They acknowledged, however, that politically this 
idea was far too radical to gain public acceptance and parliamentary approval. It was obvious 
throughout the reform campaign that they would only be able to carry the country with them 
if they concentrated on the hard cases (1971; 25)3. It seems to me that this gap between 
private opinions and political (public) discourse may make the public discourse more rather 
than less significant. Even when the reformers believed in the right of all women to choose 
abortion, and that unwanted pregnancy was not merely a probjem faced by marginal women 
on the fringes of society, they recognised that the most effective way to achieve a partial 
décriminalisation of abortion was through the exploitation of these stereotypes which played 
upon popular constructions of the kind of woman seeking abortion. Parliamentary speeches 
represent more than the feelings of the individual speaker: the more effectively a political 
discourse manages to capture broad based social assumption, the more it will carry its 
audience and the more effective it will be4.
In this chapter I begin by drawing out the way that the pregnant woman seeking abortion is 
constructed within these debates by bringing together dispersed comments of M.P.s to present
3 Similarly, Paul Ferris notes the very real need for caution on the part of the reformers: 
"[a] constant danger for abortion-law reformers, as it used to be for advocates of birth control, 
is that they should appear to be condoning immorality. This is why their propaganda plays 
up the unwanted pregnancies among married women, and says as little as it can about the 
thousands of single girls who have abortions. It is easier to make a respectable case in public 
for the weary mother of half a dozen children than for a girl of eighteen who slept with two 
men last week. The reformers’ dilemma lies in the risk that any system which makes it easier 
for the mother of six to have an abortion is liable to be applied to a promiscuous teenager" 
(1966; 154-5).
4 An interesting later example of this is David Alton’s choice of rhetoric in Parliament 
in the 1988 and 1990 debates (discussed in chapter 6  below, p. 140). Although in his (1988) 
book, Alton gives priority to religious and moral arguments (starting the chapter on abortion 
by quoting Mother Theresa), in Parliament he relies far more on medical knowledges to found 
his arguments.
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a more unified account of the sort of general assumptions about the ‘type* of woman whom 
the legislation must address: what kind of woman would seek to terminate a pregnancy? 
(section 2). I then examine how these constructions and the assumptions upon which they 
are predicated are reflected in the text of the Abortion Act itself (section 3).
2. IMAGES OF THE ABORTING WOMAN
From my reading of the Parliamentary debates which preceded the passing of the Abortion 
Act of 1967, three major strands of narrative emerge, purporting to describe the ‘type’ of 
woman who would want an abortion. The accounts view this woman as peripheral: a 
marginal and deviant figure who stands against a wider norm of women who neither need nor 
desire abortion. The accounts which are given in Parliament reflect a strategic deployment 
of knowledge on the part of both the proponents and opponents of decriminalisation, and on 
a broader level, reflect images of women that were (and to a greater or lesser degree still are) 
predominant in other social discourses. The typifications adopted are extreme - they are 
predicated partially on stereotypes, and partially on real and concrete examples which 
continually recur within the debates as leitmotifs to become generalized as representing the 
reality of the woman who seeks abortion.
Two important constructions of woman used within the debates may be broadly (though not 
always consistently) identified with the reformer/opponent split. Thus, I would argue, whilst 
the reformers represent the woman who would seek to terminate a pregnancy as an 
emotionally weak, unstable (even suicidal) victim of her desperate social circumstances, the 
conservatives view her as a selfish, irrational child. This schema is inevitably a simplification 
and imposes a unity and coherence which is doubtless lacking, but nonetheless it is useful in 
understanding and highlighting the way that women are represented in the debates. In view 
of Carol Smart’s timely warning that it is important to analyse how the female legal subject 
is constituted in classed and raced as well as gendered terms (1992; 10), this distinction might 
productively be analysed in terms of class. In this sense the poor, working class woman fits 
the model of the unstable and desperate "multi-child mother" 5 who will have to resort to a
5 Lyons, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1089, 1966 (22 July).
cheap and dangerous abortion in the back streets should legal relief be denied her. On the 
other hand, the rich, educated middle class (working) woman is open to charge of selfishness 
for choosing to have a career rather than raise a child and choosing abortion when she can 
afford to have a child.
Here I will go on to outline three images of femininity that were presented in the debates: the 
woman as minor (a), the woman as victim (b), and finally an image advocated by proponents 
and opponents of reform alike, woman as mother (c). In the following section (section 3), 
I will go on to address how these assumptions have been incorporated into the 1967 Act.
a) woman as m inor
The conceptualisation of women as minors, is often to be found in the narrative of the 
opponents of abortion (although normally in their accounts the central place would be ceded 
to the foetus). Here, the woman is posited as a minor in terms of immaturity or 
underdevelopment with regard to matters of responsibility, morality, and even to her very 
femininity or ‘womanliness’. Her decision to abort is trivialised and denied rational 
grounding, being perceived as mere selfishness: she will abort, "according to her wishes or 
whims"6, for example, in order to avoid the inconvenience of having to postpone a holiday. 
She is immoral for being sexually active for reasons other than procreation; she is 
irresponsible for not having used contraception, and now for refusing to pay the price for her 
carelessness; she is unnatural and ‘unwomanly’ because she rejects the natural outcome of 
sexual intercourse for women: maternity. There is a hint that one day she will come to realise 
the error of her ways and want children, yet may be unable to have them as a result o f the 
abortion7.
Jill Knight, a Conservative M.P. and one of the leading opponents o f reform, plays heavily 
on the idea of the woman as selfish and irresponsible within the debates leading to the 1967 
Act. She reveals an image of women seeking abortion as selfish, treating "[b]abies...like bad
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6 Mahon, H.C. Deb. Voi 750, Col. 1356, 1967 (13 July).
7 See for example the comments of Knight, H.C. Deb. Voi. 749, Col. 932, 1967 (29 
June); Glover, H.C. Deb. Voi. 749, Col. 971, 1967 (29 June).
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teeth to be jerked out just because they cause suffering...simply because it may be 
inconvenient for a year or so to its mother"8. She later adds that "[a] mother might want an 
abortion so that a planned holiday is not postponed or other arrangements interfered with"9. 
The ability and willingness of the woman to make a serious decision regarding abortion, 
considering all factors and all parties is dismissed. Rather (like a child) she will make a snap 
decision for her own convenience. The task of the law is thus perceived essentially as one 
of responsibilisation: if the woman seeks to evade the consequences of her carelessness, the 
law should stand as a barrier. Knight argues that allowing women to take the ‘easy way out’ 
encourages them to be irresponsible:
"[pjeople must be helped to be responsible, not encouraged to be irresponsible.-.Does anyone 
think that the problem of the 15-year-old mother can be solved by taking the easy way 
out?...here is the case of a perfectly healthy baby being sacrificed for the mother’s 
convenience....For goodness sake, let us bring up our daughters with love and care enough 
not to get pregnant and not let them degenerate into free-for-alls with the sleazy comfort of 
knowing, ‘She can always go and have it out”'10.
By forcing her to continue with the pregnancy then, the law will seek to ensure that the 
pregnant woman will be more responsible in the future (an application of the old adage that 
she has made her bed, and now must lie in it). As one M.P. comments with regard to 
whether abortion should be allowed to a fifteen year old girl: "one needs to think twice before 
one removes all the consequences of folly from people"11.
The woman who seeks abortion is also seen as morally immature, and hence undeserving of 
help. Simon Mahon asks who is to be given priority in terms of treatment: is it the "feckless 
girl who has an unwanted pregnancy from time to time" or the "decent married woman who 
is awaiting investigation or treatment for sterility? " 12 The use. of this rhetorical trick which
8 Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1100, 1966 (22 July).
9 Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 926, 1967 (29 June).
10 Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1101, 1102-3, 1966 (22 July).
11 Maude, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1121, 1966 (22 July).
12 Mahon, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 1046, 1967 (29 June).
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opposes the "feckless girl" to the "decent married woman" serves to emphasise that the girl 
is not only feckless but is also indecent and unworthy of respect. Such juxtapositions form 
a recurrent theme in anti-choice discourse. Prof. Jeffcoate (an implacable opponent of the 
Abortion Act, and subsequent President of the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists), speaking after the décriminalisation of abortion, asked:
"[i]s it right that the promiscuous girl, who has not troubled to practise contraception should 
have priority over the decent married woman who has been waiting perhaps twelve months 
for admission for investigation of sterility?" (in Kitzinger; 1978; 366).
In more recent years, as Smart has noted, the construction of women seeking abortions as 
immoral and self-interested has become more dominant, and the extent of their guilt is 
compounded by placing them alongside a growing recognition of the problem of infertility. 
She asserts that:
"[t]he juxtaposition of images of women who want children, but cannot have them, with 
(misconstrued) ideas of the woman who gets pregnant carelessly and then, apparently equally 
carelessly, terminates her pregnancy, creates an antipathy towards the latter" (Smart; 1989;
148).
Several participants in the Parliamentary debates give voice to an implicit assumption that it 
is morally wrong for women to make a distinction between sex and procreation - women 
should not indulge in sex, if pregnancy is not desired. William Deedes makes these 
sentiments clear in expressing his concern that: "science and its little pill will enable so-called 
civilised countries to treat sex more and more as a sport and less and less as a sacrament in 
love, a divine instrument of procreation"13. Perhaps the single most telling quotation here 
comes from David Steel himself, defending a clause to allow abortion in cases of rape14, 
which was eventually dropped after debate in Parliament, for reasons that were discussed in 
chapter 2 (pp. 37-8), and will be further developed below (pp. 60-2). He states:
"[m]ost honourable Members would agree that to have a woman continue with a pregnancy 
which she did not wish to conceive, or in respect of which she was incapable of expressing
13 Deedes, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1092, 1966 (22 July).
14 The clause sought to allow abortion to "a pregnant woman being a defective or 
becoming pregnant while under the age of 16 or becoming pregnant as a result of rape".
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her wish to conceive, is a practice which we deplore, but the difficulty is to find an 
acceptable wording which will enable termination to be carried out following sexual offences 
of this kind but which does not allow an open gate for the pretence of sexual offences"15.
What is startling here is Steel’s correlation of "a pregnancy which she did not wish to 
conceive" with conception following rape. Steel fails to imagine that the vast majority of 
requests for abortion will be for pregnancies that the woman did not wish to conceive16. In 
using this argument to justify abortion in cases of rape, he implicitly equates consensual 
intercourse with desired conception. Wanting sex equals wanting pregnancy equals wanting 
motherhood.
b) woman as victim
The second narrative account strongly present in the Parliamentary debates is that of woman 
as a victim of poverty and harsh social circumstances. This construction is typically that of 
the reforming forces, where the woman and her social situation enjoy a far more central place. 
The reformers here seek to capitalise on the public sympathy for women facing unwanted 
pregnancy, given the highly restricted access to legal abortion for poorer women, and the well 
known consequences of backstreet abortions as described in chapter 2. Newspapers, 
magazines and books had reported horror stories of backstreet and self-induced abortions, and 
as David Steel noted in the debates, in the years preceding the introduction of the Abortion 
Act, an average of thirty women per year were dying at the hands of criminal abortionists17. 
Further, the well publicised thalidomide cases had contributed to public sympathy for the 
woman carrying a handicapped foetus.
<
The image of the woman seeking abortion here draws her as "not only on the fringe, but [as] 
literally, physically inadequate" (Greenwood and Young; 1976; 76). She is presented as
15 Steel, H.C. Deb. Vol. 730, Col. 1075, 1966 (22 June).
16 Although, of course, it is possible that in certain circumstances a woman might wish 
to conceive and subsequently change her mind, it is difficult to believe that this is the norm 
rather than the exception.
17 Steel, H.C. Deb. Vol. 750, Col. 1350,1967 (13 July). This is presumably based on the 
official statistics of 35-40 deaths per year, which I cited in chapter 2. As I explained there, 
there is every indication that the real figure was far higher, see footnote 28.
distraught, out of her mind with the worry of pregnancy (possibly because she is young and 
unmarried, but normally because she already has too many children). She is desperate, and 
should the doctor not be able to help her, her potential actions are unpredictable (suicide is 
discussed)18. Her husband is either absent or an alcoholic, her housing situation is 
intolerable. She is at the end of her tether simply trying to hold the whole situation together. 
As Madeleine Simms, of the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA), later wrote: **[i]t 
was chiefly for the worn out mother of many children with an ill or illiterate or feckless or 
brutal or drunken or otherwise inadequate husband that we were fighting" (1985; 81).
Lord Silkin was one of the most eloquent exponents of this narrative, and he had many 
opportunities to develop it during the passage of his own Bill in the House of Lords19. The 
following letter to him, which he read to the House of Lords during the second reading of his 
own Bill in 1965 provides a typical and tragic illustration of the woman to be helped, as 
envisaged by the reformist forces:
"Dear Lord Silkin, I am married to a complete drunk who is out of work more than he is in. 
I have four children and now at 40 I am pregnant again; I was just beginning to get on my 
feet, and get some of the things we needed. Pve been working for the last three years, and 
cannot bear the thought of that terrible struggle to make ends meet again. I’ve tried all other 
methods that I’ve been told about; without success, so as a last resort 1 appeal to you - please 
help me if you possibly can" (cited in Hindell and Simms; 1971; 80).
The same kind of image is also repeatedly drawn in the House of Commons, where one M.P. 
speaks of "the mothers with large families and the burdens of large families very often with 
low incomes"20. Another describes the illegal abortions he knows of:
"I have represented abortionists, both medical and lay. I have, therefore, met the 30s. 
abortion with Higginson’s syringe and a soapy solution undertaken in a kitchen by a grey- 
faced woman on a distracted multi-child mother, often the wife of a drunken husband. I have 
also come across the more expensive back-bedroom abortion by the hasty medical man whose
18 See for example: Strange, H.L. Deb. Vol. 274, Col. 1235, 1966 (23 May).
19 By mutual agreement with the ALRA, Silkin dropped his Bill so that the reformers 
could concentrate on getting the Steel Bill through the House of Commons (see Hindell and 
Simms; 1971; 154).
20 Dunwoody, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1096, 1966 (22 July).
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patient returns to a distant town, there to lie in terror and blood and without medical 
attention"21.
Even Bernard Braine, a vocal opponent of the Bill, accepts the image of the woman presented 
by the reformers:
"[t]he hope of the sponsors of the Bill is to change the law that many abortions which take 
place at the moment illegally - either in the back streets or, self-induced by some poor 
unfortunate woman, driven to desperation - shall be brought into the framework of 
legality"22.
The woman who wishes to terminate her pregnancy is portrayed as someone who is not 
completely in control of her actions and who may be driven to madness if relief is denied to 
her. David Owen states that:
"[s]uch a woman is in total misery, and could be precipitated into a depression deep and 
lasting. What happens to that woman when she gets depressed? She is incapable of looking 
after those children so she retires into a shell o f herself and loses all feeling, all her drive and
affection"23.
Here again, we see worries for the health of the woman related back to concern for the well­
being of the family (see chapter 2, pp. 28-9). A more extreme example is the tragic story 
related by Lena Jeger, M.P. which I mentioned in chapter 2 (p. 27). An "honest young 
woman" with five children, recently deserted by her husband, who was refused an abortion 
because "she did not seem quite depressed enough". The woman was forced to continue the 
pregnancy, and her depression following the birth of her sixth baby was so extreme, that she 
killed the baby by throwing it on the floor. The woman was now in Holloway prison, the 
children in care24. Lord Strange notes that "nearly every woman in this condition [of 
unwanted pregnancy] would be in a state bordering on suicide"25. The woman’s irrationality
21 Lyons, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1089, 1966 (22 July).
22 Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 747, Col. 496, 1967 (2 June).
23 Owen, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1115, 1966 (22 July).
24 Jeger, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 977-8, 1967 (29 June).
25 Strange, H.L. Deb. Vol. 277, Col. 1235, 1966 (23 October).
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is sometimes conceptually linked to her pregnant condition, as David Owen states, for 
example: "[t]he reproductive cycle of women is intimately linked with her psyche"26. This 
pathologises women, playing on the notion of female behaviour as dominated and controlled 
by biology, with women ‘existing through their ovaries’27.
This image of the desperate woman is emphasized by contrasting it with the cool impassive 
figure of the doctor (described in chapter 2, pp. 34-5), The doctor represents a calm, 
responsible, rational and reassuring male figure - everything that the woman is not.
c) woman as m other
The image of the woman as mother is appropriated in the cause of reformists and 
conservatives alike. Only in the 1990 debates do (some) M.P.s feel able to challenge the 
inevitability of maternity for all women28. In 1966-7, however, for the conservatives, the 
woman who rejects maternity is seen to reject the very essence of womanhood. Kevin 
McNamara provides a strong account of woman’s maternal instinct:
"[h]ow can a woman’s capacity to be a mother be measured before she has a child? 
Fecklessness, a bad background, being a bad manager, these are nothing to do with love, that 
unidentifiable bond, no matter how strange or difficult the circumstances, which links a 
mother to her child and makes her cherish it"29.
This implicit assumption of woman as mother is further reflected in the consideration of her 
existing responsibilities to children and family (and an apparent inability to see her outside 
of this role of wife and mother). Jill Knight informs us that: "if it comes to a choice between 
the mother’s life or the baby’s, the mother is very much more important". This is not 
however, because the woman is more important in her own right, but rather because "[s]he
26 Owen, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1113, 1966 (22 July).
21 The phrase belongs to Victor Joze (1985) cited in Laqueur (1990; 149). See Thomson
(forthcoming 1995) for an exposition of medical discourse concerning women in the 
nineteenth century, and the way that these perceptions connect with the regulation of abortion.
28 See especially the speech of Theresa Gorman, cited at pp. 211-2.
29 McNamara, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1129, 1966 (22 July).
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has ties and responsibilities to her husband and other children"30.
The reformists seek to capitalise on. the idea of maternity as the female norm, rather than to 
challenge it. Madeleine Simms of the ALRA argued that it was precisely the woman with 
a fully developed ‘maternal instinct* who might require an abortion. She pointed out that 
most women wished to have not more than two or three babies and were appalled if they 
found they were having more children than they believed they could adequately care for. 
Should they accidentally become pregnant, she argued, they would then seek an abortion 
because of their feelings of responsibility to their husband and family, and because of their 
maternal instinct towards their existing children (1985; 81). Likewise, another prominent 
reformer, Alice Jenkins wrote that: "the principal beneficiary under a new law would be the 
decent mother of a family who has as many children as she can cope with" (1960; 47). In 
the House of Lords, Joan Vickers reinforces these ideas and sums up sentiments which are 
often expressed or implicit in statements of other M.P.s when she notes that: "I think that 
most women desire motherhood. It is natural for a woman to want to have a child...It is only 
in extreme cases that a woman wants to terminate her pregnancy"31. In defending the need 
for a social clause (to allow abortion where the woman’s social and economic circumstances 
are deemed inadequate) within the Act, Roy Jenkins argued that without the presence of such 
a clause, "many women who are far from anxious to escape the responsibilities of 
motherhood, but rather wish to discharge their existing ones more effectively, would be 
denied relief’32. Edward Dunwoody asserts in similar vein that in:
"many cases where we have over-large families the mother is so burdened down physically 
and emotionally with the continual bearing of children that it becomes quite impossible for 
her to fulfill her real function, her worthwhile function as a mother, of holding together the 
family unit, so that all too often the family breaks apart, and it is for this reason that we have 
all too many problem families in many parts of the country"33.
30 Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1104, 1966 (22 July).
31 Vickers, H.L. Deb. Vol. 276, Col. 1108, 1966 (22 July).
32 Jenkins, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1144, 1966 (22 July).
33 Dunwoody, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1098, 1966 (22 July).
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Dr Winstanley (Steel’s close party colleague and medical adviser for the Bill) makes the 
related argument that women should be allowed to abort handicapped foetuses, because the 
woman who is forced to give birth to a handicapped child will seldom allow herself to 
become pregnant again34. Implicit here is an understanding of the role of law as being to 
protect and entrench motherhood, to encourage women to adopt the maternal role.
3. THE A B O R T IO N  A C T ; A MORE SUITABLE MODEL OF CONTROL
In his concluding speech before the final vote, David Steel asserted that the Abortion Act (or 
as it then was the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill) is what a "reasonable man would 
regard as a reasonable statement of the law"35. Indeed, this impression of ‘reasonable 
compromise’ pervades much of what has been subsequently written on the Act. The Act is 
often depicted as a balancing act between two competing sets o f rights: the right to life of the 
foetus versus the right to choose (right o f self-determination) o f the woman. However, as 
various commentators have argued, if the law aims to protect and entrench any rights it is not 
those of the woman (nor indeed those of the foetus) but rather those o f the doctor (Fyfe; 
1991, Berer; 1988, Clarke; 1990). I would argue that if the law has achieved any sort of 
compromise, it is by way of a reconciliation of the competing narrative accounts of the kind 
of woman who would seek abortion which I have outlined above. In this section, I aim to 
show how law has incorporated and entrenched certain aspects of these narratives, in working 
with certain assumptions about women’s maternal role (section a), and the essential 
irresponsibility (section b) and sexual immorality (section c) of the woman who would seek 
to terminate a pregnancy. In its embodiment and entrenchment of these assumptions, the law 
itself (re)creates the peripheral, deviant subject which it will then seek to discipline and 
regulate. Equally it simultaneously reinforces the image of the good woman who does not 
seek to terminate her pregnancy and who provides the norm against which such deviance is 
to be measured.
a) An assumption of maternity as the normal role for women
54 Winstanley, H.C. Deb. Voi. 749, Col. 1059, 1967 (29 July).
35 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 750, Col. 1346, 1967 (13 July).
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The assumption of maternity as the female norm is reflected both in terms of the very 
structure of the law and in specific provisions which allow abortion in cases where the 
continuance of a pregnancy would involve injury to the health of any existing children of the 
woman’s family. The need for intervention is felt to be justified not merely on the basis of 
a woman’s own health and well-being, but also by that of her family: "in the name of the 
responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution 
and the safeguarding of society" (1979b; 147).
As was seen above, the law regarding abortion functions in terms of a blanket ban (the 
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861) which renders abortion illegal. The Abortion Act 
offers a defence against this law where two doctors deem that the circumstances of the 
individual woman fall within the general categories which.are laid out within section 1 of the 
Act. The decision to abort is not seen as an intrinsically acceptable one, as a choice which 
any woman could face at some time in her life. Rather, it is an option which may be justified 
only in certain cases by the individual circumstances (or inadequacies) of individual women, 
on the opinion of two doctors. Conceptually then, abortion stands as the exception to the 
norm of maternity. No woman can reject motherhood. The only women who should be 
allowed to terminate pregnancies are those who can do so without rejecting matemity/familial 
norms per se, in other words, those who have reasons to reject this one particular pregnancy 
without rejecting motherhood as their destiny in general. In this sense, women who are 
carrying the wrong sort of foetus, who have obligations to meet to existing children, or whose 
living conditions are at present inadequate for a child will be allowed by doctors to terminate 
a pregnancy. Likewise, it was felt that where the particular pregnancy was thrust upon the 
woman through rape or incest, the doctor should be free to authorise termination.
In this way, for example, section 1(1 )(b) of the Act provides that abortion can be allowed 
where "there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped". Whilst clearly displaying 
eugenicist considerations36, 1 feel that this clause can also be interpreted with regard to the
36 There is much debate in Parliament on this issue, which revolves around the number 
of healthy foetuses which must be sacrificed in order to pick out damaged ones. This appears 
to give official sanction to the notion that the lives of the handicapped are of less value than
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status of the woman. It was justified in part on the grounds that to force a woman to carry 
an abnormal child to term will discourage her from future pregnancy37 38 and, as Dr 
Winstanley points out that M[i]n every case the duty of the medical practitioners should be, 
wherever possible to encourage aid and support the mother towards term with the 
pregnancy'138. The handicapped baby or child is not seen as being as desirable as a ‘normal* 
one and does not feature in the romanticized family ideal. As Dr Winstanley says of the 
woman who has a higher than normal chance of giving birth to a handicapped baby: "this 
mother does not know whether she will get a baby which will make her very happy or one 
which will make her very sad"39, Thus, the woman can reject this (abnormal) pregnancy 
without rejecting the whole institution of motherhood itself.
The woman’s role as mother is again emphasised where s.l(l)(a) of the Abortion Act allows 
abortion where the continuance of a pregnancy "would involve...injury to the physical or 
mental health of...any existing children o f her family". The woman is allowed to reject 
pregnancy in order to fulfill her existing responsibility as a mother more effectively. Here 
again, she is seen to reject one particular pregnancy, rather than motherhood itself. Indeed, 
she may reject this particular pregnancy in order to be a better mother to those children 
already in her family. This idea is still more clearly embodied in the wording of Steel’s 
original Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill which stated as a separate head for abortion: 
"that the pregnant woman’s capacity as a mother will be severely overstrained by the care of 
a child or of another child as the case may be" (clause l(l)(c)). It is perhaps worthy of note
the able-bodied. For example, Peter Mahon, M.P. for Preston South: "It is argued that if a 
mother has a particular disease in pregnancy...there is a chance that her child will be 
deformed in some way. But the real tragedy would be that a large number of perfectly 
normal unmaimed human lives are to be sacrificed for the sake of one who would be born 
with some physical deformity. What kind of morality is that?" Mahon, H.C. Deb. Vol. 750, 
Col. 1358, 1967 (13 July), my emphasis. Likewise: "[sjurely it would be more reasonable 
to have the odd malformed child than to take the risk of killing a normal foetus." Galperin,
H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 1065,1967 (29 June). For a strong criticism by a disabled feminist 
of the provision of abortion for reason of foetal handicap, see Morris (1991).
37 Winstanley, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 1059, 1967 (29 June).
38 Winstanley, H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 1055, 1967 (29 June).
39 H.C. Deb. Vol. 749, Col. 1057, 1967 (29 June).
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that the version which is eventually incorporated into the Abortion Act only allows 
termination on this ground where the woman already has children, where the original version 
included it equally where the child would be a woman’s first. This may be seen to reflect the 
image of the overstrained ’’multi-child mother” who wishes to terminate one pregnancy in 
order to care better for her existing family. The image of a woman who simply does not 
want or cannot cope with any children at all is not present in these Parliamentary debates.
b) Female irresponsibility
Section 1(1) of the Abortion Act provides that:
"[sjubject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under 
the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good 
faith...[that various conditions are fulfilled]".
The peripheral female subject conceived of within the Abortion Act is clearly treated as 
someone who cannot take decisions for herself. Rather responsibility is handed over to the 
reassuringly mature and responsible (male) figure of the doctor. Thus, the legislation here 
assumes that the doctor will be better equipped to judge what is best for the woman, even 
though he/she may never have met her before, and even though he/she may have neither 
knowledge of, nor interest in, her concrete situation. The entrenchment of such a construction 
in law is in a close relationship with the images of woman deployed in the debates. If the 
woman is distraught and irrational, then she is an unsuitable party to take such an important 
decision. Indeed she inevitably, by her very nature, lacks the necessary emotional distance 
to make such a decision in a considered way. Equally, if she is selfish and self-ccntrcd, 
intellectually and morally immature, portrayed as only considering her own needs, and giving 
no weight to other factors (such as the claims of the foetus) in her snap decisions, she is again 
incapable of making such an important choice. She is thus in need of the normalising control 
of the doctor to impose either calm and rationality or morality and consideration of others.
The power of doctors in the field of abortion is very often justified by the argument that 
abortion is essentially a medical matter. However, the actual decision whether or not a given 
pregnancy should be terminated is not normally one that requires expert medical advice, or 
the balancing of medical criteria. Further, the doctors’ decision-making power is not here




contained within a narrow, limited medical field. In judging whether or not abortion could 
be detrimental to the mental or physical health of the pregnant woman or existing children 
of her family, "account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably 
foreseeable environment" (s.l(2)). The woman’s whole lifestyle, her home, finances and 
relationships are opened up to the doctor’s scrutiny, so that he/she may judge whether or not 
she is a deserving case for relief. This relates to the popularisation of the notion that social 
factors are inseparable from medical ones. Steel argues that:
"social conditions cannot be and ought not to be separated from medical considerations. I 
hope that the Abortion Act by its very drafting has encouraged the concept of socio-medical 
care" (1971; 7).
This represents an ongoing expansion of the authority of the medical professional over an 
ever greater area of human life. As Foucault writes: "[t]he questions to be asked are 
innumerable; the things to be seen infinite" (1989b; 111).
It is also worth returning to the proposed rape clause, included in Steel’s original bill, notable 
by its absence in British statute. Arguments for allowing abortion in the case of rape were 
dismissed for a combination of reasons, some of which I have already discussed (see chapter 
2, pp. 37-8). First, despite widespread agreement that a woman who had been raped should 
be allowed to terminate any resulting pregnancy (Hindell and Simms; 1971; 185), it was felt 
that she would already have access to abortion under the law as it stood40. Secondly, as was 
noted in the previous chapter, medical groups opposed the inclusion of a clause which 
explicitly decriminalised abortion in case of rape, as they felt that this would lead women to 
assert a right to termination in that circumstance. Thirdly,, it was argued that the woman 
could not be trusted to tell the truth about whether she has been raped. As one M.P. noted: 
"[w]e also know that a great many charges of rape are made which are quite unfounded and 
which are made for quite different motives"41. Bernard Dickens explains the decision not
40 i.e. under section 1(1 )(a) Abortion Act, 1967, continuance of the pregnancy would
involve risk of injury to her mental health. There is also some contention as to whether 
abortion in case of rape might still be permissible on the basis of the pre-existing common 
law, and notably R v Bourne (see pp. 105-6). On the issue of whether Bourne was 
completely superseded by the Abortion Act see Smith and Hogan (1988; 372).
41 W ells, H.C. Deb. Voi. 732, Col. 1086, 1966 (22 July).
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to include a specific rape clause in that were it to be included: "women would have a stronger 
inducement to allege that an unwanted or embarrassing pregnancy had been imposed by rape." 
He goes on:
"This crime always poses problems of definition. The differences between rape and 
determined ‘masculine' seduction can be fine, and the presence or absence of consent can 
sometimes be impossible to find conclusively. Further, a woman may provoke her own rape 
by finally withholding consent from a man who is unable to control the passion she has 
deliberately aroused. At present, charges of rape are occasionally found where a woman 
wishes to protect her reputation, for example, where she is unmarried, but the prospect of 
having the pregnancy terminated, without anyone having to be prosecuted or convicted, would 
be an attraction which some women might find hard to resist" (Dickens; 1966; 139).
Were it somehow possible for the verification of the occurrence of rape to fall within the 
competence of doctors, however, this might well have been sufficient for this clause to* have 
survived to be included in the text of the Abortion Act: "if there were a way in which doctors 
could decide whether or not a lady had been raped, I would be content to allow the provision 
on rape to go in"42, says one M.P.. An attempt to formalise in law such a requirement for 
medical verification was envisaged in Steel’s original Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill 
A separate heading (s.l(l)(d)) allowed termination in the case of rape, with s.l(2)(4) 
providing that:
"[a] termination of pregnancy performed on the ground of rape shall require the certificate 
of a registered medical practitioner consulted by the patient freshly after the alleged assault 
that there was the medical evidence of sexual assault upon her".
Consideration of women’s untrustworthiness in evidencing her own rape for the purposes of 
requesting abortion, forms an interesting parallel to the analysis offered in a recent article by 
Sheila Duncan. Duncan examines the requirement whereby the judge is obliged to warn the 
jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, where the 
only evidence in a rape trial is her testimony43. Duncan notes that many justifications have 
been given of this warning, however she contends that:
42 Hobson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 732, Col. 1138, 1966 (22 July).
43 However, the judge also has to point out that it is open to the jury to convict in the 
absence of corroboration if satisfied that the testimony is true.
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"[a]t the root of them in respect of rape is the notion that the complainant in sexual matters 
may be falsely accusing the defendant as a result o f a refusal to admit consent and accept 
responsibility for the sexual events which have occurred with the defendant”.
She concludes that: ”[t]he female Other is constructed as inherently untrustworthy" (1994; 16).
c) Fem ale sexuality
The Abortion Act contains a strong moral element, distinguishing between categories of 
deserving and undeserving ‘victims’ of unwanted pregnancy. The former are allowed 
abortions, the latter denied them. This distinction works on the one hand with regard to 
whether or not intercourse was wanted and, on the other, with regard to whether the woman 
has a legitimate reason for changing her mind following conception - i.e. she did want to get 
pregnant, but now wants to reject this particular pregnancy (because of foetal handicap).
Although, unlike most other Western European statutes, the 1967 Act does not explicitly 
foresee abortion for cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest (for the reasons noted 
above), there are still lengthy discussions of this matter in Parliament which are informative 
with regard to perceptions of female sexuality. There was practically unanimous agreement 
that women should be allowed abortion in case of rape, although the clause which allowed 
it within the statute was deleted for the reasons discussed above, and notably that it "is 
already enshrined in the Bill as amended" 44 and women who were the victims of rape or 
incest would already be allowed abortion under the other provisions of the Act. Here then 
the woman who did not desire sex and hence did not make a distinction between sex and 
procreation should be allowed by doctors to terminate her pregnancy.
It have argued above that the provision with regard to handicap (s.l(l)(b)) is strongly 
influenced both by eugenic considerations, and the construction of woman as mother. This 
clause also, I would argue, bears some relation to constructions of women’s sexuality, as it 
serves to provide a ‘get-out clause’ for good women who want to become pregnant (and thus 
do not commit the sin of making the fatal distinction between sex and procreation), but 
through no fault of their own happen to be carrying a foetus ‘of the wrong sort’. The form
44 Knight, H.C. Deb. Vol. 742, Col. 322, 1967 (1 March).
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adopted by the legislation refuses to legitimate a disassociation of sex and procreation. 
Avoidance of procreation remains something which can only be justified by the inadequacies 
of a particular woman or a problem with a specific pregnancy.
4. CONCLUSIONS
"At the end of this catalogue of all the various kinds of medical conditions or adverse 
situations where abortion may be the best course, it may be asked if the reformers considered 
the woman who simply did not want to give birth to the embryonic child inside her...[I]t is 
an injustice to the well-adjusted, healthy woman that she cannot get the same relief from a 
pregnancy as her inadequate or overstrained, or unmarried, or rubella-infected, or incestuous 
sisters. One wing of the reform movement in fact did feel there was a need for abortion for 
all on request. They acknowledged, however, that politically this idea was far too radical to 
gain public acceptance and parliamentary approval” (Hindell and Simms; 1971; 24-5).
Deviance, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder. Quinney has written:
"crime is a definition of human conduct that becomes part of the social world...Criminal 
definitions in their official formulations...are the most powerful means of social control used 
to control actions which conflict with the interest of those who create these criminal 
definitions" (in Lacey et al; 1990; v).
However, law does more than draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, in 
order to define deviance. Law also constructs deviants: it acts not on a pre-existing external, 
knowable individual, but itself (re)creates this individual, drawing upon and entrenching 
certain social assumptions and stereotypes. The aborting woman is given a particular 
subjectivity within the 1967 Act. She is identified as a peripheral subject with certain 
characteristics and inadequacies. In this sense, 1 have argued that the Abortion Act is 
predicated upon certain ideas of maternity as the female norm, female irresponsibility and 
emotional instability and implicit assumptions about appropriate female sexual morality. It 
is thus the woman's own nature which serves as a basis for legitimating the particular 
modality o f normalising medical control adopted within the 1967 Act. The Act stands as a 
kind of snapshot of the times: a (re)construction of certain prevalent social female norms.
Women seeking abortion, more than any women, are ‘hysterized’, medicalised "in the name 
o f the responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family
institution, and the safeguarding of society” (Foucault; 1979b; 147). Inherent female 
pathology is exacerbated by pregnancy. This redefining of ‘woman* combined with a gradual 
redefinition of birth as a medical event, meant that medical control was the obvious ‘solution*. 
Foucault writes of:
"a threefold process whereby the feminine body was analyzed - qualified and disqualified - 
as being thoroughly saturated with sexuality; whereby it was integrated into the sphere of 
medical practices, by reason of a pathology intrinsic to it; whereby, finally, it was placed in 
organic communication with the social body (whose regulated fecundity it was supposed to 
ensure), the family space (of which it had to be a substantial and functional element), and the 
life of children (which it produced and had to guarantee, by virtue of a biologico-moral 
responsibility lasting through the entire period of the children’s education): the Mother, with 
her negative image of "nervous woman," constituted the most visible form of this 
hysterization" (1979b; 146-7).
With the construction of the woman seeking termination drawn in this way, medical control 
becomes the obvious solution. There can be no doubt that it is imperative to get such a 
woman into the safe hands of her GP, so that he/she can take control and ‘manage’ the 
problem in the best interests of the woman herself, her family and the broader society. "If 
we can manage to get a girl such as that into the hands of the medical profession, the Bill is 
succeeding in its objective", argues David Steel45.
It is not only the aborting woman who is constructed in the 1967 Act, however. The 
subjectivity created here must be read alongside an implicit assumption of the ‘normal’ 
woman. The aborting woman is simultaneously the paradigmatic example and the antithesis 
of this female norm. In one sense she is its natural conclusion, standing as an extreme 
example of female instability and irrationality. In her attempt to deny maternity, the natural 
(and desired) destiny of the good woman, however, she is also its alter ego. In these senses, 
the female norm of the ‘good woman’ is simultaneously (reConstructed and enforced by the 
creation of her deviant sister.
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45 H.C.Deb. Vol. 750, Col. 1349, 1967 (13 July).
CHAPTER 4: ABORTION, REPRODUCTION AND THE 
DEPLOYMENT OF MEDICAL POWER
I
nOf course there is room for variation in opinion. All we can say is that we have to rely on 
the ethics of the medical profession to act in good faith. I accept that, just as there are bad 
Members of Parliament and clergymen, so there are bad doctors”1.
"This new structure [of the clinic] is indicated - but not, of course, exhausted - by the minute 
but decisive change, whereby the question: ‘What is the matter with you?' with which the 
eighteenth-century dialogue between doctor and patient began...was replaced by that other 
question: *where does it hurt?\ in which we recognize the operation of the clinic and the 
principle of its entire discourse "2.
7 0]ne must distinguish between the purely technical activities of treatment and the social 
interaction and manipulation surrounding those acts...The former is clearly founded on 
medical science, that special knowledge of the profession which justifies its autonomy; the 
latter is nor3.
1 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171, Col. 205 1990 (24 April).
2 Michel Foucault (1989b; xviii).
3 Friedson (1970; 342).
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1. INTRODUCTION
In previous chapters I have argued that the Abortion Act represents a shift from a model of 
law based on prohibition to one which seeks to manage and regulate abortion by locating 
power in the hands of the medical profession. I have also suggested that a study of the 
regulation of abortion as a way of controlling women would be best to start by an 
examination of the workings of power "in its extremities" that is, at the level of medical 
practice, rather than in legitimate, regulated, central locations (such as the state) (Foucault; 
1980b; 99). With this in mind, it is important to outline exactly how power can be deployed 
at the level of a request for a termination, and this will form the focus of the present chapter. 
This represents a shift from a focus on the aims o f the legislation to consideration of its 
effects: an assessment of some of the operations of medical power in practice, following the 
introduction of the 1967 Act.
The analysis of this chapter will progress from the very general to the quite specific. First, 
I will deal briefly with the doctor-(female) patient relationship (section 2 ). Secondly, I will 
narrow the focus to look at the particular operation of this relationship in the case of 
reproduction (section 3). Lastly, and most specifically, I will analyse the way that power is 
deployed through the doctor-patient relationship in the case of a request for pregnancy 
termination (section 4). I will here distinguish between four deployments of power, which 
I describe as technical, decisional, paternalistic and normalizing control.
2. THE WOMAN AND H ER  DOCTOR 
a) The Doctor-Patient Relationship
Medicine enjoys a very privileged position within modern society with a particularly strong 
claim of access to ‘truth’. In a movement away from a narrow disease model of ill-health, 
the medical profession is capable of claiming jurisdiction far beyond that which it has 
traditionally enjoyed (Zola; 1972) and perhaps also beyond the confines of its basic technical 
competence, training and knowledge. Increasingly, the doctor increasingly takes responsibility 
for the patient’s whole lifestyle.
Doctor and patient meet within the field of medical knowledge, where the doctor (by 
definition) speaks from a position of power and status. Medical statements cannot come from 
just anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, 
their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person 
who has the right to make them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and 
death (Foucault; 1989b; 51). The doctor is thus an expert with the whole body of medical 
knowledge behind him/her. The medical gaze is not the gaze o f any observer, but that of a 
doctor supported and justified by an institution, and endowed with the power of decision and 
intervention (1989b; 89). The patient, on the other hand, is normally a lay person with access 
to medical knowledge only through the person of the doctor. As such, there is an inevitable 
and structural power dimension to any doctor-patient relationship (Roberts; 1985). This is 
more pronounced than in other expert/non-expert relationships (for example lawyer and 
client), as in the medical case the patient her/himself becomes the very object of study, and 
the doctor the one who can explain her/his illness and claim to understand her/him. 
Moreover, the basis of the authority of the doctor is the claim to overcome suffering and even 
death, which cannot be matched by other professionals. In this sense, the closest analogy 
might be to the power which was traditionally enjoyed by priests. Doctors are seen to hold 
powers over bodily health similar to the powers of the clergy over the soul: they are "a 
therapeutic clergy" or "priests of the body" (Foucault; 1989b; 32). Modern society has 
witnessed a shift from the centrality of religious knowledges to the new found pre-eminence 
of scientific rationality as the fundamental way of ordering and making sense of the world. 
In the case of understanding the human organism, medical science is now central4. The 
medical profession has taken over a large part of the function traditionally linked to the clergy 
as the guardians of social reality with a claim to identify abnormality, deviance and social 
disorder (Zola; 1977, Donzelot; 1979, Friedson; 1970): "[medicine] is becoming the new 
repository of truth, the place where absolute and often final judgments are made by 
supposedly morally neutral and objective experts" (Zola; 1977; 41). Doctors’ credibility 
depends on their ability to make successful claims about the scientific value of their work and
4 Indeed, medical science is fundamental in constituting the individual human organism, 
as Foucault showed medicine was the first to study the individual as such. Further as 
Foucault (1979b) and more recently Laqueur (1990) have argued, medical science is central 
to our understanding of the individuals as essentially coded male/female.
68
the way in which their medical knowledge is grounded in precise, accurate and reliable 
scientific information. The power of the doctor is to categorize and classify the patient w ithin 
the medical framework (healthy/ill, normal/abnormal) and thus to claim the ability to 
understand, to treat and to cure.
Speaking of an inherent power dimension in the doctor-patient relationship, is not, however, 
to assert a straightforward and unilateral relationship of control o f the individual doctor over 
the patient. Arney, in discussing the relationship between patient and doctor, draws an 
analogy with Foucault’s work on the panopticon. Arney asks of the panopticon:
”[w]ho is in control? Certainly not the prisoner; but not the guards either. To speak o f  an 
agent of control in the panopticon is absurd since the machine is in control. As when a m an 
walks a dog that carries its own leash in its mouth, neither party can claim to be in control. 
Rather the situation is controlled by the fictitious relationships created through history, in o u r 
case through the deployment of monitoring with its reformation of the doctor-patient 
relationship" (Arney; 1982; 231 - emphasis in original, see Foucault; 1991).
There is a power relationship intrinsic to the doctor patient relationship, which does not rely 
on the constant reassertion of authority by the individual doctor5. For both doctor and patient 
this is seen as the natural way of things6. Any challenge to the power basis in the doctor- 
patient relationship must therefore begin with a process of demystification. One step towards 
this is the recognition of medical discourse not as an abstract logical system, but as a specific 
cultural form (Foucault; 1989a, 1989b, Turner; 1987). Since these forms of rationality reside 
on a base of human practice and human history - since they have been made - they can be 
unmade (Raulet; 1983; 206).
b) The Case of the  Female Patient
The power balance inherent in the doctor patient relationship can only be reinforced when it 
is overlaid by a (male doctor/female patient) gender relationship. First, women use health
5 "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility 
for the constraints o f power; he makes them play simultaneously upon himself; he inscribes 
in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection" (Foucault; 1991; 203).
6 See Kitzinger (1978) for discussion o f the medical training, and the argument that it is 
predicated on and serves to enforce and replicate this relationship of control.
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services more frequently than men and are more subject to a routine, daily medical control 
(Roberts; 1985, Pfeffer; 1985, Davis; 1988a, Gardner; 1981; 130-1). Secondly, medical 
discourse constitutes women as psychologically and socially vulnerable and therefore in need 
of close medical surveillance, advice and guidance (Turner; 1987; 102, Scully; 1980; 14, see 
also, Ehrenreich and English; 1978, Showalter; 1987). Thirdly, the way that women are 
constructed within medical discourse often depicts them biologically as natural patients, at the 
mercy of their bodies or hormones (Turner; 1987; 109, see also Ehrenreich and English; 
1978).
Medical involvement in the policing of female behaviour, and the restraint of potentially 
‘dangerous’ feminine traits has been well documented. Medical texts have characterized 
women by irrationality, sexual passivity, and a desire for maternity (Martin; 1987, Scully and 
Bart; 1973, Merchant; 1980, Easlea; 1981) and various historical studies have demonstrated 
how doctors have acted to ensure female compliance with these constructions through such 
draconian measures as ovariectomies (Scully; 1980) or committal to psychiatric institutions 
(Smart; 1992c; 38)7. Further, in the late 19th century, the deployment of medical knowledge 
was integral to the attempts made to keep women in the home, through claims that studying 
outside it would damage their reproductive capacities (Ehrenreich and English; 1978, 
Thomson; forthcoming 1995). As one doctor put it: ”[w]hy spoil a good mother by making 
an ordinary grammarian?" (cited in Thomson; forthcoming 1995).
Although the claims and methods of the medical science of more recent years seem (by and 
large8) far less dramatic, evidence of the same pattern of medical enforcement of appropriate 
female behaviour is still visible. Barrett and Roberts (1978) in their study of GPs and female 
patients, found that GPs and hospital specialists would often relate to women in terms of non­
medical, social criteria in order to reinforce women’s traditional social role (see also Roberts;
7 This was practised well into this century under the Mental Defectives Act, 1913, for 
unmarried mothers on the grounds of moral imbecility or feeble-mindedness.
8 However, Hudson (1987) relates the case of a woman who developed obsessive 
behaviour as a result of living with a sadistic husband. The recommended medical ‘cure* was 
to operate on her. Roberts (1985; 33) gives the example of another woman who, following 
an illness which consisted of a refusal to do any housework, was given a course of six ECT 
treatments and subsequently discharged as ‘well’ again.
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1985).
"In consultation after consultation the GP smooths away the surface anxiety and adjusts the 
woman to the limitations of a life totally located in a home from which the children have 
moved away. In this respect the institution of medicine legitimates and endorses the status 
quo in relation to the position of women, and in so doing it fulfils an ideological function as 
an agency o f disguised social control. We found that frequently doctors would use the 
authority of their medico-moral language to offer not neutral, clinical advice but a set of 
prescriptions based on the conventional wisdom of their own social milieu" (Barrett and 
Roberts; 1978; 42).
Likewise, Thomas notes that doctors are influenced by non-medical criteria in their 
determination o f which contraception is suitable for which patient:
"[djoctor’s perceptions of women’s and men’s contraceptive.needs are based on assumptions 
about the social organisation of reproduction which support existing social and cultural 
norms" (Thomas; 1985; 63).
The role of the medical profession in policing and regulating women in line with certain 
norms of appropriate female behaviour thus has a long history. While doctors may have the 
role of "therapeutic clergy" for the whole of the population, their work is seen as doubly 
necessary with regard to female patients, who are characterised by an inherent pathology. 
This rests on a particular ideology of the nature of woman, her role and needs. It represents 
the double effect of medical relationship overlaid by conventional gender assumptions. The 
doctor-patient relationship is thus saturated with power: it is a relationship of expert/Iay 
person, and the doctor with the full weight of medical science behind him/her has a strong 
claim to truth when he/she diagnoses and treats. This control relationship is reinforced when 
the doctor is male and the patient female.
3. M EDICAL CONTROL OF REPRODUCTION
"Nature is perfectly competent to bring without the assistance of man, a child into the 
world..Assist Nature! Can anything be more absurd? As though God in his 
wisdom...required the assistance of man " (Chavasse; 1832, cited in Oakley; 1984; 13).
"It is evident that the newborn outcome b  controlled by events of multiple origins which take 
place even before conception. It can be seen that many of the factors can be attributed to 
genetic background and health as well as adolescence. These factors can be controlled in
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part by parents, the government, and state or private agencies. Society certainly has a 
responsibility to develop programs in the community that can achieve this goal' (Roux et al 
in Arney; 1982; 133).
Just over one hundred and sixty years ago, Chavasse dismissed the need for the medical 
supervision of childbirth. Since then, the perceived role of the doctor in the management of 
pregnancy has clearly undergone radical transformation, with the modem obstetric text clear 
in its assertion of the need for an appropriate program of surveillance and at times active 
intervention9. It is part of the common sense of the modern era that pregnancy and childbirth 
are too dangerous and important to be left in the hands of God, and must rather be taken in 
hand by man. This is of crucial importance to discussion of abortion, for as reproduction has 
fallen under medical control, so too has access to methods of avoiding birth by way of 
contraception and termination of pregnancy. The woman is seen to have the responsibility 
to actively embrace the medical help which she is offered in the interests of her own health 
and that of her family. When it is a matter of giving birth, the health of her foetus and her 
eventual child is dependent on her acceptance of medical control. The doctor becomes cast 
as the representative of foetal interests: the person objectively most able to ensure its well­
being. In the case of a request for pregnancy termination, the doctor retains this role, 
becoming the agency responsible for ensuring that these interests are heard and weighed 
against those of the woman.
Reproduction is the singularly most important area where doctors operate control over 
women’s lives (Oakley; 1981, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, Ehrenreich and English; 1978, O’Brien; 
1981, Donnison; 1988, Arney; 1982, Roberts; 1981). Birth, a happening long controlled by 
women with help from friends, older women and midwives, has gradually fallen under a 
hegemonic medical control. Today, 98% of births in Britain take place in hospital and the 
number of births performed by caesarian section continues to increase (Bridgeman; 1993c).
9 For example, this extract from Williams Obstetrics: "[t]he widespread adoption of 
effective means for population control and consideration of their impact upon the well-being 
of current and future generations o f offspring have logically accelerated interest in modalities 
for preserving and improving the health of the fetus and newborn infant...The health team 
providing care for the mother, fetus, and newborn infant currently must deal with an 
appreciably higher risk of unfavorable outcome unless an appropriate program of surveillance 
and at times active intervention is mounted" (cited in Arney; 1982; 137).
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Whatever benefits the médicalisation o f reproduction may have brought in the way of safety 
(and these are not undisputed10), it has also led to considerable erosion of women’s 
autonomy. As reproduction has become more and more technologised, knowledge regarding 
it has become increasingly privatized, available only to the medically trained. This has 
provided the rationale for all sorts of reproductive decisions traditionally made by women 
(regarding pregnancy, contraception, infertility treatment11 and abortion) to fall instead under 
medical control. Moreover, those doctors who try to provide a more woman-centred service 
and leave more choice to women as to how they wish to give birth, can face extreme hostility 
from their colleagues, as was clearly illustrated by the Wendy Savage case12.
.Ann Oakley provides the most thorough exposition of the médicalisation of reproduction in 
the British context (1981, 1984, 1986a, 1986b, 1987). She argues that this médicalisation is 
at once an aspect of the broader phenomenon of the médicalisation of daily life, and at the 
same time a specific exemplar and facilitator of the social control of women. She indicates 
two main stages in the médicalisation o f pregnancy: its incorporation into medical discourse 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a ‘natural’ state; and its gradual redefinition as 
pathology (Oakley; 1984; chapter 1, see also Ehrenreich and English; 1976; 15, Beech; 1985). 
With the definition of all pregnancies as potentially pathological, antenatal care obtained its 
final mandate which gave it an unprecedented degree of licence over the bodies and approved
10 Marjorie Tew has suggested that infant mortality was already in decline when 
obstetricians took over birth and that the increasing hospitalisation of birth, the focus upon 
abnormality and the employment of medical technology has actually slowed down the 
decrease in the infant mortality rate (in Bridgeman; 1993; 33, see also Gardner; 1981; 130).
11 Most kinds of contraception and infertility treatments are available only on prescription 
from a doctor, who can frequently influence the patient as to which method is most suitable 
(Gillespie and Hubbard; 1986, Klein; 1989, Andrews; 1986, Roberts; 1981, Pollack; 1985).
12 Wendy Savage was suspended from her post as Honorary Consultant in Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology to Tower Hamlets Health Authority in 1985 for alleged incompetence. In her
(1986) book she forcefully argues that she was a victim of an ongoing power struggle about 
who controls childbirth. Her real crime had been to give women too much autonomy in the 
process. See also Young (1981), for an account of the difficulty of finding room to express 
female or feminist values within medicine.
lifestyles of women (Oakley; 1984; 2)13. Further, as the role o f the doctor has become more 
central to birth, the role of the woman has become less so. Martin (1987) asserts that women 
have increasingly been seen only as machines, with the doctor as the technician who ‘fixes* 
them:
"the dominant medical metaphors applied to women’s bodies in menstruation, birth and 
menopause involve a hierarchical system of centralized control organized for the purpose of 
efficient production and speed. Medical attention usually is given when this system 
undergoes breakdown, decay, failure, or inefficiency" (Martin; 1987; 67)14.
This medical ‘take over’ was no doubt more marked in the USA than in the UK. Notably, 
midwives were actually outlawed in the USA, which was not the case in the UK (Ehrenreich 
and English; 1976, Arney; 1982). Indeed, Amey notes that British obstetrics has accorded 
women a larger role in childbirth than is the case in the USA. He adds, however, that it 
might be more appropriate to say that obstetrics was organized so that it could pay attention 
to more aspects of the woman than simply the narrowly obstetrical ones (1982; 61). Arney 
discusses the expansion of the medical gaze through the person of the midwife who would 
select who was suitable for home or hospital confinement:
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13 It seems that two basic innovations have been especially important in establishing this 
rationale of modern antenatal care: control of the timing of the onset of labour (Kitzinger; 
1978) and the medical-professional claim to know what is going on inside the uterus better 
than the pregnant woman herself (Oakley; 1984; 27).
14 This centrality of the doctor in the medical control of birth is reflected in the language 
which we use to describe it. Treichler (1990) points out the use of the verb ‘to deliver’ has 
changed in accordance with the growing medical control of birth. The construction 
traditionally used was: "she was delivered [i.e. liberated] of her child", which maintains the 
position of the woman as a subject. The present form, used from the 19th century onwards, 
o f "he delivered her child" makes clear that it is a third party who is the one to have 
delivered or ‘liberated’ the child (Treichler; 1990; 129). Thus, she argues, technological and 
professional dominance is now enshrined within language - the birth process is now projected 
as interaction between doctor and foetus. This shift is also evident in medical textbooks 
which portray the woman as the "passive host" to the uterus (Martin; 1987; 59-61). One 
doctor explains that: "[n]ormal labor is the physiologic process by which the uterus expels, 
or attempts to expel, its contents-.through the cervical opening and vagina to the outside 
world. Normal labor is characterized by periodic involuntary uterine contractions which 
produce gradual cervical effacement and dilation, as well as descent of the fetal presenting 
part" (in Treichler; 1990; 122).
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"[t]he midwife’s attention extended to the person, her beliefs, her concerns, and beyond her 
to the concerns o f her relatives and to the environment in which she found herself. Midwives 
were instructed to select some women for hospital delivery for social reasons as well as for 
strictly medical reasons" (Amey; 1982; 61).
Rather than just seeking out and containing potential pathology, obstetrics turned its attention 
to developing systems of monitoring and surveillance of all birth. These mechanisms were 
originally expressly designed as part of a demographic policy to improve the quality o f the 
nation in the years following the First World War, and reflected widespread fears triggered 
by the high infant mortality rate (Oakley; 1984). Whilst these fears may have subsided, the 
structures developed and the perceived need for them have survived. The medical control o f  
pregnancy and birth is not limited to narrow medical considerations. Rather, every aspect o f 
a woman’s life becomes subject to the obstetrical gaze because every aspect of every 
individual is potentially important - obstetrically speaking (Amey; 1982; 154).
"Does [medical experience] not involve, because of the special attention that it pays to the 
individual, a generalized vigilance that by extension applies to the group as a whole?...One 
began to conceive of a generalized presence of doctors, whose intersecting gazes form a 
network and exercise at every point in space, and at every moment in time, a constant, 
mobile, differentiated supervision" (1989b; 19, 31).
The doctor then has come to be a key figure in a decentralized network of control.
The médicalisation o f reproduction has received further legitimation from the perceived need 
to protect the foetus, and this has entrenched the development of techniques making it 
possible to see and monitor the foetus in utero. Whilst the figure of the woman fades into 
the background as the mere ‘maternal environment* or ‘grainy blur’ at the edge of the image 
(Petchesky; 1987, Hartouni; 1991), the foetus itself comes to enjoy an increasingly central 
place as a separate candidate for medical attention. Despite their benefits for individual 
women, the new technologies (ultrasound, amniocentesis, in vitro fertilisation, electronic foetal 
monitoring, routine caesarian deliveries and in utero foetal therapies) also have the effect o f  
carving out more space/time for obstetrical management of pregnancy (Petchesky; 1987; 64, 
Wells; 1993). Moreover, increasingly the major threat to foetal well-being is seen to be the
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behaviour of the pregnant woman15. The idea of the doctor as the best representative of the 
foetus receives further legitimation from medical technology which gives him/her ever more 
knowledge about previously invisible processes within the woman’s body. This also has 
implications for the regulation of abortion, in terms of entrenching the role of the doctor as 
the only one capable of representing the interests of the foetus (against those of the pregnant 
woman).
4. MEDICAL CONTROL OF ABORTION
I have so far sought to establish some very general points. First, 1 have shown that the doctor- 
patient relationship is saturated with power, that this is still further reinforced when the 
patient is a woman, and that this relationship has been used to regulate female behaviour and 
impose certain dominant norms. Secondly, I have demonstrated that reproduction is firmly 
established as a domain where medical control is seen as essential for the good of both 
woman and foetus/baby. Thirdly, I have argued that medical control of reproduction is 
established and legitimated by the development of the notion of pregnancy as pathology and 
the emergence of the foetus as a patient in its own right, with the doctor as the representative 
of its best interests. Now I will examine more specifically the operation of medical control 
and supervision in the specific case of a request for abortion. If 1 have dealt at length with 
more general questions of the médicalisation of reproduction, that is because this is the 
background against which the médicalisation of abortion must be viewed. As reproduction 
has fallen under medical control, so too have the means of avoiding it. Abortion is now 
legally and medically - even commonsensically - viewed as the exclusive province of the 
doctor, to the extent that, as Linda Gordon (1980; 515) has written, it is almost impossible 
to imagine an alternative legal context.
At the outset I would like to make two distinctions. Firstly, there will clearly be a difference 
between the experiences of women seeking access to state funded terminations and those who 
opt for abortions in the private sector (including the abortion charities, such as the British
15 See Petchesky (1987), Wells (1993). See Fortin (1988) for the spilling over of such 
ideas into the legal arena, chapter 5 below (p.100).
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Pregnancy Advisory Service). In Britain, GPs operate as gatekeepers to other health services 
and NHS terminations are obtainable only if a woman’s GP will agree to refer her to a second 
(hospital) doctor who must agree to perform the termination. Women who choose this course 
are much more likely to have some of the negative experiences described below, as there is 
no way of knowing the views o f either GP or consultant in advance, and there is certainly no 
guarantee of sympathetic treatment. If women attend a specialist abortion clinic in the private 
sector, they are therefore less likely to meet with hostility. As the latter option is normally 
available only to those women who have the necessary £200-300 to pay for the termination, 
this inevitably introduces an element of class into the analysis, with the experiences of poorer 
women being more negative. Secondly, it is also important to distinguish between different 
categories of medical professionals - notably nurses, GPs and gynaecologists/obstetricians. 
There is some evidence that there may be significant differences of opinion regarding abortion 
between these groups (Hordern; 1971; 30, Homans; 1985; Simms; 1985, Farrant; 1985)16.
In this chapter I will distinguish between four different levels of control: technical control o f 
the actual performance of abortion operations (section a), decisional control over which 
women shall be permitted to terminate their pregnancies (section b), and paternalistic and 
normalising control (sections c and d) which may be exercised over women who request 
termination (regardless of whether they are granted access to it). This is an analytical 
distinction, designed to clarify the way that power operates at this level; there is some overlap 
between the categories in practice. Some of these ‘types’ of power have received more 
attention than others - in Britain the feminist call for abortion on demand has focused on 
decisional control, typically (although not invariably) assuming a medical retention o f 
technical control.
16 Hordern indicates one possible reason for this when he cites a family doctor, who 
replied to a consultant gynaecologist that he was "much less likely to see at first hand, as do 
general practitioners, the day to day struggles of the ill-housed, impoverished mother o f a 
young family, whose husband may be sick or unemployed or ‘ne’r do well’. Has he really 
never read of a desperate, distraught mother driven to suicide, usually by gas poisoning - 
because she could not face another pregnancy? Often the mother who seeks an abortion has 
a truer conception of the dignity and sanctity of human life that those who preach the doctrine 
to her while rating the quality of her mental and physical life and her value to her family 
below that of a foetus less than 13 weeks old" (1971; 30).
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a) Technical Control over the Performance of Abortions
No law expressly prohibits any unregistered or unqualified person from practising most types 
of medicine and surgery, unless such a person deliberately represents him/herself as being a 
registered practitioner, or as having medical qualifications. Along with the treatment of 
venereal disease17, abortion is one of the few specified exceptions to this (Brazier; 1992; 11). 
Thus, although the technology involved in terminating a pregnancy is simple, under s.l of the 
Abortion Act, abortion can only be legal “when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner*'. In a creative decision of the House of Lords, this has been interpreted 
as meaning that a doctor must remain in charge and accept responsibility throughout the 
termination. However where parts the procedure can, in accordance with good medical 
practice, be performed by auxiliary staff, the operation would still fall within the terms of s.l 
of the Act, and such staff would be protected from prosecution18 19. The medical technical 
monopoly is more easily justified in some cases than in others. The most common form of 
early abortion - vacuum aspiration - is an easy and quick process with a very low rate o f side 
effects'^. Here, it is by no means self evident that such terminations could not be performed 
just as safely by trained lay personnel, nurses or midwives. Indeed, in practice, terminations 
by prostaglandins are already in large part performed by nurses rather than doctors. The 
decision of what method of termination is to be used also rests largely with the doctor rather 
than the woman herself. In Britain the favoured method for terminations in early pregnancy 
is that of vacuum aspiration, performed under general anaesthetic. The choice of general 
anaesthetic means that the majority of patients must stay one night in hospital.
Although doctors hold the monopoly of the right to perform abortions, they also benefit from 
a clearly specified right not to participate in the provision of abortion services for reasons of
17 Under the Venereal Diseases Act, 1917.
18 Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security, HL [1981 ] 1 All 
ER 545, discussed in chapter 5 below (pp. 120-3).
19 5-10% of first trimester may be followed by minor complications of which the most 
common are infection and pain and bleeding due to incomplete evacuation. Many of these 
complications are self-limiting but up to 3% may result in hospital admission (Diggory; 1991).
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conscientious objection, under s.4 of the Abortion Act20. This distinguishes abortion from 
all other treatments - there is no right to refuse to participate, for example, in the 
administration o f ECT treatments. One important result o f the right of conscientious objection 
is the extent of regional variation as to the possibility of obtaining an abortion on the NHS. 
In 1992 (the last year for which figures are available) around 50% of terminations in England 
and Wales were performed on NHS premises21, whilst in Scotland, 90-99% of the demand 
for abortion was met by the NHS (Logan; 1994; 33). Moreover, there is a tremendous degree 
of regional variation within England and Wales: in North Tyneside, 93% of women have 
their terminations on NHS premises, compared with only 3% in North and South Birmingham, 
and just 1% in Dudley and Coventry. The statistics for the Birmingham area would seem to 
be the direct result o f the hostility towards abortion of the consultant obstetricians and 
gynaecologists employed in the hospitals there and their right to exercise conscientious 
objection. Regulations have left it to the discretion of the consultant gynaecologist in charge 
of each hospital whether or not the hospital provides an abortion service22. Thus, two women 
in identical situations with the same reasons for seeking termination, but living in different 
parts of the country, are likely to receive different answers to their requests for an NHS 
termination.
The issue of technical control has been sharply thrown into relief by the decision to license 
the drug RU 486 for the provision of chemical abortions in Britain23. The Spring 1994
20 This right extends to doctors and nurses, not to administrative staff such as secretaries, 
see Janaway v Salford AHA [1988] 3 All ER 1051.
21 Around 7.5% of terminations were performed in Agencies, but funded by the NHS, 
meaning that a total of 57% of abortions were funded by the NHS. This represents an 
increase on the figures for the previous year, when 45% of abortions were performed on NHS 
premises, with an extra 5% funded but performed elsewhere. All statistics are taken from the 
annual reports issued by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, and published by the 
Birth Control Trust.
22 This may now be changing, as increasing power is given to administrators in 
purchasing services, see Paintin (1994b).
23 See chapter 7. RU 486 (mifepristone) is an abortion drug, developed by a French 
company, Roussel-Uclaf. It is available in Britain up to the ninth week of pregnancy, and 
would seem to require far less expert medical control than any other method of abortion. A 
woman using this method of termination would not need anaesthetic, and can receive
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edition of Abortion Review related that RU 486/PG abortions were now available in around 
122 NHS hospitals and 16 private clinics, and this number should continue to expand* 24. 
As will be seen in chapter 7, despite the fact that RU 486/PG abortions have been marketed 
as easier and needing less control than conventional terminations, the procedure for the 
administration of RU 486/PG has been seen as leading to an increase in the level of medical 
supervision necessary. It is especially relevant to recall here that the performance of abortions 
is (in practice) a monopoly of certain - and not all - doctors. Although the proposal of the 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) that terminations should only be 
performed and authorised by or under the supervision of a consultant gynaecologist25, was 
not incorporated into the Abortion Act, the law does provide that abortions must be performed 
in licensed medical premises (such as hospitals or clinics)26. This has greatly restricted the 
ability of some doctors - in particular GPs - to perform terminations. As will he seen in 
chapter 7, this is particularly relevant to the provision of RU 486/PG terminations, where the 
GP might otherwise administer the either one or both of the stages of treatment.
A particular instance o f de facto resistance to this technical control of abortion by doctors, 
has been the emergence of small groups performing very early abortions by menstrual 
extraction27 in the US. In the recent wave of fear that rights to abortion would be drastically
treatment as an out-patient.
24 Although reports suggest that doctors are still not well informed as to its availability. 
The Independent, 5 December 1992.
25 Even though at that time there were only 460 of these in the country (MacIntyre; 1973; 
127).
26 Except in an emergency, under s.l(3) of the Abortion Act: Hany treatment for the 
termination of pregnancy must be carried out tin a hospital vested in the Minister of Health 
or the Secretary of State under the National health Service Acts, or in a place for the time 
being approved by the said Minister or the Secretary of State".
27 On or around the day that a woman expects to begin menstruating, the contents of the 
uterus are suctioned out by way of a cannula. This will lighten and shorten menstruation and. 
if an egg has been fertilised during the preceding weeks it will be removed at the same time. 
Menstrual extraction is also known as menstrual regulation or menstrual evacuation.
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restricted there28, a self-help guide to abortion by this means, A Book of Women's Choices 
(Chalker and Downey; 1992), was published. Menstrual extraction performed in small self- 
help groups would seem to be the most radical means of rejecting the technical level of 
medical control over pregnancy (and obviously the other levels of control discussed below 
would fall with it). Here there is no ‘expert’ in the group - all the women are at once 
practitioner and patient. There is no hierarchy and no privatized knowledge which is 
available to one but not all. However, menstrual evacuation has clear limitations. First, it 
is useful only in the very early stages of pregnancy, often before a woman would even know 
with any certainty that she is pregnant (although pregnancy tests are increasingly sensitive). 
Secondly, its legality is dubious even when performed within the limits set out in the Abortion 
Ac/29. Outside o f such limits, menstrual extraction is clearly an offence under s.58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act. Thirdly, it is to be assumed that many women would not 
wish to use this method, which implies an intimacy with one’s own body and the bodies o f  
other women, that might be unwelcome to many, and involves challenging a still strong taboo 
around menstruation. Finally, whatever the claims made by exponents of the method as to 
its safety, they also note that the method is riskier when the groups are less experienced in 
its use (Chalker and Downey; 1992; 129).
b) Decisional C ontro l over Access to Abortions
Women have no positive legal right to an abortion. Rather they may request termination, and 
it is the medical professionals who must decide whether their request is founded with regard 
to the various criteria laid out by the Abortion Act. Where the doctor is not a conscientious 
objector, his/her personal position on abortion should in legal terms be irrelevant. However 
in practice this is far from the case. The opinions of doctors regarding abortion will - 
naturally enough - run the whole gamut o f those opinions present in the wider British society
28 This fear has now somewhat abated following the election of Bill Clinton to the 
Whitehouse and the Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), which was less restrictive than had been anticipated.
29 Tunkel (1979) discusses the case of Dr Goldthorp, who performed menstrual extraction 
within 10-18 days of a missed period. The DPP asserted that this was illegal. Subsequently 
the law officers (the Attorney General and Solicitor General) expressed the opinion that such 
a procedure would be legal only if performed in accordance with the terms of the Abortion 
Act.
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from very liberal (favouring abortion on demand of the woman) to very restrictive (regarding 
abortion as unacceptable in any circumstances). The crucial difference here is that no other 
member of society is normally granted the right to impose their views over those of the 
pregnant woman. There is no doubt that even women whose situations would seem to fall 
well within the conditions foreseen in the law are refused abortions, because of the 
beliefs/attitudes of the individual medical practitioner approached. For example, Denise Winn 
cites the case of a 22 year old divorcee with two children, who had suffered a miscarriage 
five months previously, was pregnant again after her ex-husband forced her to have sex while 
he was drunk. She was refused an abortion by a NHS consultant (1988; 10). The wording 
of the Abortion Act is such that it allows a very liberal or very restrictive interpretation by 
those empowered to interpret it and grant or refuse abortion. In Britain, many medical 
practitioners have taken a very liberal interpretation of thq Act and the result is that a woman 
is normally able to obtain a termination, if not on the NHS, then in the private sector. In the 
absence of a positive right to abortion, however, this may require some initiative on her part 
in order to find a sympathetic doctor where her own does not agree with her decision (and 
the funds to pay for it herself if necessary). This is likely to mean greater problems for 
certain categories of women, in particular young women, and women from ethnic minorities.
Seema Daud asserts that illegal abortion is still prevalent within the ethnic communities, with 
cultural abortifacients being imported from ‘back home’. These include bamboo sticks, or 
twigs of irritant plants (1993; 151).
The tremendous discretion left to doctors under the Abortion Act means that if a woman 
approaches her GP seeking to terminate a pregnancy, it is normally impossible for her to 
predict how her request will be received. The doctor may be supportive and helpful or 
moralising and judgmental. As was seen above, the GP has a right under the terms of s.4 of 
the Abortion Act not to participate in the provision of abortion on grounds of conscientious 
objection. Typically, he/she has no duty to refer the woman to a colleague with a different 
view of the matter30. What makes this especially problematic is that there is no way for
30 There is, however, a statutory duty under s.4(2) of the Abortion Act to particiate in any 
treatment necessary to save the life or prevent grave permanent damage to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman. See Smith and Hogan( 1988; 373-4) for the same duty 
at common law, following Bourne. There may also be a duty to discuss the possibility of
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women to know a GP’s views on abortion before approaching him/her. A proposal that the 
Abortion Act's conscientious objectors should be registered on a list which would be available 
to women, was rejected in 1990 on the grounds that it might lead to discrimination against 
them. The suggested amendment to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, was 
sponsored by Labour’s then front bench spokesperson on women, the late Jo Richardson, a 
stalwart campaigner for abortion law reform. She argued that the reform was essential to cut 
down on delays in the NHS:
”[o]ne of the problems is that doctors who have a conscientious objection to abortion tell 
women they are not entitled to abortions, when in fact they are. If a public register of doctors 
were available, women would not approach unsympathetic doctors and, as a result, get their 
abortions more quickly"31.
The problem of delay is a serious one, and has been recently highlighted with regard to  
antiprogestin terminations (see chapter 7) which depend oh a speedy referral. Women are 
often unable to choose this method of termination because their requests for abortion take so 
long to be processed. A study by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
found that in 1981, 16% of all terminations were carried out after 12 weeks, and that 2.3%  
occurred after 19 weeks (Alberman and Dennis; 1984)32. One thing which emerged clearly 
from the report was the delay between referral by the first doctor and the actual operation. 
Of those women aborting at 13-14 weeks, 25.6% had been referred by the ninth week, as had 
16.8% of those aborting at 15-16 weeks. Even more worrying was the fact that over 20% o f  
the women having their terminations between 20-23 weeks had been referred at 12 weeks, and 
7% had been referred at 9 weeks. A Birth Control Trust report provides one particularly clear 
example of how delay can build up in the NHS:
"[a] separated woman, aged 27, went to her GP when her period was one week late. He told 
her she was too early and to return in four to five weeks. The pregnancy test took ten days
amniocentesis with a view to abortion for women of over 35 (see Brazier; 1992; 308).
31 The Times, 7 June 1990.
32 The report identified four factors which contributed to delay: non-recognition o f 
pregnancy, the decision to seek an abortion, locating and obtaining medical agreement and 
a clinic or hospital to carry out the operation and waiting for admission after agreement has 
been confirmed.
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by which time she was around twelve weeks pregnant. Her GP then referred her to a 
consultant but the appointment was delayed because the consultant was on holiday. She was 
15 weeks pregnant before she was seen. The consultant agreed to perform the abortion and 
told her he would admit her for the operation when possible. She waited for the appointment 
but nothing happened. After a while she phoned the hospital and was told that the doctor was 
away again. She told the hospital of her concern over the lateness of the pregnancy and was 
told she was now too late and they could not perform the abortion. By the time she found 
alternative help she was at least 21 weeks pregnant" (Chambers in Francome; 1986; 55).
According to Francome, some of the women whom he interviewed for his study of abortion 
practice believed that doctors can sometimes deliberately create delay in the hope that women 
will continue with their pregnancies:
"I went to my doctor and at first he said I wasn’t pregnant. For a month I felt unwell and 
when I went back to him he said I was three and a half months and that I was too late for 
an abortion. I believe he said I wasn’t pregnant on purpose. I continued with the pregnancy 
but had a miscarriage" (Francome; 1986; 55).
In cases of refusal, women must go to a private clinic, or one of the abortion charities, and 
thus lose the possibility of NHS funding (which is normally dependent on a referral from 
one’s own GP). Francome cites a survey in Wessex in 1978, which showed that 16% of 
patients at the BP AS clinic had been refused NHS termination. However, he contends that 
women’s decisions to ‘go private’ are not entirely a result o f refusal but also reflect an 
unwillingness to face bureaucracy, delay and the uncertainty of how the doctor will decide 
(1986; 53). A recent survey of patients attending a London Pregnancy Advisory Service 
showed that three quarters of the respondents to a questionnaire, although not dissatisfied with 
the private care they had received, would have preferred NHS treatment had it been available 
(Abortion Review; Winter 1993).
The doctor is not legally entitled to allow abortion to any woman who asks for it without 
more ado - the one reported prosecution of a qualified doctor acting with the second opinion 
foreseen in the 1967 Act was of a doctor who took just such a view of the law33. Thus the 
law reinforces the element of decisional control, even should the individual doctor concerned 
seek to reject it, and it is clear that not every doctor would wish to do so. MacIntyre, in her
33 R v Smith [1974] 1 All ER, 376, discussed in chapter 5 below (pp. 110-2).
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analysis of the views publically expressed by the medical profession in the months leading 
up to the Abortion Act, found near unanimity even in the Medical Woman’s Federation that 
the decision should be made by the doctor although the pregnant woman would have the right 
to "state her case" (1973; 131)34. This control is seen as essential with regard to abortion 
for, as 1 argued in the previous chapter, the very nature of the woman who would seek to 
terminate her pregnancy would make her an unsuitable person to exercise self-determination.
An interesting illustration of the problem inherent in a law that demands that doctors act as 
gatekeepers, controlling access to abortion, is the case of London GP, Trisha Greenhalgh. 
Greenhalgh was approached by a pregnant woman of 38, who was married, with a large house 
and a nanny for her three children. She requested termination as pregnancy would interfere 
with her holiday plans. After counselling, Dr Greenhalgh felt unable to sign the referral form, 
but asked another GP-at the practice, who did so. Dr Greenhalgh wrote:
"I am a feminist. 1 have marched and lobbied in support of a woman’s right to choose, and 
I would do so again. But I am not a rubber stamp. I am a thinking and feeling professional 
and I must live with the clinical and ethical decisions I make" (British Medical Journal; 1992; 
371).
A piece by James Campbell in the same issue of the British Medical Journal commented that
"doctors would not need to be confronted with difficult decisions of this type if the British 
law was amended to match the law in most developed countries...[which] allows women free 
choice of abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and a reason does not have to be 
stated”.
Thus, at present, even when a doctor feels that the decision of whether or not to terminate 
should rightly belong to the woman, he/she may not feel at liberty to repudiate all control of 
the situation. Indeed, legally speaking, he/she is not entitled to do so. Greenhalgh, although 
stating a commitment to women’s right to choose, did not feel able to allow the woman 
absolute freedom of choice in these circumstances when the law still states the decision to be
34 One member of the MWF dissented , believing that the decision should belong to the 
pregnant woman. See also Tunnadine and Green: "if the doctor-patient relationship is a good 
one, the doctor is more likely to be in the best position to advise the woman on the most 
suitable course of action. Only if she has confidence in him will she be inclined to allow him 
to take control" (Tunnadine and Green; 1978; 180).
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that of the doctor. The role foreseen for the doctor is not simply to "rubber stamp".
In leaving the decision to doctors, law leaves a free rein to the individual doctor’s prejudice 
or opinion. In the exercise of the doctor’s discretion, the age, ethnic origin, class background, 
or marital status of a woman may be deemed important (Aitken Swan; 1977, MacIntyre; 
1977). Moreover, there is every indication, that the criteria used by doctors to decide who 
should have access to NHS abortions vary tremendously. MacIntyre notes that when 
examining statements made by the medical profession at the time o f the introduction of the 
1967 Act she was struck by the different rationales for decisions to refuse or to authorise 
terminations and how far these were on the periphery of medical knowledge. One doctor 
suggested that termination should be avoided for middle class women because they frequently 
consciously or unconsciously desire the pregnancy and, if they go to term, cement 
relationships with their own mothers. Another, however, considered an unwanted pregnancy 
worse for a middle class woman than for a lower class woman, whether married or not. He 
would therefore be more likely to allow a termination to the former even in the presence of 
less strong medical indications. MacIntyre concludes:
"[tjhere appears to be an extremely wide variation in the factors likely to influence different 
doctors. What is clear is that idiosyncratic moral views or definitions of social and 
psychological reality are put into practice by doctors, and that this can have enormous 
implications both for individual women and society as a whole" (MacIntyre; 1973; 132).
It also seems clear that it is easier for certain groups of women to obtain abortions. 
According to Oakley, it is unmarried women with no children whose request for abortion is 
most likely to be unsympathetically interpreted; as a group they are most likely to have 
private rather than NHS abortions (Oakley; 1981; 92, see also .McDonnell; 1984, MacIntyre; 
1977). In MacIntyre’s (1977) study of single, pregnant women it seems that students are 
deemed to have more of an interest and investment in their occupational careers than those 
already in the labour force in manual or white-collar jobs, and are thus more likely to be 
awarded abortions. Further, it is also significantly easier for women who have passed what 
is seen as the normal child bearing age to obtain abortion. An article in The Times reported 
that one in three pregnant women over the age of 40 is automatically offered an abortion by
their doctor35. Doctors have been documented as trying to ‘weed out’ ‘defective* foetuses: 
Morgan (1990) has asserted that at the time of pre-natal testing for defects in the foetus, 
women are often asked for an undertaking to terminate should it prove to be affected36. 
Another report in The Times expressed the fear that doctors are putting pressure on women 
to have abortions in certain cases of foetal abnormality37.
Wendy Savage relates the story of a West Indian single parent, whose gynaecologist refused 
to perform an abortion unless she cosented to sterilization concurrently. Whilst admitting that 
this is anecdotal, Savage argues that there is abundant published evidence that some doctors 
continue to press their ideas on women with regard to sterilisation. She points out that the 
rate of sterilization at the time of abortion has always been higher in the NHS than the non- 
NHS sector (1982; 294-5).
<
Further, decisional control makes it all the more easy for unsympathetic GPs to attempt to 
impede or hinder women seeking termination. Colin Francome suggests that sometimes 
doctors may deliberately create delay in the hope that the woman would be forced to continue 
with the pregnancy. For example, one of his interviewees relates:
"I went to my doctor and at First he said I wasn’t pregnant. For a month I felt unwell and 
when I went back to him he said I was three and a half months and that I was too late for 
an abortion. I believe he said I wasn’t pregnant on purpose. I continued with the pregnancy 
but had a miscarriage" (in Francome; 1986; 55).
Likewise one of the doctors in Isobel Allen’s study illustrated the fact that speedy treatment 
is allied to a sympathetic attitude. He said:
"[t]hey’re entitled to the benefit of the law. I’ve given up moral judgement. If it’s for a 
reason like they have a heavy mortgage etc I forget to write sometimes. I say ‘Too late, love, 
sorry. It’s the hospital appointment system. You’ll have to have the baby’" (in Cossey;
35 The Times, 15 April 1991.
36 See Amey (1982; 183) for the same assertion with regard to the USA: "some doctors 
refuse to do amniocentesis unless the woman is willing to commit herself, before the test is 
done, to an abortion in case a defective fetus is found".




Similarly, Dawn Primarolo told the House of Commons that:
"a young woman who went to see her doctor when she was two weeks pregnant. She did not 
know that her doctor was an anti-abortionist. The doctor was a man and he did not declare 
his conscience. By the time that young woman finally managed to get through the 
bureaucracy and to have the abortion that she had sought at two weeks, she was 22 weeks 
pregnant"38.
The large quantity of data collected yearly with regard to terminations performed in England 
and Wales contains no information on how many women are refused NHS terminations39 40.
The situation regarding delay is also greatly influenced by the views of senior obstetricians 
and gynaecologists and their level of commitment (or hostility) towards the provision of 
abortion services. Another Birth Control Trust report concludes that the areas which have 
been most successful in avoiding delay early terminations are those with interested and 
sympathetic gynaecologists (1987; 41). A survey conducted regarding abortion provision in 
Wessex Regional Health Authority found that twelve of its thirty-two NHS consultants had 
conscientious objections to abortion, and these consultants were directly responsible for the 
delays suffered by some Wessex women in obtaining abortion who, refused an NHS 
operation, turned to the private sector. Some districts in the Wessex RHA were served by 
only two consultants and if both had a major objection to abortion then NHS abortions were 
minimal in that district (in Cossey; 1982; 9). In 1990, the late Jo Richardson put this to the 
House of Commons:
"[i]n 1987, the consultant gynaecologist for Hexham told a Life conference that it was 
impossible - or almost impossible - to get a National Health Service abortion in Hexham. I 
wonder how late in pregnancy women in Hexham end up having abortions"41’.
The doctors’ decisional control also makes it more difficult for a woman to resist the hostility 
or moralising lecture that she may encounter: she is very much a captive audience. Such
38 H.C. Deb. Vol. 171, Col. 247, 1990 (24 April).
39 See Sackville H.C. Deb Vol. 209, Col. 605w, 1992 (17 June).
40 H.C. Deb. Vol. Col. 1156 1990 (21 June).
8 8
evidence as exists of doctors availing themselves o f the opportunity to air their views on the 
morals of the woman who has approached him/her to request a termination is largely 
anecdotal, and its occurrence is thus impossible to quantify. However, reports of such 
scenarios occur with such frequency in what studies there are of women’s experiences of 
abortion that they must be taken very seriously (see especially, Winn; 1988, Neustatter and 
Newson; 1986; Cossey; 1982, Davies; 1991, Francke; 1980). The following examples are 
taken from interviews with women who have had abortions:
"The worst part was going to my doctor, who was very insensitive and cruel. My doctor 
refused flatly to grant a termination but offered a second opinion by another doctor. The 
second was a lady who still did her best to make me feel like a monster for wanting an 
abortion" (Davies; 1991; 69-70).
"[The gynaecologist] was horrid. He treated me like a piece of meat and then really told me 
off. He said he would only consider abortion at all because I had been depressed. I had to 
be grateful he would even condescend to see me. I felt so ashamed but, also, angry. That 
behaviour made me the more determined to go ahead." (Winn; 1988; 50).
"I didn’t like her. She was trying to blame me for everything. She said I was wasting other 
people’s money and the bed" (15 year old girl describing hospital doctor; Cossey; 1982; i).
"He was determined I was going to have the baby. He said ‘...then someone else who can’t 
have babies can have your child’. It was a shock. My mum was upset and she’s got heart 
trouble, and she said ‘Don’t I have any say in it?’ and he said ‘No’ ...so we changed doctors" 
(14 year old girl talking about her GP; Cossey; 1982; i).
"Their moralising and obvious hostility...put me on the defensive. I’d used contraception 
responsibly for seven years...Although I had expected some resentment and a few nasty 
comments from anti-abortion staff, this sort of scaring tactic was hard to believe" (Cossey; 
1982; 14).
"The GP was very rude. He basically said: "my wife had her first child at 19, so what’s the 
problem?’ 1 was living with a junkie at the time, in a squat in Bath" {The Guardian; 9 May
1994).
Some of the above examples might, of course, be characterized as instances of medical 
malpractice. The point is, however, that the current regulation of abortion leaves the woman 
with very little ability to resist such treatment - she is dependent on the goodwill of the doctor 
to secure access to a termination. Moreover, she has no recourse against a doctor who does 
act in such a way. Whilst the decisional control rests with the doctor, the woman seeking 
termination has the choice between risking submitting to this treatment, or seeking a
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termination in the private sector. Obviously the possibility of taking the latter option depends 
on the woman’s financial situation and her knowledge of the existence of such services. 
Whether or not an individual doctor grants access to abortion is based on his/her perception 
of the situation - the only control over the doctor being that his/her opinion must be formed 
in good faith: there is no requirement that the opinion be reasonable and judges are reluctant 
to supervise how the doctors will exercise this control (see chapter 5). Moreover, widespread 
social deference to medical authority makes it difficult for a woman to challenge a medical 
refusal for termination41.
c) Paternalistic Control
In a work which focused on how a patient’s initial presentation of complaints was diagnosed 
and treated in the course of consultation, Kathy Davis argues that the process is carrie'd out 
not strictly on the basis of medical and scientific criteria, but is also tied up with the 
constitution of an asymmetrical gender relationship (1988a, 1988b). She speaks of the Janus 
quality of interviews, with GPs often being sympathetic and kind, but still making moral 
judgments or failing to take women’s problems seriously: "it was precisely the intimate, 
pleasant quality of the medical encounter itself that made issues like power and control 
continue to seem like something else" (1988a; 48). Davis thus developed the concept of 
paternalistic control in order to understand the way in which power was being deployed in 
these encounters. She defines paternalism as:
"limiting the freedom of another person by means of well-meant regulations. In this way, 
benevolent intentions are combined with relations of power. The person in authority may 
restrict and coerce, but only for the good of the other...Paternalism...impIies a relationship of 
asymmetry. The original model for a paternalistic relationship is that of parent and child" 
(1988b; 23-4, references omitted).
In abortion, where the legal regulation is overtly paternalistic, explicitly according the doctor 
the power to decide in the woman’s best interests, this kind of power is especially significant. 
Moreover, as was seen in chapter 2, the woman seeking abortion is powerfully constructed 
as someone in need of this kind of control. The doctor’s function is viewed as apostolic: to
41 On the acquiescence of women in the face of medical power, see: Roberts (1985), 
Gallagher (1987; 13), Cooke and Ronalds (1987), Kitzinger (1978). See Martin (1987), 
however, for instance of resistance.
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guide the woman to the correct decision, one which will be objectively discernible to the 
trained doctor with access to medical knowledge. The doctor thus is better equipped than the 
woman herself to determine what constitutes her best interests. Thus, here I want to 
emphasise that even where the doctor is sympathetic and kind towards the pregnant woman, 
he/she may equally deploy power over her, influencing her course of action, rather than 
working to help her to make her own decision.
* ■ -
This interpretation of the medical relationship fully concords with the role of the doctor as 
foreseen in the Parliamentary debates which, as was seen above, was that of someone who 
would be able to reassure and support the woman, and encourage her to go ahead with the 
pregnancy. Paternalistic control may involve influencing a woman to continue (or equally to 
terminate) a pregnancy. Equally, it may be failing to tell her about some of the alternatives 
open to her - the doctor has more power over the ‘agenda’ of what will be talked about in 
the medical interview. The doctors in MacIntyre’s study varied as to which options they 
would discuss with a woman. Some said they would present all women with all the possible 
alternatives (including abortion), some said they would mention the possibility of abortion 
only after ascertaining that the woman was not intending to marry, others said that they would 
discuss termination at all unless the woman herself raised the subject. One doctor told her:
"[s]he must bring up the subject of termination - 1 won’t. I think if they’d like a termination 
they will bring the subject up - 1 don’t want to put ideas into their heads" (MacIntyre; 1977; 
75).
Further, doctors may put pressure on women, telling younger women that they must inform 
their parents (MacIntyre; 1977; 80, Cossey; 1982; i), or attempting to persuade reluctant 
women to tell their sexual partner. Several of the doctors in MacIntyre’s study said that they 
favoured marriage as the best ‘solution’ to an unwanted pregnancy. One of them told her:
"[t]he majority of girls, those I’ve known since they were children, I manage to persuade 
them to get married. Girls from outside town, those I haven’t seen previously - they’re more 
difficult to persuade. Occasionally, girls do come in demanding termination but most can be 
talked out of it" (1977; 75-6).
Another had quite opposite views:
"[i]f they say, ‘I ’m getting married in September anyway’ I ask if they realty were intending
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to - I’m enough of a rebel to say, ‘Don’t get married if it’s just because of the pregnancy’" 
(MacIntyre; 1977; 76 - emphasis in original).
d) Normalizing Control in the Medical Interview
"In order to be able to offer each of our patients a course of treatment perfectly adapted to 
his illness and to himself, we try to obtain a complete, objective idea of his case; we gather 
together in a file of his own all the information we have about him. We 1 observe' him in the 
same way that we observe the stars or a laboratory experiment" (Sournia; 1962; in Foucault; 
1989b; xv).
There is also, I would assert, a fourth important deployment o f power in the request for a 
termination of pregnancy, which goes beyond these three levels - this is the element of a 
normalising control exercised over women in the process of their request for an abortion. 
This ‘type’ of control is, of those described here, the least tangible and the most difficult to 
define coherently. Normalisation is the combination and generalisation of ‘panoptic 
techniques’: a process of insertion, distribution, surveillance and observation, which subsumes 
other forms of power (Foucault; 1991). Through constant observation, all those subject to 
control are individualized, and a body of knowledge about them is built up, with examinations 
producing dossiers and records containing observations about each individual.
"Not only has power now introduced individuality in the field of observation, but power fixes 
that objective individuality in the field of writing. A vast, meticulous documentary apparatus 
becomes an essential component of the growth of power" (1991; 190).
Details of the woman’s abortion will be recorded in her medical records and also registered 
on notification forms which must be forwarded to the Chief Medical Officer (or the Secretary 
of State for Scotland). These reports enable the authorities to fix a web of objective 
codification, as more knowledge leads to more specification. This accumulation of 
documentation regarding individual women in a systematic ordering makes
"possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of groups, the 
characterization of collective facts, the calculation of gaps between individuals, their 
distribution in a given population" (Foucault; 1991; 190).
In the field of abortion, this is seen in the yearly publication of statistics which provide a 
wide range of information about which women have terminated pregnancies in the preceding
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year. Thus we know reasonably accurately how .many women of a childbearing age (15-44) 
will terminate their pregnancies in any given year, where they live, their marital status, age, 
how many children exist in their family, the grounds for performing the termination and so 
on.
A woman may succeed in obtaining an abortion referral from her GP, and have her pregnancy 
terminated, yet to achieve this she must still undergo a certain interviewing process. The 
strategy of the deployment of power which I want to capture here is that control exercised 
in the process of the medical interviews preceding an abortion, firstly the initial interview 
with one’s GP preceding referral (or refusal of the same) and secondly, that with the 
obstetrician/gynaecologist. Here, there is the requirement that the woman open herself to the 
medical gaze and reveal quite intimate details of her personal life in order to justify her 
request and convince the doctor, as it is the doctor’s interpretation of her life experiences 
which will be valid and recognised for all official purposes. The very way that the law is 
phrased seeks to make every aspect of the woman’s life and "actual or reasonably foreseeable 
environment" relevant to her application. Indeed, it imposes the medical surveillance and 
control as a duty.
A 1978 book entitled Unwanted Pregnancy: Accident or Illness, written by two doctors, 
provides a particularly interesting insight into how abortion interviews might serve as sites 
in a network of normalising power. The book provides a study of various women seeking 
abortion, with the aim of increasing the abortion counsellor’s understanding of the ‘illness’ 
(sic) underlying these women’s requests for terminations (Tunnadine and Green; 1978; 15)42. 
The doctors’ information comes from a discussion group with other doctors each of whom 
would present to the group an account of each woman who approached them with a request 
for abortion. They present forty two case studies selected from the one hundred and forty 
seven women considered in their study. Here I will discuss just the first one by way of 
illustration of their approach.
42 This idea that a desire to terminate a pregnancy is an illness, reflects a common 
assumption that deviant behaviour in females often arises from psychological problems (see 
Smart; 1976; chapter 6). One might also think back to Oakley’s assertion that pregnancy in 
itself has increasingly become seen as a state of pathology (1984; chapter 1).
The ‘relevant’ facts of the first ‘case’ (as they present them) are as follows: the patient, 
‘Angeline’, was 26 and married with 3 children. At her first appointment, she said that she 
had become pregnant as the result of an accident, and had decided with her husband that she 
would have an abortion. Her doctor told her that she should make the decision for herself, 
but that he would make an appointment with a gynaecologist for her, and see her regularly 
in the meantime. At the next appointment, she came with her children. The third 
appointment was missed, and the fourth time she came without making an appointment. 
‘Angeline’ had left home at 19, because of a bad relationship with her mother. She had 
recently seen her mother in the High Street, yet they had turned away from each other without 
speaking. She experienced a sexual coolness between the births of her first and second 
children, and had also complained at this time of a lack of energy. During the second 
pregnancy, she had rectal pain and, after the birth of her second child, the husband sent her 
to the doctor because of dyspareunia. Lack of finance forced the couple to move to a smaller 
house, she conceived again and towards the end of the pregnancy, she had a series of minor 
haemorrhages. After delivery the placenta was reported to be perfectly normal (Tunnadine 
and Green; 1978; 10-12). From these facts, the doctors draw the following conclusions:
”[i]t could be seen from the above that there are signs that Angeline was someone who had 
shown, at least over the last few years, an inability to cope with her sexual life and her 
pregnancies. She had never really matured and yet Angeline’s GP attempted to get her to 
make her own decision. She had to decide what to do despite the evidence that she was not 
a responsible or full-value woman" (1978; 12, my italics).
Her GP was then criticized for having allowed ‘Angeline’ to take the decision regarding her 
abortion for herself.
Over and above the extremely negative picture of the woman seeking abortion painted by 
these doctors, I find two things particularly striking about this case study. The first is the 
extent of the detail which the examining doctor is able to report from the woman’s life. 
Although he was criticised for his failure to really get to know the woman’s situation, the 
doctor is still able to relate details of the couple’s finances (why they had to move to a 
smaller house) and sex life. He even knows when ‘Angeline’ last saw her mother, and what 
the circumstances and outcome of the meeting were. All of this is seen as necessary and 
relevant in her request for abortion and yet is still deemed insufficient detail by the study.
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If this is considered an insufficient knowledge of the woman’s life, one can only wonder what 
degree of minute detail Tunnadine and Green would feel is necessary. I am reminded of the 
quotation from Soumia with which I opened this section:
"we gather together in a file of his own all the information we have about him. We ‘observe’ 
him in the same way that we observe the stars or a laboratory experiment" (in Foucault; 
1989b; xv).
The woman is required only to be passive in terms o f decision-making. However, as 
Douzinas and McVeigh point out (with regard to the medical interview in general),
"the patient is required to speak and to explain her relationship with the world (sexual, social, 
business etc)...the medical object becomes the speaking subject, the orator of the personal 
experience or relation of health" (1992; 20).
The second thing which particularly impressed me about this study is that the authors feel 
able to draw very radical conclusions from such information as they do have. The bad 
relationship between Angeline and her mother no doubt seemed particularly important to 
them, given the strong significance which they attach to the maternal relationship (1978; 181, 
183). The "inability to cope with her sexual life and her pregnancies" is presumably inferred 
from the sexual coolness between the births of two of her children - perhaps it is also this that 
leads them to assert that she is not a "full-value woman". The conclusion of irresponsibility 
is possibly based upon the fact that ‘Angeline’ had difficulty in keeping her appointments (a 
fairly obvious alternative interpretation might be that as ‘Angeline’ has three children to care 
for she does not enjoy complete freedom with her own time). The doctors here consider the 
details of ‘Angeline’s’ life to produce an authorized account of her reality - albeit one that 
may have precious little to do with her lived experience of it. Their account, moreover, has 
the stamp of medical ‘truth’. I argued above that the power of the doctor is tied to his/her 
ability to understand, to classify, and then on this basis to treat. After a close surveillance, 
‘Angeline’ is located within a conceptual framework, her problems identified and explained, 
her sickness understood, the correct treatment decided. In the normal course of events, the 
examining doctor will then go on (if the woman is referred for abortion) to register the 
abortion, with explanation for the contraindications which justify her referral. It is thus
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his/her version of events which are officially recorded in state archives43, and in the 
woman’s medical records.
What is especially relevant about Tunnadine and Green’s book is the light which it sheds on 
the medical method: the woman’s life is put under the spotlight, her problem is located within 
a medical frame of reference, and the medical professional can thus claim the power to 
understand and to cure. This same process, I would argue is present even in the approach of 
the far more progressive Dr Greenhalgh (discussed above, p.84). Greenhalgh talks in depth 
to the woman seeking abortion, assesses her situation and then decides that a referral is 
unjustified. Despite her own liberal views on abortion, and the fact that she has marched in 
favour of a woman’s right to choose, she cannot recommend a referral in this case. Her 
perception of her role is not that of a "thinking and feeling professional", rather than a ‘rubber 
stamp’. The criteria may be different, the process is the same.
Several of the women in Sally MacIntyre’s (1977) study were surprised and somewhat 
disconcerted by the amount of questions which their GPs asked regarding their pasts. As one 
woman concisely put it: "[w]hat does it matter what form of contraception we was using - it 
didna’ work, did it?" (1977; 81). MacIntyre comments:
"[¡Information about events and relationships in the past provided GPs with the major 
evidence by which they could typify the women and understand their circumstances. This 
could be resented by women wishing a simpler form of diagnosis and management, e.g. who 
wished confirmation of pregnancy and access to further services. Some saw questions about 
the past as prurient curiosity that had to be tolerated in order to obtain the required services, 
and as irrelevant to the management of their pregnancies" (1977; 81).
MacIntyre contends that GPs use the abortion interview to classify (single) women into 
certain categories, and these categories (combined with the GP’s own views on abortion) 
influenced whether termination will be recommended. She identifies three ideal types: 
normal-as-if-married women (who would, o f course, continue their pregnancies), nice girls 
who made mistakes (who would have abortions or surrender their babies for adoption) and
43 Section 2 of the Abortion Act provides that every abortion referral must be notified to 
the State, with such other information as required by the Minister of Health (for England and 
Wales) or the Secretary of State (for Scotland).
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bad, promiscuous girls (who did not deserve abortion).
Other women haven spoken about these interviews as painful and unpleasant:
"[h]e kept asking questions about my boyfriend...very embarrassing questions which I 
wouldn’t answer...he made my mum cry" (Cossey; 1982; i).
"I took great exception to being told off in a very condescending, humiliating manner. He 
wanted to know how long I’d known the man and asked what kind of relationship we’d have 
after this. I told him it was none o f his business. He treated me like a stupid little girl. 1 was 
almost in tears and I was furious that he should have made me feel like this" (Cossey; 1982; 
14).
Uncertainty as to how one’s request will be received by doctors means that women may feel 
the need to convince doctors that they are justified in seeking abortion and thus are unable 
to really talk through their reasons for abortion in a way that may be helpful for them, or to 
voice any uncertainty or ambivalence about choosing abortion. This belies the idea that the 
GP’s role is that of counsellor. The woman’s awareness that the final decision rests with the 
doctor undermines any possibility of his/her acting effectively in this way (Hiihn; 1992, Berer; 
1993), even where this is how the GP views his/her role. Two of the women interviewed by 
Denise Winn, expressed this very clearly:
"I felt I had to express guilt to get a letter for an abortion, so the decision was made. I felt 
I couldn’t have expressed reservations".
"I told the doctor that 1 was only 22, did shift-work, had no home and everything was chaotic. 
1 think I was saying all that because I was basically going to ask for an abortion. So 1 was 
putting forward the negatives" (1988; 51, 47).
I do not want to overstate the existence o f what I have classified here as ‘normalizing’ 
control. While this is built into the very structure of the medical interview, it’s extent will 
vary from interview to interview. One factor which may minimise the woman’s experience 
of this type of control might be simply that, given the current pressures on GPs in terms of 
the time they can spend with patients, he/she will not have a great deal of time to investigate 
the woman’s situation fully, before making his/her decision as to referral.
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5. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the relationship between a doctor and a woman approaching him/her for 
a pregnancy termination is pervaded with power. The patient approaches the doctor as a lay 
person to an expert, (s)he is the object of knowledge which the doctor must locate within a 
medical framework, to understand, to classify and to treat. This perceived need for medical 
control is reinforced when the patient is a woman, and even more so when she is a woman 
seeking abortion. With regard to abortion, this control operates firstly at the level of a 
technical control of the means of avoiding reproduction, secondly at the level of decisional 
control - policing who should (and who should not) be allowed the possibility of an abortion, 
thirdly at the level of paternalistic control (where the benevolent doctor still enforces his/her 
views through ‘persuasion’), and lastly at the level of a normalizing control exercised in the 
medical interview over women seeking abortion.
If we accept with Foucault, that a claim to knowledge is always already an assertion of 
power, then it seems that as new and more complex techniques and medical knowledges are 
developed, this will inevitably enhance and enforce still further the medical control over 
women’s lives. Oakley has warned, "[retention of absolute control over technical procedures 
is absolutely necessary for the survival of modern medical power” (Oakley; 1987; 46, see also 
Barrett; 1980; 168). Likewise, there is no guarantee that the removal of decisional control 
can by itself solve the problems posed by other forms of control: Davis’ study shows 
paternalistic control as prevalent in doctor-(female) patient interaction regarding other medical 
matters (1988a). It is questionable, then, how easily the process of separating out the various 
strands of control, which I have here attempted on an analytical level, will be possible in 
practice.
It might be argued that state and law are neutral in this matter, with women’s negative 
experience in access to abortion stemming from the hostility of individual medical 
practitioners. However, such official ‘neutrality’ serves to support the existing status quo and 
the power imbalance which characterises it. Law does more than this, however: it imposes 
the control of the woman as the doctor’s responsibility. A doctor fulfilling the role foreseen 
for him/her by statute, will exercise all those forms of control described above. Those doctors
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those who view their role as one of helping the woman to make her own choice 
do so by attempting to step outside of this role.
A final point to bear in mind, is that this chapter has revealed some of the very negative 
consequences for women of the fact that control of abortion rests so firmly in medical hands. 
In the next chapter, I want to go on to examine the relevant case law in this area, and here 
we will see the other side of the coin - some o f the positive aspects of medical control, and 
notably the strategic benefits which it has brought: protection against the power of third 
parties (such as parents and sexual partners).
who do not * 
for example -
CHAPTER 5: THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION 
OF MEDICAL DISCRETION
"ƒ do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the institutions ofjustice 
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the 
judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, 
administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory"1.
"Not only would it be a bold and brave judge who would seek to interfere with the discretion 
of doctors acting under the [Abortion] Act, but I  think he would really be a foolish judge who 
would attempt to do any such thing, unless possibly, there is clear bad faith and an obvious 
attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence. Even then, of course, the question is whether that 
is a matter which should be left to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney- 
General"2.
1 Foucault (1979b; 144).
2 Pa ton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1978] 2 All ER, 987 at 992.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As was seen in the previous chapter, the medical control of reproduction is a matter which 
has provoked a great deal of concern and an ever-expanding literature from feminist 
commentators. The role of the courts in protecting and entrenching such control has not 
escaped the attention o f such writers, and judicial decisions provide important focal points for 
conflict in the ongoing struggle between advocates of medical discretion and those who are 
concerned to protect female bodily autonomy. In particular, the growth of the body of 
medical knowledge regarding the development of the foetus has already led to important 
social restraints on the autonomy of pregnant women, and worries have been expressed of the 
possible consequences of importing such knowledges are imported into law. In an article in 
the Modern Law Review, Jane Fortin has argued that it is only right that law should take 
account of such matters for: “[i]n most circumstances, the unborn child is much more likely 
to be harmed, not by a third party but by his [sic] own mother“3. The courts have so far 
refused to make the foetus a ward of court in order to protect it against the activities of the 
woman who is carrying it4, but they have been prepared to take account of a woman’s 
conduct during pregnancy, when considering the need to make a care order following the 
baby’s birth5.
3 Fortin continues: "[t]he expansion of biological and medical knowledge about the needs 
of the unborn child show that it is at its most vulnerable at the earliest stages of its gestational 
development and that foetal abuse or neglect at this time, may do serious and permanent 
structural damage. It is now well known, for example, that the excessive consumption of 
drugs or alcohol and the excessive smoking of cigarettes by the pregnant mother is hazardous 
to the health of her unborn child. There are many other sources of potential harm; safeguards 
are now commonly taken against unsuitable or inadequate maternal diet and workplace 
hazards such as exposure to radiation or harmful chemicals of various kinds" (1988a; 75).
4 Re F  [1988] 2 WLR 1288, [1988] 2 All ER, 193. The courts refused a local authority’s 
application for an order to restrain a pregnant woman who was mentally disturbed, had a 
history of drug use and led a ‘nomadic existence’.
5 D (a minor) v Berkshire County Council and others [1987] 1 All ER 20. A woman who 
was a registered drug addict and had taken drugs throughout her pregnancy, gave birth to a 
baby born with drug withdrawal symptoms. The local authority obtained care and control of 
the child by order of the juvenile court on the grounds that, inter alia, the mother’s abuse of 
her own bodily health during pregnancy had avoidably impaired or neglected the child’s 
proper development, see Bainham (1987) and Fortin (1988b).
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The aim of this chapter will be to discuss the case law dealing with various aspects of the 
regulation of abortion, and in particular to highlight the médicalisation of the jurisprudence 
in this area. However, it is important that this should be considered in the context of 
decisions in other areas of law in order to form a basis for the argument which I wish to 
make in this chapter: whilst all o f the cases which I will consider below are strongly 
influenced by judicial deference for medical opinion, in the case law dealing with abortion, 
this may have had quite different results for considerations of women’s bodily autonomy. 
Consequently, I will first sketch two of the more recent cases where medical discretion and 
female autonomy have come into conflict (section 2), before going on to examine in more 
detail some of the cases which have arisen with regard to abortion (section 3).
2. FEMALE AUTONOMY IN CO NFLICT W ITH M EDICAL DISCRETION
a) Re S (Refusal of Medical Treatment)6
S was admitted into hospital with the foetus in a position of traverse lie with an elbow 
protruding through the cervix. Doctors attempted to persuade her to have a caesarian section 
but, backed by her husband, she refused on religious grounds. The doctors applied to the 
courts for a declaration that they could lawfully perform the operation even in the absence 
of S ’s consent, the consultant surgeon testifying that it was a question of "minutes rather than 
hours" and that this was a "life and death situation". He maintained that S’s baby could not 
be born alive in the absence of a caesarian operation and that S herself was in imminent 
danger of a rupture of the uterus.
The position in English law is that a caesarian section (like any operation) is saved from 
constituting an assault only by the patient’s consent to it, and a mentally competent adult 
patient has every right to withhold consent. The position in this case seemed to be 
complicated, however, by a statement made obiter by Donaldson, MR in an earlier case, Re 
T7, where he specified the only possible qualification to this principle might be: "a case in
6 Family Division, 12 October, 1992, N U  23 October, 1992.
7 Re T (refusal of medical treatment) , NLJ 7 August 1992. This case concerned the 
legality of giving a blood transfusion to an unconscious patient who had previously refused 
her consent to such a process.
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which the choice may lead to the death o f a viable foetus” (1126)8. It is into this legal 
lacuna which Re S fits. Sir Stephen Brown, President o f the Family Division granted the 
declaration as sought and the caesarian was performed. S ’s baby died shortly afterwards and 
her own condition was reported to be critical following the operation. In his reasoning Sir 
Stephen seems to go no further than noting that this point seemed to have been left open in 
Re r ,  judging the caesarian to be in the best medical interests, and stating (probably 
incorrectly) that an injunction would be accorded under U.S. jurisprudence9 10. As Derek 
Morgan quite rightly points out this should have been no more than the starting point for his 
deliberations (1992; 1448). It seems relatively clear, however, that the only possible legal 
basis for the decision can be the (medically determined) interests of the foetus.
Re S provoked a storm of discussion and protest'0. Its precise effects in law remain 
uncertain, but its potential implications seem to be great. The case has been reported as the 
first time in English law that the rights of the unborn child have taken precedence over the 
rights of the pregnant woman to determine her treatment11 and as establishing that a 
competent woman’s absolute right to decide treatment could be overridden where the 
operation might save the child’s life and would do the mother no harm12. As Morgan wryly 
adds in his commentary on this case,
”if non-consensual caesarian can be described as doing the mother no harm then it is difficult 
to imagine how other possible interventions to the benefit of the foetus could be refused" 
(1992; 1448).
The legal precedent remains, despite the fact that the ethical committee of the Royal College
K Donaldson does not precise any legal basis for this one possible qualification.
9 The judge refers to the case of Re A.C. (1990) A 2d 1235, where an order to perform 
a caesarian section was granted by a trial judge against the woman’s wishes. However, he 
seemed to be unaware that the Court of Appeals had later overturned and roundly condemned 
the decision.
10 See Morgan (1992), Young (1993), Bridgeman (1993b, 1993c) Wells (1993) and Draper
(1993).
" The Guardian, 14 October 92.
The Times, 14 October, 1992.12
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of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists have since decided that the life of the foetus should not 
give doctors grounds for overriding a woman’s explicit refusal to undergo a ‘caesarian 
section13. Further, as Allan Levy (1992) indicated: "[¡]f the ruling was in the interests of 
the unborn child and recognises its rights, it could fuel the anti-abortion lobby and have 
unpredictable consequences"14.
b) R e  W 15
Another controversial area and point of potential conflict between female autonomy and 
medical control is that of the ability of minors to give or withhold consent to medical 
treatment. In the case of Re W, the doctors of an anorexic 17 year old, who had expressed 
her wish to refuse medical treatment, were granted permission to force feed her. Jo 
Bridgeman mounts a strong critique of this judgment as "taking a paternalistic approach, 
based on the assumption that treatment recommended by the medical profession must always 
be in the patient’s best interests" (1993; 69). For Bridgeman, this case highlights an illogical 
distinction in the law regarding the medical treatment of minors: whereas children arc often 
now allowed to override parental wishes in consenting to medical procedures, they cannot 
override parental wishes in refusing to consent to such procedures16. Within the context of 
judicial respect for medical opinion, this distinction becomes easier to understand - in the first 
case the child is agreeing with the medical opinion, in the second she/he seeks to oppose it. 
The latter requires parental consent, the former not. This reveals the courts as essentially pro­
treatment or at least as biased towards upholding the decision of the medical professionals 
involved.
13 The Guardian, 13 April 1994.
14 The Guardian, 14 October 1992.
15 The High Court judgment was reported as Re J, the Court of Appeal judgment as Re 
(The Times, 14 May 1992).
16 Under Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 403, 
a child of under 16 with the necessary intelligence and understanding can consent to medical 
treatment; however she/he does not have the ability to refuse treatment. In the latter case, 
other parties (and notably parents) can give consent on her/his behalf, even when the child 
has explicitly refused consent to a procedure.
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In the light of these two cases, it may not seem surprising that medical power has been 
perceived by feminist writers as such a significant threat to women’s bodily autonomy. In 
these cases of conflict between woman and doctor, the judicial respect for medical discretion 
and prioritisation of medical opinion in defining a woman’s best interests has facilitated a 
significant encroachment into women’s bodily autonomy. Moreover, whilst these cases 
remain exceptional, it is impossible to know what practical day to day effect they have in 
weighting the power balance in the doctor-patient relationship still more heavily against the 
patient. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to see this as a serious compromise of the consent 
requirement. What real meaning can a patient’s consent to a procedure have, if she believes 
that if she withholds the consent, the doctor can secure a court order to authorise treatment 
without it?
3. THE MEDICAL CONTROL OF ABORTION
The medical control of abortion cannot be understood outside of the context of these other 
cases of judicial support for medical discretion. Yet for abortion, 1 would argue, the existing 
case law has a very different flavour. In the two cases discussed above, a woman’s claim of 
bodily autonomy has come into conflict with her medically defined ‘best interests’. In the 
cases dealing with abortion which I will discuss below, however, the woman normally 
approaches the court in conjunction with her doctor. Thus, in these cases, the same judicial 
prioritisation o f medical opinion and reluctance to interfere with good medical practice has 
had far more positive results for women and their possibility to exercise some reproductive 
autonomy in deciding to terminate a pregnancy. Where problems may still occur, however, 
is when law is called upon not to protect the medical relationship from outside challenge, but 
to protect the woman within it.
First, I will address five series of cases involving the regulation o f abortion which have been 
faced by the English courts: a) prosecutions for the unlawful procurement of miscarriage 
under s.58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, prior to 1967; and b) after 1967; c) 
applications for injunctions to restrain an intended abortion; d) the legality of abortions by 
medical induction and; e) cases of abortion where consent is problematic (where the pregnant 
woman is a minor or is mentally handicapped). Finally, I will address another case which
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looks poised to enter the English courts: that of non-consensual abortion, 
a) Prosecutions under s.58 OAPA: P rio r to  the 1967 A ct
Even prior to the introduction of the 1967 Abortion Act, there were relatively few 
prosecutions for illegal abortion. As was noted in chapter 2, despite estimates of 10,000 to
100,000 illegal abortions per year, in 1966 there were 62 prosecutions, only 28 of which 
resulted in convictions entailing prison sentences. Further, very few of these prosecutions 
were of registered medical practitioners. Prosecutions before and after the introduction of the 
Abortion Act seem to be based on two criteria: whether, the abortionist is a qualified doctor, 
and if so whether he/she was operating within the bounds of good medical practice.
i) R v Bourne17
Until 1967 the provision of legal abortion in Britain was ruled by R v Bourne and this still 
forms the basis for what abortions are performed in the six counties of Northern Ireland, 
where the Abortion Act does not apply18. In this case, a girl of 14 was pregnant as the result 
of being raped by a group of soldiers. Alec Bourne, a surgeon with a good reputation n 
openly performed an abortion in a London hospital without charging any fee. He was 
charged under s.58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, with unlawfully procuring 
an abortion. The Offences Against the Person Act provided no specific defence against this 
crime, however the judge, Macnaghten J., directed that the word "unlawfully” implied that 
there must also be certain circumstances in which abortion might be considered lawful. He 
argued that the scope of lawful abortion should be equated with the scope of lawful child 
destruction under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. Thus, the jury were directed that in order 
for Bourne to be convicted, that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
operation was not performed "in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the 
mother”. Here Macnaghten, J. established a wide definition of life which was to form the
17 3 All ER [1938] 615.
18 An amendment aiming to extend the Abortion Act to Norther Ireland was firmly 
rejected in 1990, by 267 to 131 votes. All M.P.s representing Northern Irish constituencies 
(all of whom are male) voted against the reform. As several of them commented, it was the 
First issue to unite them for some time. In 1990, 1,855 Northern Irish women travelled to 
Britain to terminate their pregnancies (OPCS figures).
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basis of the performance of legal abortions for the next thirty years:
"if the doctor is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the 
probable consequences of the continuance o f the pregnancy will be to make the woman a 
physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor, who, in 
those circumstances, and in that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of 
preserving the life of the woman"19.
According to his (1962) autobiography, Bourne had actually made the decision to bring such 
a case to court three years earlier when, to his anger, his house surgeon had walked out 
during a termination performed on a girl of a similar age. He himself informed the police 
of the operation, and it seems highly probable that he would never have been prosecuted were 
he not to have done so. His acquittal rests squarely on the fact that he is a qualified doctor. 
This is noteworthy in that at this time, no such distinction existed in statute as to the 
professional status of the abortionist (Hoggett; 1968; 256). In his summing up, however, the 
judge pointedly and repeatedly distinguished between the act of the professional abortionist 
and an operation openly performed by a qualified surgeon. He contrasted the case in hand 
with another which had come before the court earlier in the month. In the first case
"a woman without any medical skill or any medical qualifications did what is alleged against 
Mr. Bourne here...She did it for money. £2 5s. was her fee, and she came from a distance 
to a place in London to do it...She came, she used her instrument, and, within an interval of 
time measured not by minutes but by seconds, the victim of her malpractice was dead on the 
floor. She was paid the rest of her fee and she went away. That is the class of case that 
usually comes before the court. The case here is very different. A man of the highest skill, 
openly, in one of our great hospitals, performs the operation...as an act of charity, without fee 
or reward, and unquestionably believing that he was doing the right thing, and that he ought, 
in the performance of his duty as a member of a profession devoted to the alleviation of 
human suffering, to do it" (619)20.
1V Cited approvingly in Newton v Stungo, Crim. L.R. [1958] 469, and Bergmann and 
Ferguson, BMJ 22 May 1948, 1008.
20 And later at 617: "[this case] has nothing to do with the ordinary cases of procuring 
abortion to which I have already referred. In those cases, the operation is performed by a 
person of no skill, with no medical qualifications, and there is no pretence that it is done for 
the preservation of the mother’s life. Cases o f that sort are in no way affected by the 
consideration of the question that is put before you. In the ordinary cases, no question of that 
sort can arise. It is obvious that the defence could not be available to the professional 
abortionist". The same distinction is made once again at 621.
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Indeed, it was the norm in such cases to distinguish between ‘respectable’ qualified medical 
providers of abortion acting within the bounds of good medical practice and unscrupulous, 
unqualified backstreet abortionists, operating for profit. Again, in the later case of R v 
Bergmann and Ferguson21, a sharp distinction was made between unqualified people 
performing such operations and those lawfully engaged in the practice of medicine. Drs 
Bergmann and Ferguson were subsequently acquitted (not, however, before the former had 
attempted suicide). It seems, however, that this stark division between the altruistic medical 
practitioner and callous and greedy backstreet abortionist is far from representing the reality. 
It belies the fact that a great many of the qualified medical practitioners were actually making 
large sums of money from performing abortion (see Ferris; 1966 and chapter 2 above) and 
that at least some backstreet abortionists were motivated more by compassion and a desire 
to help a woman in trouble than by any financial motive. Sometimes these abortionists were 
women who had first terminated a pregnancy for a friend in trouble and frequently they 
charged very low amounts for their services. Moya Woodside (1963) interviewed 44 women 
who were in Holloway prison for the performance of abortions in the early 1960s. She found 
that although most knew abortion to be illegal, they did not feel it to be wrong. They 
asserted that they had acted out of "compassion and feminine solidarity" for women facing 
unwanted pregnancies and denied that financial gain was their chief motivation (1963; 100).
According to Andrew Grubb (1990; 152), Bourne marks the first (albeit primitive) regulation 
of abortion. Three factors are especially significant in the form of this regulation: first, the 
judge notes that only the medical profession can lawfully perform abortions; secondly, a 
doctor should act only when he has consulted some other member of the profession of high 
standing; thirdly, the judge distinguishes between paid and unpaid abortionists. As Grubb 
rightly points out, the bases for such requirements are not easily found in law, but they 
provide the first judicial confirmation of the ascendancy of the medical profession over any 
rivals it might have had in earlier times, whilst sketching some safeguards against possible 
abuse by doctors. This case clearly signals the lines which will be followed by the British 
courts in treating abortion as a medical procedure. Thus judicial confirmation of greater
21 Reported in the British Medical Journal (22 May 1948) 1008-9. This case would 
appear to extend the test as laid down in Bourne, demanding not that a belief be reasonable, 
but merely that it be honest.
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access to abortion is integrally related to the tightening of an exclusionary medical monopoly 
over it.
ii) R v Newton and Stungo22
In this case a woman, Ms Smith was referred to Dr Newton by a psychiatrist, Dr Stungo, 
who deemed that, given her suicidal state, her pregnancy should be terminated. Dr Newton 
saw Ms Smith at 2.30, told her to think about it and come back at 5.30. When she returned, 
still requesting an abortion, he administered utus paste by way of uterine injection and sent 
her off to her hotel in a taxi. He charged Ms Smith a total of £75 for the operation, accepting 
the sum in cash in advance. He admitted that the fee was high, but explained that he had 
done this on purpose "to discourage her from having anything done". Ms Smith became ill 
the same evening and was vomiting continuously the following morning. Dr Newton 
examined her. Her condition continued to deteriorate and on the third day he claimed that 
he decided to send her to hospital, but that she declined. She actually went to hospital the 
following day. The prosecution claimed that the delay in sending Ms Smith into hospital 
showed gross negligence or an intention to conceal for as long as possible the fact that he had 
terminated her pregnancy. In the letter requesting her admission to hospital, Dr Newton 
stated the reason for admission as "incomplete abortion" but made no reference to the fact 
that it was he who had operated. Further, according to the registrar at the hospital, when Dr 
Newton phoned to check on Ms Smith’s condition he explicitly denied that he himself had 
performed the abortion.
The respective verdicts delivered for the two defendants are instructive. Dr Stungo, who had 
acted in accordance with regular medical practice, and whose good faith was demonstrated 
by the low fee (of three guineas) which he had charged, was acquitted of being an accessory 
before the fact to using an instrument to procure a miscarriage under s.58 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act, 1861. Dr Newton, however, was found guilty both under this section, 
and also of manslaughter by unlawfully using an instrument to procure a miscarriage. He was 
sentenced to consecutive terms of two and three years’ imprisonment respectively. Dr
22 Crim. L.R. [1958] 469. See Harvard (1958) for more detail o f the facts o f this case.
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Newton had not acted in accordance with good medical procedure. He had operated in his 
consulting rooms, without admitting Ms Smith to hospital, and without anyone else being 
present. He delayed in admitting her to hospital and then (apparently) lied about the fact that 
it was he who had terminated the pregnancy. Finally, he had charged an unusually large 
amount for performing the operation. The expert witness for the prosecution testified that 
where a patient was three months pregnant, the normal medical practice would be to keep her 
in hospital for five to seven days. He refused to recognise Dr Newton’s actions as proper: 
indeed everything about them pointed to the fact that he was carrying out the operation 
clandestinely for profit. If he had charged a lower fee and had carried out the operation more 
openly, it is highly unlikely that he would have been convicted. Harvard writing of this case 
argues: ;
"in practice it is often found that a doctor who terminates pregnancy unlawfully will make 
certain departures from accepted medical practice in order to conceal the matter. Such is the 
integrity of the medical profession that abortions carried out under the accepted medical 
procedure are rarely, if ever, questioned, at any rate since the decision in Bourne" (1958; 
607).
He goes on to conclude that this case has
"confirmed that the accepted medical indications for terminating pregnancy will be recognised 
as constituting the defence of necessity. Providing the operation is carried out in good faith 
for the purposes of preserving the life or health of the woman the doctors have nothing to 
fear" (1958; 613)23.
b) Prosecutions under s.58 OAPA: after the 1967 Abortion Act
If there were few prosecutions before the Abortion Act, understandably there have been still 
fewer following its introduction. In fact, there has been just one reported conviction of a 
doctor operating with the necessary second opinion foreseen in 'the Abortion Act. One might 
have foreseen the possibility of more prosecutions - the Act explicitly refuses complete 
freedom of action to doctors, but rather allows them to perform abortions in the presence of 
specified indications. However the only requirement for the doctor in attesting to the 
condition of such conditions is that he/she reached his/her decision in good faith. There is 
no requirement that the assessment be a reasonable one. As Hoggett foresaw in the months
23 See also the case of R v Sumner (1958) Glamorgan Assizes, discussed in Harvard 
(1958; 600).
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before the Abortion Act came into force: "the availability o f abortion will rather be governed 
by medical ethics than by legal requirement" (1968; 257). Later, Denning MR, in a judgment 
which is explicitly hostile towards the liberal provision of abortion, confirms this in asserting 
the impossibility of controlling the doctor’s decision beyond the requirement for good faith. 
He states that the only limitations on abortion imposed by the Abortion Act are the 
requirement of a certificate signed by two doctors, that the abortion must be done in hospital 
or other licensed premises, and that it must be done by a registered medical practitioner24.
Moreover, the courts have exercised only a minimum of supervision as to what constitutes 
good faith. In a frequently cited comment from the judgment in Paton v BPASy Baker P 
notes that:
"not only would it be a bold and brave judge who would seek to interfere with the discretion 
of doctors acting under the [Abortion] Actf but 1 think he would really be a foolish judge who 
would attempt to do any such thing"25.
The "discretion of doctors" is interpreted by the judge here very widely, as anything which 
does not include "bad faith and an obvious attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence". Even 
then, according to Baker P, it is possible that this matter may still be best left to higher 
judicial authority. Given the judicial reluctance to prosecute doctors in this matter, it is 
worth examining in some detail the only reported prosecution of a registered doctor operating 
within the 1967 Act.
i) R v Smith26
A woman of 19, who wanted an abortion, was sent to Dr Smith, a general practitioner, with 
a specialised practice in the termination of pregnancies. Dr Smith neither examined her 
internally nor enquired about her medical history but agreed to perform the operation on the
24 Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security, 1 All ER
[1981] 545, at 554.
25 [1978] 2 All ER, 987 at 992. Cited approvingly by Donaldson, MR in C v S [1987] 
1 All ER 1230, at 1243.
26 [1974] 1 All ER 376, 1 WLR 1510, 58 Cr App Rep 106.
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payment of a fee of £150 a week or so later. Their appointment lasted just 15 minutes, and 
he made no suggestion of the need for a second opinion or further inquiries. Eight days later, 
Dr Smith performed the abortion at a nursing home. The woman did not see any other doctor 
in the meantime, nor were any enquiries or investigations made about her. Further, there was 
some doubt as to whether the operation was carried out in accordance with good medical 
practice. In particular, she claimed that her anaesthetic was administered by a man who was 
later identified as a porter at the nursing home. Dr Smith was subsequently charged and 
convicted of illegally procuring a miscarriage under s.58 o f the Offences Against the Person 
Acty 1861. It was held that he was not protected b the defence offered under the Abortion 
Acty as he cannot have been acting in good faith when he operated, having allowed himself 
no opportunity to form a bona fide opinion as to the balance of risks between termination and 
continuation of pregnancy. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.
The case is interesting for the light which it throws on the very liberal judicial interpretation 
of the limitations imposed on the medical profession by the 1967 Act. Scarman LI 
summarizes the operation of the Abortion Act in the following way:
"[t]he Act, though it renders lawful abortions that before its enactment would have been 
unlawful, does not depart from the basic principle of the common law as declared in R v 
Bourne, namely that the legality of an abortion depends on the opinion of the doctor. It has 
introduced the safeguard of two opinions: but, if they are formed in good faith by the time 
the operation is undertaken, the abortion is lawful. Thus a great social responsibility is firmly 
placed by the law on the shoulders of the medical profession" (381).
However, this does not delegate total responsibility to the medical profession:
-[¡if a case is brought to trial which calls in question the bona Tides of a doctor, the jury, not 
the medical profession, must decide the issue...By leaving the ultimate question to the jury, 
the law retains its ability to protect society from an abuse of the Act" (381).
Again, however, the only requirement is one o f good faith.
The issue of the case became according to Scarman, U  to determine whether or not Dr Smith 
had abused the trust placed in him by the Act of Parliament (383). As the judge in first 
instance had explained Doctor Smith’s actions in his summing up:
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"[the defendant] took the view that if any girl wanted her pregnancy terminated, that of itself 
was, if not entirely sufficient, a very powerful indication of the risk of injury to her mental 
health if the pregnancy continued being greater than if the pregnancy was terminated".
The verdict of the court reveals that to authorise abortion for no more reason than a woman’s 
desire to have one was indeed an abuse. It seems from the judgments delivered in R v Smith, 
that if Dr Smith had examined the woman then there would have been no possibility for the 
judges to ‘second-guess’ his opinion. His failure here was that, objectively, there was no 
possible way in which his opinion could have been formed in good faith based on an 
assessment of the case in hand, as there was no possibility that a real assessment had been 
made. Rather he was prepared to provide a termination for any woman who had the money 
to pay for it. Other actions of Dr Smith’s also indicated a failure to act in accordance with 
good medical practice: the doubt as to who applied the anaesthetic, the fact that their 
appointment was so short, his failure to inform the woman of the need for a second opinion 
and the size of his fee.
Significantly, the doctor’s failure to act in good faith is evidenced by the fact that he did not 
act within the bounds of good medical practice. This standard is not met here because of his 
failure to exercise the level of medical control foreseen in law. Dr Smith advised the woman 
that she might have an abortion without any medical investigation or discussion of her social 
circumstances. His defence was that if any girl wanted her pregnancy terminated, that of 
itself was a very powerful indication of the risk of injury to her mental health. There is no 
suggestion that there was any danger to the woman’s health as a result of Dr Smith’s actions, 
however, his actions are an abdication of the role that Parliament had foreseen for him. 
Indeed, given the role of the doctor as envisaged in the Parliamentary debates as discussed 
in chapter 2 (see especially pp. 34-5), it is hardly surprising that the conduct of Dr Smith 
failed to measure up. Another doctor gave evidence to the court that:
"one would want to know as much as one could about the patient’s general background and 
so on...Then there is the girl’s own history, her past medical history, has there been mental 
illness in the family, one would expect to check that".
As Scarman, LJ summarises: "[h]e made it clear that in his opinion careful enquiries on a 
number of matters would be needed before an opinion could be formed" (382).
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Thus, at least as it was seen in 1971, the discretion granted to doctors under the 1967 Act has 
one very important limit: it does not include a discretion to abdicate control and allow 
abortions indiscriminately, simply on the basis that the pregnant woman wants it (and is able 
to pay for it). Although some doctors may operate in this manner, they are expected to 
justify their decision in some other way. A minimum of control is demanded and will be 
enforced by the law. This would be a very minimalist level of control however - presumably 
a cursory medical examination would suffice. This is reinforced by the 1976 Regulations 
issued by the Minister of Health, which require the doctors to base their opinions on the 
woman’s individual circumstances and to state whether they were formed after seeing the 
patient27.
ii) Notification Forms and the *Statistical Argument*
It is unlikely that the British courts will see a similar prosecution to the one described above. 
Now it seems to be widely accepted that some doctors are very liberal in their interpretation 
of the Abortion Act. In 1982, in an effort to tighten up the rules for legal abortion, the 
1 Department of Health and Social Security changed the abortion notification forms. The new
forms made no reference to the environmental grounds2” for termination of pregnancy. 
Rather, they demanded to know the main medical condition justifying abortion, whereas the 
previous form had specifically left a space for non-medical grounds29. Pro-choice doctors 
responded by answering with ‘pregnancy’ as the grounds justifying an operation. No 
prosecutions have been brought in these cases. Indeed such a prosecution would be extremely 
difficult as, under s.l of the Abortion Act, an abortion is justified where there is risk to the 
| woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated. It is generally agreed that where
abortion is performed early in the pregnancy, statistically speaking, it poses less of a risk to 
' the woman than carrying the pregnancy to term. A successful prosecution of a doctor in these
circumstances would need to show that the doctor on trial did not honestly believe these
i
27 Abortion (Amendment) Regulations 1976 (SI 1976 No 15), see Grubb (1990; 152).
28 S.l(2) of the Abortion Act which states: ”[i]n determining whether the continuance of 
a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of
i subsection ( 1 ) of this section, account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or
' reasonably foreseeable environment."




statistics to be valid, and so had failed to act in good faith (Brazier; 1992; 292). Thus, it 
would seem that abortions (at least where performed in the first trimester), can be freely 
available from a doctor who is prepared to accept the statistical argument. However this does 
not relieve doctors of their duty to make a comparison between the risks to the particular 
woman of continuing or terminating a given pregnancy: as was seen above the 1967 Act 
requires the doctor to make an individualised decision (see Grubb; 1990; 155).
What the courts have done in these cases is to actively protect and entrench the monopoly of 
doctors, whilst policing those marginal cases which did not fall within the bounds of good 
medical practice. This accords with a long tradition o f leaving the regulation and control of 
medical practice largely to the medical profession (Kennedy; 1988; 5). As has been seen 
above, the courts act only in the most exceptional cases, and this serves to sanction and 
legitimate the ‘ordinary* cases in which they do not intervene. Further, they confirm the 
legitimacy of day to day medical practice by adopting medical standards (‘normal medical 
practice* or ‘good medical practice’) and punishing only those who deviate from it. Thus, 
in the interaction between the two systems (legal and medical), doctors can be held criminally 
liable when they deviate from what are thus essentially standards developed within the 
medical profession30. Judges constantly reiterate and reinforce the naturalness and 
correctness of the medical control of abortion and the autonomy of medical practice. This 
seems to neatly illustrate an argument made by Peter Fitzpatrick (forthcoming):
”[b]y intervening occasionally and to correct excess, law confirms the normal run of 
administration as the unexceptional, as ‘the nature of things’. In their relation, there are 
indefinable but inevitable limits to what law can do about administration. The supervising 
judge will ultimately recognise and respect the bounds or the integrity of administrative 
expertise".
And as Grubb concludes:
"[t]here can be little doubt that the English judiciary has no desire to challenge, except in the 
most exceptional circumstances, the medical decision-making power conferred upon doctors
30 Compare this with the standard of medical negligence as established by BolamvFriern 
Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 at 121: "[a] doctor is not guilty of 
negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible 
body of medical men skilled in that particular art." Again the court must judge the actions 
of doctors against the standards of their peers.
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by the Abortion Act 1967" (1990; 156).
The judicial recognition of the authority o f these ‘parallel judges* of the medical profession, 
has meant that doctors who decide to take a liberal interpretation of the Abortion Act are 
unchecked, and women’s access to legal abortion is thus facilitated.
c) Injunctions to Restrain Abortion
Judicial reluctance to step within the area o f discretion carved out for medicine can also be 
seen in cases where injunctions to restrain a proposed abortion have been requested. Such 
an injunction has never been granted in the UK, nor, to the best of my knowledge, in any 
other common law jurisdiction, with the one notable exception of the Canadian case of 
Tremblay v Daigle. Here, the judge at first instance granted the woman’s sexual partner an 
injunction to prevent her proposed abortion, commenting that:
”[t]he child conceived but not yet born, regardless of the term that is given to his civil status, 
constitutes a reality which must be taken into consideration. It is not an inanimate object, nor 
anyone’s property, but a living human entity, distinct from that of the mother that carries it, 
which two human beings have give existence to, which they procreated, and which, at first 
blush, is entitled to life and to the protection of those who conceived it"31.
This case has since been overturned, however, and is hence bad law. There have been two 
well-publicised failed attempts to secure such injunctions from the UK courts.
31 (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 609, per Bernier JA, at 613. He continues: "[a] person who 
freely does an act must assume its consequences. Pregnancy is not in itself an infringement 
of the physical integrity of a woman, an interference with her body, but a function which is 
a fundamental part of her nature. The rule of nature is that a pregnancy must be carried to 
term. The right to voluntarily terminate it constitutes an exception to this general rule. To 
arbitrarily have recourse to this without reasonable grounds constitutes at any stage of a 
pregnancy an abuse of right. On the other hand, a woman is entitled to an abortion if there 
are reasonable grounds for doing this in the light of the stage of pregnancy. The further 
advanced the pregnancy, the more serious and peremptory must be the grounds...But when 
the interests of the mother are contrary to those of her unborn child, when she wishes to 
terminate her pregnancy in a situation where the public interest is not involved, it is 
unquestionably the right of the father, on serious and reasonable grounds, to oppose the 
abortion. This legal interest is based on the very fact of conception of which both the father 
and mother were the cause. It is his child as much as it is the mother’s, neither more, neither 
less." See Graycar and Morgan (1990; 218-9) on this case.
116
i) Paton v Trustees o f  British Pregnancy Advisory Service32
Mrs Paton obtained the two necessary certificates from registered medical practitioners, which 
would enable her to have her pregnancy lawfully terminated under s.l(l)(a) of the Abortion 
Act, She did not consult her husband, nor was he consulted by the authorising doctors. Mr 
Paton opposed the foreseen abortion, arguing that he had a right to have a say in the destiny 
of his child. He applied to the court for an injunction restraining his wife from causing or 
permitting an abortion to be carried out on her without his consent. The Court refused the 
injunction on the basis that a husband had no right, enforceable either at law or in equity, to 
stop his wife having, or a registered medical practitioner performing, a legal abortion. The 
court refused to supervise the discretion of a doctor acting under the Abortion Act where there 
was no clear indication of bad faith.
Paton clearly illustrates the judicial attitude to the position of doctors acting within the 1967 
Act. The judgments clearly show the role of médicalisation in depoliticising the judges’ 
decision. The judges here explicitly deny the relevance of moral values stating an aim of 
applying the law, "free of emotion or predilection"33. The first question addressed by the 
court was whether the plaintiff had any right which was enforceable at law. The foetus was 
held to be incapable of having any rights of its own until born and having a separate 
existence from its mother (989). To have succeeded, the case must have rested on the rights 
of the father. As the illegitimate father can have no rights at all (other than those which he 
is explicitly accorded by statute), the claim would have had to have rested on his rights as 
a husband (990), but the court will not seek to enforce or restrain by injunction matrimonial 
obligations. Therefore, Baker P concluded that the husband cannot by injunction prevent his 
wife from having a lawful abortion within the terms of the Abortion Act (991). He dismissed 
the plaintiff’s claim that if the doctors did not hold their views in good faith (which would 
be an issue triable by jury following R v Smith, see above), then the plaintiff might recover 
an injunction. Baker P held that it was unnecessary to decide this "academic question" 
because it did not arise in this case:
32 [1978] 2 All ER, 987.
33 Per Baker, P. at 989. Cited approvingly in C v S [1987] 1 All ER 1230, ät 1238.
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"[m]y own view is that it would be quite impossible for the courts in any event to supervise 
the operation of the 1967 Act. The great social responsibility is firmly placed by the law, on 
the shoulders of the medical profession” (991).
He concluded that it was not and could not be suggested that the certificate was given by the 
doctors in other than good faith and that that was an end to the matter in law (991). He 
ended his consideration of English law with the now famous words (which are cited more 
fully above): "not only would it be a bold and brave judge...who would seek to interfere with 
the discretion of doctors acting under the 1967 Act, but I think he would really be a foolish 
judge...” (992).
The husband’s action thus failed in the face of the broad discretion accorded to doctors 
working within the terms of the Abortion Act, and the refusal of the judges to police within 
this discretion. Paton was the first occasion that the courts were faced with making such a 
decision, and it was not self-evident that they would have found in such a way34. 
Furthermore, the case was taken all the way to the European Court of Human Rights, and so 
the decision is supported by the very highest authority35. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
few similar actions have been brought. Indeed, only one further attempt to obtain an 
injunction to restrain an abortion has been reported in the UK.
34 The decision goes against the prediction of an earlier article in the Modern Law Review 
which foresaw the necessity of consent, at least where the couple were cohabiting. O’Neill, 
and Watson argued that: ”[i]t seems quite feasible that the court might hold, not only that it 
has a duty to protect the unborn child, but also that the child’s father has a right to request 
that it do so. If sympathy ever guides a court in coming to its decision on law, such 
sympathy might well, in the case of an abortion apparently ”on demand”, guide the court 
towards a decision in favour of the father" (1975; 184).
35 Paton v UK [1980] ECHR 408. The Commission (the preliminary screening body for 
the Court) held that the right to respect for family life cannot be interpreted so widely as to 
confer on the father a right to be consulted or to make applications about an abortion his wife 
intends to have performed. Grubb (1990; 157) has argued, however, that this case may not 
be the last word at this level, as the decision was narrowly expressed: Mrs Paton was only 
8  weeks pregnant and the Commission made it clear that it was not concerned with balancing 
the rights of a mature foetus with those of the woman, for this was a case where the 
pregnancy was in its initial stages. Further, the Commission restricted its decision to cases 
where there is a 'medical indication’ for abortion in the interests of the woman’s life or 
health. For example, it specifically excluded from its consideration, abortions performed on 
eugenic grounds.
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i i )  C v S 36
The case of C v S involved an application by Robert Carver, president of the Oxford 
University Pro-Life group, on his own behalf and as next friend of the ‘child en ventre sa 
mère’, for an injunction to restrain his pregnant ex-girlfriend, from terminating her pregnancy. 
Carver conceded that he had no locus standi based on a claim o f biological paternity (this 
much was clear from Paton37). However, he argued that he had a sufficient personal interest 
to do so as the proposed termination would be a crime concerning the life of his child. 
Further he argued that the unborn child was a proper party to the proceedings since it was the 
subject of a threatened crime. Carver argued that the issue to be decided could be 
distinguished from that in Paton, given the gestational age of the foetus (between 18 and 21 
weeks). This, he argued, meant that it w as "capable o f being born alive" and the act of 
aborting it would thus constitute the offence of child destruction under s.l(b) of the Infant 
Life (Preservation) Act, 1929. Carver defined "capable o f being bom alive" in terms of the 
ability to demonstrate real and discernible signs of life, namely a primitive circulation and 
movement of the limbs.
The judge at first instance refused to grant an injunction, holding that the foetus had no right 
to be a party and that the father had failed to establish that an offence under the 1929 Act 
would be committed if the termination was carried out. The father appealed to the Court of 
Appeal which dismissed the action, holding that although a foetus of between 18 and 21 
weeks of gestation could be said to demonstrate real and discernible signs of life, the medical 
evidence was such that it would not be "capable of being born alive" within s .l( l)  of the 
1929 Act. This decision was reached by the court on the basis that the foetus would be 
incapable of breathing either naturally or with the aid of a ventilator - and that "capable of 
being born alive" also included some capacity for independent survival. Given that lung 
development does not occur until around 24 weeks of gestational development, capacity for 
life could not be presumed before that point. The House of Lord upheld the decision by
36 [1987] 2 WLR 1108, [1987] 1 All ER 1230.
37 Indeed Mr Paton would have been in a stronger position to make such a claim as he 
was married to the pregnant woman, and thus would have been the child’s legal guardian. 
Further, Baker clearly dismisses the possibility that the putative or illegitimate father could 
have any rights at all in such a case, Paton v BPAS [1978] 2 All ER 987, at 990.
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refusing leave to appeal38.
Thus the issue in C v S is essentially a medical one, and the task of the judges is to sift 
through medical evidence provided in the affidavits of "medical men, all of high reputation 
and great experience" (1235) to arrive at the correct definition of "capable of being bom 
alive". Here the judge must take into account the "rapid, extensive and truly remarkable 
developments in medical science, not least in the field of obstetrics" (1238). The interesting 
thing about C v S is that, despite the very clear authority of Paton, Carver still thought that 
there was a possibility to obtain an injunction by challenging the received legal construction 
(i.e. the rebuttable presumption that viability is presumed to occur at 28 weeks, contained in 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929) with the argument that it has been overtaken by 
medical technology and the production of expert medical witnesses to testify to this effect. 
The judge is then forced to step onto essentially medical territory, in weighing up different 
medical criteria for viability and choosing from amongst them. In so doing, he does indeed 
find that the limit of 28 weeks too high, but fails to accept the criteria (and the still lower 
time limit) proposed by Carver. The judge also weighs up the different medical definitions 
against pre-existing case law on the matter, and thus retains final authority for the law39. 
He adds:
"[i]t is not necessary for me, nor would I want, to try to decide on affidavit evidence in a 
somewhat limited sphere the answer, which baffles men and women with great scientific 
expertise, to a very profound question. I would, however, say that I am not greatly attracted
38 C v 5, could no longer occur in the same form as s.37 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act has specifically uncoupled the application of the Abortion Act from that of 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act and introduced a fixed upper time limit of 24 weeks into 
the Abortion Act (except in the presence of some specified contraindications). It is worth 
noting that although Carver lost this case in the courts, he won it out of them: S felt unable 
to go through with the termination following all the publicity surrounding the case.
39 The following cases were referred to (at 1239): R v Handley (1874) 13 Cox CC 79, a 
child was considered to have been ‘born alive* when it existed as a live child, breathing and 
living by reason of its breathing, through its own lungs alone, without deriving any of its 
living or power of living by or through any connection with its mother. R v Poulton (1832) 
5 C&P 329, 172 ER 997, even the fact of a child having breathed was said not to be 
conclusive proof of it having been in ‘a living state*. In R v Enoch (1833) 5 C&P 539, 172 
ER 1089 and R v Wright (1841) 9 C&P 754, 173 ER 1039, the judge directed the jury that 
to be alive there must be, in addition to breathing, a circulation independent of the mother.
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to the very limited definition relied on by [the expert medical witness for the plaintiff] and 
I do not accept it as a realistic one" (1240).
Paton and C v S show the same reluctance on the behalf of the judiciary to supervise the 
doctors or to second-guess their decisions (other than in clear cases of bad faith or bad 
medical practice) as was seen in the other cases described in sections a) and b) above. As 
Sir Roger Ormrod, then a judge of the Court o f Appeal and a qualified doctor stated in 1976:
"[a]bortion has become generally available, if not yet quite on demand, but subject only to 
the attitude of the surgeon concerned or of the clinic to which the woman is referred" (in 
Grubb; 1990; 154).
d) Protection of M edical Practice: Term inations by M edical Induction
Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social 
Security40
The Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) sent out a circular to regional and area 
medical officers and district nursing officers, dealing with abortions by medical induction41. 
In it they advised that it was not necessary for a registered medical practitioner personally to 
perform every action in the process, providing that he/she decided on and initiated the process 
and remained responsible for it throughout. The Royal College o f Nurses (RCN) claimed a 
declaration from the courts that the advice given in the department’s letter and annexes was 
unlawful in that nurses were not registered medical practitioners, and that the defence in 
s .l( l)  of the Abortion Act, applying only when "pregnancy is terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner", was therefore not available to them.
Woolf, J., deciding the case at first instance, decided in favour of the DHSS, arguing that 
s .l( l)  should not be interpreted narrowly. The RCN appealed to the Court of Appeal who
40 QBD, CA and HL [1981] 1 All ER 545.
41 The procedure for abortion by medical induction is as follows: a doctor inserts a 
catheter into the woman’s uterus and subsequent steps are earned out either in whole or in 
part by nursing staff, who may be responsible for connecting a pump to the catheter which 
would feed the prostaglandins into the woman, and monitoring the process which could take 
anything up to 30 hours. The prostaglandins serve to induce uterine contractions which will 
expel the foetus and terminate the pregnancy.
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overturned the decision. In turn, the DHSS appealed to the House of Lords which (by a 
majority verdict of 3:2) reversed the Court of Appeal's decision42, holding that the 1967 Act 
must be construed in the light o f the fact that it was intended to clarify the previously 
unsatisfactory law, to broaden the grounds on which abortions might lawfully be obtained and 
to ensure that they were carried out with proper skill in hygienic conditions in ordinary 
hospitals as part of ordinary medical care and in accordance with normal hospital practice. 
Thus, in the words of Diplock, LJ:
"a registered medical practitioner.-.should accept responsibility for all stages of the treatment 
for the termination of the pregnancy. The particular method to be used should be decided by 
the doctor in charge of the treatment for termination of the pregnancy; he should carry out 
any physical acts, forming part of the treatment, that in accordance with accepted medical 
practice are done only by qualified medical practitioners, and should give specific instructions 
as to the carrying out of such parts of the treatment as in accordance with accepted medical 
practice are carried out by nurses or other members of the hospital staff without medical 
qualifications. To each of them, the doctor, or his substitute, should be available to be 
consulted or called on for assistance from beginning to end of the treatment" (571 )43.
There is almost a circularity to the logic here: doctors are legally authorised to do what 
doctors normally do. In fact, this is a clear statement of the judicial preference for self­
regulation by the medical profession, and the development of standards for .good medical 
practice to be determined within the profession. Accordingly, so long as a doctor prescribed 
the treatment for the termination, remained in charge and accepted responsibility throughout, 
and the treatment was carried out in accordance with his directions, the pregnancy was 
"terminated by a registered medical practitioner" for the purposes of the 1967 Act, and any 
person taking part in the termination was entitled to the protection afforded by s .l(l) .
42 This case was thus decided by the narrowest of margins. As Smith writes in his 
commentary of it: "[f]ive judges answered the question in the negative and four in the 
affirmative - but as three of the four were sitting in the House of Lords, their opinion 
prevailed" (1981; 323).
43 See also Woolf, J. at 553: "the registered medical practitioner must decide on the 
termination; the process must be initiated by him, and he must remain throughout responsible 
for its overall conduct and control in the sense that any actions needed to bring it to a 
conclusion are done by appropriately skilled staff acting on his specific instructions, but not 
necessarily in his presence, though he or another registered medical practitioner must be 
available to be called if required".
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This case is notable for several reasons. W hat first struck me on reading it is the extent to 
which those judges who found for the DHSS are prepared to stretch an interpretation of the 
terms of the Abortion Act in order to reach an acceptable decision. The decision which the 
House of Lords eventually comes to is the common sense verdict and no doubt accords with 
"the obvious intention of the Act"44, yet it is one that is squared with the actual wording 
of the statute only with great difficulty. W hen the doctor’s actual involvement in the 
termination is limited to the insertion o f the catheter - an act preparatory to the 
administration of the prostaglandins which cause the uterus to contract and expel the foetus - 
it involves a rather creative interpretation to see the doctor as terminating the pregnancy 
rather than the nursing staff who do everything else. Explicitly underlying this decision is 
a refusal to interfere with ‘good medical practice’.
Liz Kingdom welcomed the final (House of Lords) verdict in the case, saying that had it 
upheld the Court of Appeal that this would have been "a setback to feminists’ hopes that 
trained personnel other than registered medical practitioners might, in the future, lawfully 
terminate pregnancies" (1991; 53). However, whilst Kingdom is correct to state that this case 
does not represent a setback to such hopes, neither would it be right to see it as particularly 
advancing them45. It appears that the situation is now governed by the statement of Lord 
Diplock cited above. Whilst nurses are hereby authorised to do certain actions in this kind 
of termination, they can still do so only under the control of the doctor who retains the 
ultimate responsibility for the operation. This strict hierarchy o f the relationship between 
doctor and nurses is thus reproduced in the legal assessment and the doctors’ legal monopoly 
is reasserted. Especially telling here is Lord Keith’s statement:
"I find it impossible to hold that the doctor’s role is other than that of a principal; and I think 
he would be very surprised to hear that the nurse was the principal and he himself only an 
accessory" (575).
122
44 See Hoggett: "[t]he obvious intention o f the Act is to protect not only the doctor but 
any person who takes part in an abortion, such as nursing and theatre staff, and any person 
who procures or supplies instruments or other abortifacients knowing that they are to be used 
"with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman"" (1968; 254).
45 The one area where I feel it may advance them is the liberalisation of the 
administration of drugs in antiprogestin terminations (see chapter 7  below).
The doctor’s control o f the process is thus enforced: it doesn’t matter if it is the nurse who 
physically performs the actions necessary to bring about termination, so long as the doctor 
remains in control and instructs. As Montgomery comments on this case:
"[i]n order to justify the [Department of Health and Social Security’s] position it was 
necessary to construe the actions of the nurses as being those of the doctors in the eyes of the 
law...their Lordships characterised the relationship between the two professionals as one in 
which the nurse is little more that the doctor’s handmaiden" (1992; 145).
Kingdom raises a second interesting point with regard to this case: the fact that the catalyst 
which provoked this case was a departmental circular46. This highlights a trend in the 
regulation of abortion for decisions to be made at the level o f administration/medical practice. 
As Kingdom notes, in the RCN case the use of administrative measures was consistent with 
improved abortion facilities. However in other cases it is not. Kingdom also cites the 
introduction of new notification forms which I discussed above (pp. 113-4). Pro-choice 
campaigners were concerned that the absence of any reference to the ‘environment clause’ 
on the notification form could influence the willingness of doctors to use that clause when 
authorising terminations. Resistance was situated within a concern that the forms heralded 
the removal of the basis for any future campaign for independent social grounds for abortion 
(Kingdom; 1991; 53).
The RCN case demonstrates again how the reluctance of law to interfere with medical 
discretion and good medical practice, can benefit women by protecting the provision of 
abortion services.
e) Abortion in the Absence of Consent: Minors and the Mentally Handicapped
Abortion - like any medical procedure - is only saved from constituting an assault by way of 
the consent of the patient. In certain cases this is problematic as the pregnant woman is not 
legally competent to consent, either because she is too young, because she is mentally 
handicapped or (as will be considered in the following section) in an emergency situation
46 In the Court of Appeal decision, Lord Denning criticised this, commenting that: ”[i]f 
the Department of Health want the nurses to terminate a pregnancy, the Minister should go 
to Parliament to get the statute altered...that is the way to amend the law and not by means 
of a departmental circular" (557).
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where she is unconscious. In such cases, difficult ethical and legal issues arise as to who is 
in a position to make the decision on her behalf. Since the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority*1, the courts have adhered to the principle that where the 
care and upbringing o f  a child was at issue, the court must treat the welfare of the child as 
the paramount consideration. In practice, very often the courts find that these best interests 
of the child accord with the opinion of the medical professionals involved.
i )  Re B 47 8
L, a schoolgirl o f 12, was cared for by her mother until she was 18 months old. Since then 
she had been brought up by her maternal grandparents, but was in regular contact with her 
mother, who now had two other children living with her. L became pregnant and being 
informed of the pregnancy by her GP, the local authority initiated wardship proceedings and 
applied to have the pregnancy terminated. The Official Solicitor (who represented L), the 
maternal grandparents and the putative father of 16 all supported L, who was said to be "of 
normal intelligence and understanding" and who had been "constant" in her wish to have the 
abortion. Her mother, however, opposed the application, arguing that "it is not right to take 
the baby’s life". Medical evidence was conflicting. Two obstetricians and gynaecologists 
said that L, who was small in build, was both physically immature and mentally 
inexperienced and although termination would be traumatic it was her best interests. A 
different prognosis was offered by two obstetricians and gynaecologists on behalf of the 
mother, who suggested that psychological effects might surface years after an abortion and 
there was also a risk of future premature births. In their view the risk of an abortion at this 
stage was higher than the risk of pregnancy. However, it seems that they were also clearly 
influenced by considerations other than the strictly medical, as they also argued that it was 
"wrong to kill the baby simply because it is inconvenient to have". Referring to Gillick (see 
p. 124 above), Hollis J. rejected the view that "it is wrong to kill the baby" as putting the
47 [1985] 3 All ER 403. In this case, the House of Lords upheld the right of doctors to 
give contraceptives and contraceptive advice to minors, even in the absence of parental 
consent. This case also established the principle that the ability o f a child under the age of 
16 to give her/his consent to medical treatment and advice depends on her/his level of 
understanding and intelligence.
48 The Independent, 22 May, 1991 (Family Division).
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interest of the foetus and not the ward of court as paramount. Having considered L’s age, 
the wishes of all those concerned, the competing medical opinions and the view of the 
Official Solicitor, he asserted that it was clearly in L’s best interests to have the pregnancy 
terminated since its continuance involved greater risk both to her mental and physical health.
One commentator has described this case as an important landmark in the continuing erosion 
of parental rights, complaining that it is now the medical profession who has the power to 
define what is in the best interests of the child:
"[t]oday, on medical matters, at least, parental rights seem relatively unimportant, and the 
medical profession apparently has the final say on any contested issue of the treatment of 
chiJdren...Is there any important respect in which a parent can hold out against medical 
orthodoxy when it comes to the treatment of a child and when the state has become 
involved? " 49 50
Here, the adoption of the girl’s best interests (as determined by her own doctors) accorded 
with her own wishes and the Gillick test. The medicalisation of the issue favoured a verdict 
which accorded with considerations o f the girl’s autonomy.
The English courts have never yet had to decide on a case where a pregnant minor opposes 
an abortion, when this is desired by her parents and recommended by her doctor. However, 
it has been suggested that the law as decided by Re W (see above) could lead to abortions 
being carried out by doctors with the consent of parents, despite the refusal of 16 or 17 year 
olds. Donaldson MR considered this possibility and stated (rather ominously) that although 
it might be possible as a matter of law, medical ethics would ensure that it was only the case 
if it were in the "best interests" of the young woman (see Bridgeman; 1993a; 80).
ii) T v T and another*0
The defendant was a woman of 19 who was epileptic and severely mentally handicapped. 
She was completely dependent on others. She became pregnant and termination of the
49 Alexander McCall Smith in The Times, 28 May, 1991.
50 [1988] 1 All ER 613.
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pregnancy was recommended by medical advisers on the ground that it was impossible for 
her to understand the concept of pregnancy or to cope with the difficulties and complications 
associated with that condition and that she would be incapable o f providing and caring for 
a child. However, the defendant was unable to consent to abortion and sterilization 
procedures. Her mother applied to the court for a declaration that the proposed termination 
of pregnancy and sterilization would not amount to an unlawful act by reason only of this 
lack of consent. The court accordingly made a declaration of right because the circumstances 
were special and proper medical practice demanded that the operations take place. The court 
held that where there is nobody in a position to consent, that a medical adviser must consider 
what decisions should be reached in the patient’s best interests51.
Hi) Re G52
In the case of Re G, this discretion and authority is again recognised. The case concerned 
a 26 year old mentally handicapped woman who was 17 weeks pregnant. Her doctors felt 
it desirable to apply to the High Court before terminating the pregnancy. However, Stephen 
Brown, President of the Family Division, held that it was not essential as a matter of practice 
to seek a declaration from the High Court before carrying out a termination of pregnancy on 
a mentally handicapped woman. The Abortion Act provided fully adequate safeguards for the 
doctors involved and it was not necessary that specific approval of the High Court should be 
a pre-condition for the termination of a pregnancy.
Here again, the judges accord the authority to the doctor to reach the decision which he/she 
believes correct in recognising her/him as the person most well placed to determine what 
constitutes the woman’s ‘best interests’. Once again the doctor is located as the appropriate 
expert to take a decision which is not merely a (narrow) medical one, but one involving far 
reaching social and ethical questions.
51 [1988] 1 All ER 613 at 621.
52 Reported in The Times, 31 January, 1991.
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f) Abortion in the Absence of Consent: the Unconscious Patient 
A recent case has posed the possibility for conflict between medical paternalism and female 
autonomy in a particularly dramatic and tragic way. In March 1993, Barbara Whiten, a thirty- 
five year old woman, was in hospital for a hysterectomy to relieve a painful and chronic 
disease of the womb which she believed had left her unable to conceive. The operation was 
performed by a consultant gynaecologist and obstetrician, Reginald Dixon. During the 
operation, Mr Dixon noticed that Mrs Whiten’s uterus was enlarged, one possible cause of 
this being pregnancy. He decided against delaying the removal of the womb so that a scan 
could be arranged in order to determine the cause of the swelling and (if due to pregnancy) 
to give Mrs Whiten the opportunity to decide whether or not she wished to go ahead with the 
operation. Rather, he removed ovaries and uterus and the next day informed her that she had 
been pregnant and that he had removed a healthy 1 1  week old embryo, stating this to be "the 
usual practice". Mrs Whiten, who had been trying to conceive for some years, was horrified. 
She complained that she had had the possibility of making her own decision taken away from 
her.
In a letter to Mr and Mrs Whiten, Mr Dixon said that he felt an emergency termination was 
justified on the grounds of Mrs Whiten’s age, desire for a hysterectomy and history of 
depression. In a second letter he acknowledged that with hindsight he may have done better 
to have sewn up the abdomen and arranged a pregnancy scan. In this case, then, Mr Dixon 
has taken what, with the benefit of hindsight, seems (also to him) to be have been the wrong 
decision. Nevertheless, he has taken it in good faith and has acted within the grounds of what 
he considers to be "usual practice". The surgical services manager at the hospital told The 
Guardian that this was a sad and complex case, but that the doctors involved had "acted in 
good faith"53 54. In the course of their investigations of Barbara Whiten's complaint, the police 
uncovered a second similar case. A woman called Jane Henson told detectives that a trainee 
gynaecologist acting under the supervision of Reginald Dixon ignored her concerns that she 
might be pregnant and removed her womb in December 1991. After the operation Mrs 
Henson was told that she had indeed been pregnant5*.
53 The Guardian, 13 September 1993, see also Thomson (1994).
54 See The Observer,, 27 March 1994.
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Both Mrs Whiten and Mrs Henson are currently preparing court actions, however their 
chances of obtaining legal redress are uncertain (Thomson; 1994). As was seen above, it is 
only the consent o f the patient which prevents medical treatment from constituting an assault 
and in both of these cases, consent was obviously absent. However, Mr Dixon has two 
possible defences. First, there is the defence of tacit consent. The standard form which 
patients sign before undergoing surgery authorises:
"any procedure in addition to the investigation or treatment described on this form [which] 
will only be carried out if it is necessary and in [the patient’s] best interests and can be 
justified for medical reasons" . 55
The doctor is only permitted to carry out further surgery without which the patient’s life or 
health will be immediately at risk. There is also a second possible defence: necessity. In 
emergency situations, the doctor is justified in taking any necessary action to save life and 
to proceed without consent "with any procedure which it would be unreasonable, as opposed 
to merely inconvenient, to postpone until consent could be sought" (Skegg; 1974; 518)56. 
The crucial factor with regard to the success of both defences is whether the abortion was 
immediately necessary. Mr Dixon contends that it was, on the grounds of Mrs Whiten’s 
mental state: her age, history of depression and desire for a hysterectomy. Although these 
arguments seem less than compelling, it is still highly possible that a court would find in his 
favour. To demonstrate that Mr Dixon’s conduct was unreasonable, Mrs Whiten must show 
that the surgeon did not act "in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible 
body of medical men skilled in that particular art"57. In practice, this means that Mr Dixon 
must produce some of his colleagues who are prepared to testify to the effect that what he 
did was not outside the boundaries of what other medical professionals accept to be 
reasonable. Again the essential test becomes one determined within the medical profession,
55 A copy of the standard consent form is included in Brazier (1992; 76).
56 These two defences seem very similar, but in practice there is one important difference: 
in the First the burden of proof is on the patient to establish that the surgeon’s assumption of 
consent was not reasonable, in the second, the burden of proof is on the surgeon to establish 
that the intervention was reasonable and necessary to save the life of the patient or to prevent 
grave and permanent injury to her health (see Brazier; 1992; 91).
57 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 at 122.
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and if many (or even some) doctors are operating with similar standards (even if such 
standards seem unreasonable or unacceptable to the broader public) then Mr Dixon is not 
liable.
The Crown Prosecution Service were also reported to be considering Barbara Whiten’s case, 
but at the time of writing they have yet to decide whether to bring an action. In terms of a 
criminal prosecution, there is a possible action under the Abortion Act, as Mr Dixon has not 
complied with the terms of s.l which foresee the need for the consent of two doctors. S.l(4) 
provides a defence for the doctor who terminates a pregnancy without such second opinion 
only in an emergency situation, where:
"he is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to 
save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman".
Again the legal outcome will rest upon Mr Dixon’s opinion that this was an emergency 
operation. What is relevant is not whether the situation objectively constituted an emergency, 
but subjectively whether Mr Dixon believed in good faith that it did so (there is no 
requirement of reasonableness).
Barbara Whiten’s story is an extreme and particularly tragic example of the effects of medical 
paternalism. Mr Dixon here feels justified in making a decision for Mrs Whiten as to whether 
or not it is best for her to continue with her pregnancy, and may be proved right in his 
contention that this falls within the bounds of "usual practice". The fact is that English law 
explicitly grants the authority to doctors to take important decisions regarding female 
reproduction - notably abortion - even when it is clear that these decisions are only rarely 
based on strictly medical criteria. Medical paternalism is not merely allowed by the law, with 
regard to abortion it is actively condoned and enforced. Such paternalism is thus within the 
bounds of ‘good medical practice’, and so the doctor is left beyond administrative reprisal (Mr 
Dixon has the support of his health authority and is not to be dismissed from his post58) and 
possibly judicial intervention. If this case proceeds, it will stage a confrontation between
58 The Times, 12 September 1993, Thomson; 1994; 13.
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women’s autonomy and medical discretion that will be a test for English law. If no case is 
brought, then it would seem to illustrate my fear that the law is far more reliable in protecting 
the medical relationship from outside challenge than it is in protecting the position of women 
within it.
4. CONCLUSION
The breadth of the discretion which the judiciary accords to doctors is as clearly shown by 
the cases dealing with abortion, as it is in the cases of Re S and Re W which 1 discussed in 
the introduction to this chapter. In the abortion cases, however, I would contend that 
considerations of medical discretion have not impinged on women’s autonomy. On the 
contrary, they have favoured it and have constituted a vital factor in the liberalisation of the 
provision of abortion. This has been shown in a variety of cases. First, the safety from 
prosecution which doctors enjoy as a result of judicial respect for medical discretion, has 
created a situation in which some doctors feel free to be increasingly liberal in the provision 
of abortion, even to the extent where those pro-choice doctors discussed above who specify 
"pregnancy” as the reason for termination have not been prosecuted. Secondly, the court’s 
complete refusal to supervise the doctors* decision, beyond ensuring the existence of good 
faith, was an extremely influential factor in establishing that women cannot be prevented from 
terminating a pregnancy by the opposition o f their sexual partners. Thirdly, in the RCN case 
the courts let considerations of good medical practice dictate a very creative interpretation of 
statute, hence ensuring the possibility of legally providing abortions by medical induction. 
Finally, in cases where consent is problematic, in the case of Re B, L was allowed to 
terminate her pregnancy in accordance with her own wishes, despite the opposition of her 
mother.
The argument which I am making here is not a principled justification (or still less an 
apologia) for the benefits of the medical control of abortion. I have argued above that such 
control rests on paternalism: a refusal to credit women with the necessary maturity, rationality 
and integrity to make their own reproductive decisions. It has also been clearly seen in 
previous chapters that such control has presented serious obstacles to the establishment of 
good provision of abortion services. What this analysis does do, however, is to highlight the
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peculiar difficulties of the situation which feminists face with regard to the medical control 
o f abortion. The principled arguments against such control must be weighed against the 
practical and concrete benefits it has provided (and the security which it may continue to 
give) on the level of entrenching and extending women’s access to abortion services. In the 
case of abortion, the judicial deference for medical opinion has been so beneficial for women 
because they approach the courts in conjunction with their doctor, desiring the same legal 
outcome. The benefits for them arise from the legal refusal to look within the doctor’s area 
o f discretion, and the doctor-patient relationship. The last case, I discussed reveals the limits 
of this in terms of protecting women’s autonomy. Here, like the cases of Re S and Re Wt 
which 1 mentioned in the introduction, the woman stood in opposition to her doctor and 
problems arose when she sought to challenge the doctors’ control. The story of Barbara 
Whiten provides an illustration of how this might also occur with regard to the regulation of 
abortion. It seems likely that, also in abortion cases, where the law has been effective at 
protecting the doctor-patient relationship from outside attacks, it is less useful at protecting 
female reproductive autonomy within it.
C H A P T E R  6 : T H E  H U M A N  F E R T I L I S A T I O N  A N D  E M B R Y O L O G Y  
A C T  (1 9 9 0 ) : W IN N IN G  T H E  B A T T L E S  B U T  L O S IN G  T H E  W A R ?
"The outcome of voting on the abortion amendments to the government sponsored Embryology 
Bill was a massive defeat for the anti-abortionists, which poses a new stage in women's 
struggle for reproductive control It decisively confirms the impact of the underlying trends 
in the position of women, and the political developments these make possible. Success in this 
most difficult abortion battle rested more than ever before on the tactical choices made by 
the Pro Choice movement. It is crucial that the left and the whole movement learns the 
lessons of these tactics and how the campaign was waged and won"1.
"Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing 
it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. 
Once this is accomplished the problems become technical ones for specialists to debate...Bio 
power spread under the banner of making people healthy and protecting them. When there 
was resistance or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the 
need to reinforce and extend the power of the experis...We are promised normalization and 
happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of 
the same"2 3.
"We need to establish a principle that is related to the best medical practices. We should not 
have to debate the matter year in, year out but should place our trust in medical practitioners 
and give them a legal framework within which they can operate and which the public can 
understand'*.
1 Anne Kane, coordinator of the Stop the Amendment Campaign (STAC) (1990; 19).
2 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982; 196).
3 Doran, H .C  Deb. Vol 171 Col. 214, 1990 (24 April).
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, after fierce and protracted debates both inside and outside Parliament, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act was voted onto the statute books* The Act has three 
fundamental objectives: to provide a statutory framework for the control and supervision of 
research involving human embryos, to provide for the licensing of certain types of assisted 
conception, and to effect changes to the Abortion Act 1967. These changes are the first to 
be made to the Act since it came into effect, despite numerous previous attempts by way of 
Private Members’ Bills, all of which were talked out of time4. As the reforms contained in 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act were to be heard in Government time however, 
filibustering was now impossible and it was inevitable that, after nearly 25 years, the 1967 
Act would be put once again to the vote. Although various additional amendments to the 
1967 Act were suggested, the main point of contention was the upper time limit on abortion: 
pro-choice activists argued that the rebuttable presumption of a 28 week limit read into the 
Act from the Infant Life Preservation Act, 1929 should be maintained; anti-choice activists 
demanded that it should be reduced to 18 weeks5. The eventual outcome of the voting was 
widely hailed as a gain for the pro-choice movement. The upper time limit was reduced to 
24 weeks, however this was not to apply in cases where the pregnant woman’s life or health 
was seriously threatened by the pregnancy or birth, or when the foetus was seriously 
handicapped. In this chapter 1 want to look again at the reforms embodied in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, and ask how far they can be seen to represent victory, and 
how far they should be assessed as loss. My contention will be that whilst the reforms 
undoubtedly represent the most recent in a series of political victories for the pro-choice 
campaign, on a significant level, they also represent a defeat.
4 These were introduced by Norman St John-Stevas (1969), Godman Irvine (1970), 
Michael Gry 11s (1973 and 1974), James White (1975), William Benyon (1977), Bernard 
Braine (1978), John Come (1979), Enoch Powell (1984), Ken Hargreaves (1985 and 1986), 
Alistair Burt (1987) David Alton (1988) and Douglas Houghton (HL, 1989). For more 
information on attempts to reform the Abortion Act between 1969-1982, see Kcown (I9S8; 
138-52).
5 18 weeks was chosen as the lowest limit for which might be realistically attainable • this 
reflects a strategy of cutting away ‘salami’ fashion at the law, gradually paring down the time 
limit on abortions.
134
It is important not to be alarmist. The victories which have been won over the past 25 years 
are not negligible and repeated attempts at restricting the 1967 Act have all failed. The 
reforms introduced to the Act by way of s.37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
in 1990 did not introduce radical changes in respect of the practice which existed prior to its 
implementation and, if  anything, have liberalised the operation o f the Abortion Act. There 
even seems to have been, at the time of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, an 
undertaking by the anti-choice forces in Parliament that if the possibility of voting on reforms 
of the 1967 Act was given, that they would ‘go away for a while* and not introduce more 
bills aiming to restrict the Act (see below, pp. 137-8). Thus the immediate future of the 
provision of abortion services in Britain seems doubly secure after 1990, the status quo 
assured.
Whilst avoiding alarmism however, one should also be careful not to succumb to 
complacency. In this chapter I will analyse the broader assumptions and constructions which 
underlie this development. My contention is that although feminists have won an important 
series of legal battles, there may still be a danger of losing the wider war of definition of 
what is really at stake in the issue o f abortion (Science and Technology Sub Group; 1991; 
147). Feminist strategies have long aimed at directing attention to broader social issues, and 
to situate abortion in relation to issues of contraception, sex education, welfare benefits and 
general discussion over women’s sexuality and position in society. Such broader concerns, 
however, are becoming increasingly marginalised even within pro-choice discourse. The 
mutually accepted framework of the abortion debate increasingly posits the issue as a narrow 
medical question, revolving exclusively around the status of the foetus and at what (medically 
determined) point its claim to protection becomes paramount. As Elizabeth Grice (1988) 
wrote in the Sunday Times: "[ajfter two decades of a woman’s right to choose, the emphasis 
in debate has slid with a minimum of fuss towards the child’s right to life'1. To accept an 
essentially medical framework for debate seems doubly dangerous given that, as has been 
seen in previous chapters, and as I will expand below (pp. 196-203) many of the problems 
faced by women seeking termination are related to medical control.
I will begin by considering briefly the Alton Bill (1988), a Private Members’ Bill which 
received considerable public attention and which, despite its eventual failure, has been cited
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for its importance in establishing a new agenda for discussion of abortion (Steinberg; 1991) 
and thus provides a suitable starting point. I then move onto my main focus of attention - 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology AcU with particular reference to section 37 
(amendments to the Abortion Act). Here, the acceptance o f a medical framework as the only 
legitimate structure for discussion on abortion is clearly marked. Likewise a construction of 
the issue in terms of protection of the (essentially separate) foetus seems to have been largely 
accepted (or at least inadequately challenged) within Parliament. I will also discuss briefly 
the provisions o f section 3 (prohibitions in connection with embryos), for their significance 
in fostering a discourse of foetal protectionism which may yet have an impact on the 
provision of abortion.
2. THE ALTON BILL (1988)
"What has happened to alter David Alton*s chances of abortion reform where at least 12 
others have failed is that life in the womb is not nearly so shadowy as it was 20 years agon 
(Grice; 1988).
The Alton Bill was introduced into Parliament in October 1987 by a Private Member, the 
Liberal M.P. for Mossley Hill (Liverpool), David Alton. It received its second reading in the 
House of Commons on 22 January 1988, where it was passed by a majority of 296 to 251. 
The main provision of the Bill was a reduction in the upper time limit for legal abortion to 
18 weeks with exemptions of up to 28 weeks only where termination was necessary to save 
the life of the woman or where the child was likely to be bom dead or with physical 
abnormalities so serious that its life could not be independently sustained. A further 
exemption for women under eighteen years old who had suffered incest or rape was 
introduced at Committee stage. After vigorous campaigning by both anti-choice and pro- 
choice supporters, the Bill ran out of time at the Report Stage which follows Committee and 
failed without being put to the test of a final vote.
The Alton Bill forms the focal point of a fascinating series of essays published together in 
the book, Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies (Franklin et al; 1991). The contributors 
worked together as the ‘Science and Technology Subgroup* (STSG) at the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University and focussed on the importance of
7
science to recent debates about abortion in Britain. In a general conclusion to the essays, they 
assert that:
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"despite the fact that the Bill itself was legislatively unsuccessful, the terms in which abortion 
was to be considered had been forged in a way which left little opening for women’s needs 
or interests or for exploring reproduction as a social, not just a technological, biological or 
individual issue" (1991; 215).
One member of the group, Deborah Steinberg (1991) argues that although the Alton Bill 
ultimately failed in that it did not pass into law, it was successful in several respects in 
shifting the terrain of the meaning of abortion. Amongst the legacies of the Alton campaign 1
which she lists is the increasing degree on reliance on medical/scientific knowledges to define |
abortion and it is this which will form the major focus of my discussion concerning the |
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Thus the importance of the Alton Bill and its ^
surrounding campaign should rather be seen in terms of the assumptions which it succeeded j
in establishing and/or further entrenching in the public consciousness. These assumptions |
were also fostered by the media coverage. Tess Randles contends that in the reporting of the |
progress of the Alton Bill, the media established a particular framework within which j
scientific knowledges were seen as structuring the debate. She argues that within the |
reporting of the Alton Debate, this consensual framework took the form of a "medico-moral J
rhetoric" which drew upon a fusion of Christian dogma and state-of-the-art medical |
technological knowledge. This resulted in the establishment of a seemingly ‘consensual’ I
framework for debate which invited ‘objective’ decision-making and ‘rational’ discussion j
(1991; 207)6. The STSG conclude: 1
"the debate focused on fetal viability as the established role of medical expertise in the (
adjudications surrounding abortion in Britain. In addition, the enhanced role of medical ,
expertise went hand-in-hand with the harnessing of abortion rights to the technological 
capacities of modern medicine and an unquestioning faith in scientific progress. Prenatal ,
diagnosis, technological systems for sustaining infants born prematurely and the technology 
which produces photo-images of fetuses were all invoked frequently during the Alton abortion 
controversy. In such circumstances, medical judgements and technical possibilities or 
limitations, not women’s needs or lives, set the parameters of debate" (1991; 214).
6 See also McNeil (1991; 151) on press panics during the period of debate over the Alton 
Bill which reinforced the enhanced status of the foetus.
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3. THE H U M A N  F E R T IL IS A T IO N  A N D  E M B R Y O L O G Y  A C T : S. 37 
(AMENDMENT OF LAW RELATING TO TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY)
The most recent prolonged Parliamentary discussions of abortion occurred in 1990, when 
certain reforms to the 1967 Act were introduced by way of s.37, Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act. Prior to this there had been no time limit in the Abortion Act itself, but an 
effective time limit on abortions had been read into it by way of the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act, 1929, which made it an offence to destroy a "child capable o f being bom alive", and 
contained a rebuttable presumption that a child would be held to be "capable of being born 
alive" from 28 weeks of gestational development. In the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, the Abortion Act was specifically ‘uncoupled’ from the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act, and a fixed limit of 24 weeks7 was inserted into the former, with 
exceptions made for cases of serious risk to the pregnant woman’s life or health, or in the 
presence of serious foetal handicap. These provisions did not greatly effect the operation of 
the 1967 Act - it had already become established medical practice to treat viability as 
occurring at around 24 weeks and not to provide terminations after this point (Hall; 1990, 
Murphy; 1991). If anything the provisions extended the circumstances in which abortion 
should be allowed, in allowing terminations up to birth in the case of foetal handicap. 
Murphy (1991) argues that in practice, this is the only real change introduced by the reforms.
Following the introduction of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, it seems unlikely 
that there will be another challenge to the abortion law in the immediate future. There seems 
to have been an ‘understanding* between the Government and anti-choice supporters within 
the House of Commons, that if the Government gave time for discussion of abortion and a 
re-evaluation of the working of the 1967 Act, that the anti-choice forces in Commons would 
‘disappear’ for a while and cease their periodic attacks on the Act. In replying to a question 
as to how long was meant by ‘a while’, one of the most vociferous anti-choicers in 
Parliament, Anne Widdecombe answered:
7 One persistent point of imprecision in the law, is that it does not specify when the 24 
weeks will be deemed to begin. As Murphy (1991) argues there are four distinct stages 
which may be argued to mark the critical date: date of the last period prior to conception 
(LMP); date of fertilisation; date of implantation; or when the embryo reaches two weeks old.
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"[a]s to what is meant by "for a while", how long is a piece of string? A decent interval must 
mean just that. We, I or anyone may go to Government again to say that the House wants 
to take a decision on this matter and must do so, but if we simply get into the habit of 
coming back with a whole load of similar or different proposals, frankly we would not 
deserve the trust of Government, nor would I expect to receive it. Therefore, "for a while" 
means a decent interval"8.
So far, at least, this promise seems to have been by and large respected9.
All in all, the limited nature of the reforms introduced and the successful defence of the 
substance of the 1967 Act would seem to be an emphatic victory for the pro-choice camp. 
The time limit introduced was that which had already been widely adopted and would 
potentially effect a very small number of women - in 1988 (the last figures which were 
available at the time of the debates), only 22 abortions had occurred after 24 weeks10, and 
under the specific exemptions in the new legislation, it seems likely that these would have 
been allowed in any case. The anti-choice M.P.S were even committed to ‘disappearing’ for 
a while. However, a close analysis of the Parliamentary debates and the actual form of the 
changes introduced presents a less happy aspect. In particular, I will argue that the debates 
display an unquestioning reliance on medical knowledges as the exclusive framework for 
approaching any question of abortion and an acceptance of the construction of the foetus as 
an essentially separate individual who must be protected from the pregnant woman. This 
construction is disturbing both with regard to future defence of the 1967 Act and in terms of 
how it might effectively block further progress towards liberalisation of the law. Here I will 
examine a) the médicalisation of the debate and b) the construction of foetal separation within 
the debates in more detail.
8 H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 199 1990 (24 April). An article in The Times (24.04.90), cited 
Widdecombe as promising a lapse in the Parliamentary Pro-Life campaign "at least until after 
the general election" (which eventually took place in April 1992).
9 The exception to this was a Ten Minute Rule Bill introduced by anti-choice M.P., David 
Amess on 23 February 1993. The Bill (which stood no chance of being passed) opposed the 
use of sex selection technology.
10 See The Times, 23 April 1990.
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a) Médicalisation
Deborah Steinberg’s argument that one legacy of the Alton Bill is the increasing reliance on 
scientific and medical knowledges, is wholly borne out by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act debates. First, the need for reform was introduced to the House of Commons 
as necessitated by "developments in medical and scientific practice". Virginia Bottomley, 
Minister for Health, presented the need for reform as a narrow and technical matter - not a 
political issue, but a matter of updating the existing law in line with medical developments:
"The Government have...[the] role of advising Parliament of ways in which changes over time 
and the recent developments in medical and scientific practices may have affected the existing 
law in ways in which Parliament should take account. It is in that context that the 
Government have considered the question of abortion time limits" . 11 12
Secondly, there is an ongoing struggle within Parliament as to who can claim the medical 
‘high ground’ and who has the support of the various medical bodies. Thirdly, there is 
extensive reliance on medical sources and knowledges by both ‘sides’ of the debate, to the 
exclusion of other factors.
i) Use of Medical Knowledges
Anti-choice campaigners make use of medical knowledges both inside and outside Parliament 
and their literature increasingly relies on medically established facts to justify its claims. The 
following assertion, taken from a LIFE leaflet, is typical:
"[t]he unborn child is not part of (the woman’s] body. He (or she) is a unique human being, 
genetically, physiologically, and organically distinct from both parents. Human life begins 
at conception - so from conception onwards the mother is carrying another human being. 
Deny any of that and you deny the evidence of modern genetics and embryology"11.
Anti-choice M.P.s make similar use of medical knowledges. They relate gruesome ‘medical 
facts’ of the reality of abortions, give medical accounts of the development of the foetus13
nH.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Cot. 172 1990 (24 April), see also at Col. 175.
12 In Life leaflet: "Abortion: A woman’s right to choose?"
13 See Braine, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 217 1990 (24 April); Alton, H.C. Deb. Voi. 174 
Col. 1206 1990 (21 June).
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and cite letters from doctors and nurses w ho have been involved in abortion relating their 
experiences14. They based their main argument in the 1990 debates - that a time limit of 18 
rather than 24 weeks was needed - on the assertion that a reduction of four weeks is no fair 
reflection of 23 years o f advancement in medical science15 and that it is necessary to 
legislate also for the future, which will no doubt bring technological advances which will 
lower the gestational age at which the foetus can be considered as viable outside of the 
womb16. David Alton argues:
"[t]wenty-three years ago, let alone 61 years ago, there was no ultrasound scanning of the 
type that I have described, no electrocardiograms for a foetus, and no appreciation of the 
complete sensory development of the unborn child or knowledge that the unborn baby feels 
pain...Given those quantum leaps in our knowledge, it is absurd to leave our laws in the dark 
ages"17.
In this specific context, Alton treats the medical as the decisive factor in discussion of 
abortion and, marginalising other concerns, sees reform as the inevitable result of medical 
‘progress’. It is interesting to note that the rhetoric which Alton adopts in Parliament is very 
different from the terms which he uses to discuss abortion in his (1988) book, What Kind of 
Country. Here he opens the chapter which deals with abortion with a quote from Mother 
Teresa of Calcutta: "...[i]n destroying the child, we are destroying love, destroying the image 
of God in the world", and continues in a vein which gives moral and religious values priority 
over medical ones. From this, it seems that Alton believes (correctly, no doubt) that in order 
to voice his opinions in Parliament and be effectively heard within the debates, the most 
effective discourse is the medical. Likewise, it is noteworthy that another anti-choice M.P., 
the Reverend Martin Smyth, despite his vocation, makes use of medical, rather than religious, 
arguments within the debate18.
14 See Alton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 228 1990 (24 April).
15 Amess, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 255 1990 (24 April).
16 Kellett-Bowman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 175 1990 (24 April).
17 Alton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 223 1990 (24 April).
18 H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 241-2 1990 (24 April). The speech made by the Rev. Ian 
Paisley forms a notable exception to this, with heavy recourse to religious arguments, H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 174 Col. 235-9 1990 (21 June).
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The defenders o f the 1967 Act, who in 1966-7 had focussed on social factors and in particular 
on the desperate situation o f the woman facing an unwanted pregnancy, in 1990 chose 
primarily to work within this medical framework. The arguments used by pro-choice M.P.s 
fall into three categories: the social, the feminist and the medical. The social aspect whilst 
not being completely ignored, has become increasingly marginal and now appeared in the 
form o f (very) occasional references to sex education19, family planning facilities20, and 
the state of the National Health Service21. The use o f feminist arguments in the debates is 
also much more evident than was the case in 1966-7. However, it is confined to a small 
group of M.P.s22. Moreover, it seems that the efficacy o f the arguments is doubtful given 
the ability of anti-choice activists to subvert them (Steinberg; 1991; 181-2). David Alton, in 
particular, makes use o f feminist rhetoric both in the House of Commons and in his book:
”[m]en will often use their sexuality in a way that demonstrates a greater sense of machismo 
than it does responsibility towards their partners. At the heart o f the debate about 
contraception...is the need to recognise that when love and a sense of responsibility is 
removed from sexual relations, there will always be a tragedy. Sometimes that can result in 
men trying to pressurise women into what people often perceive as the quick fix of an 
abortion"23.
Overwhelmingly, however, the rhetoric and framework adopted is medical.
19 Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 186 1990 (24 April).
20 Steel, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 205 1990 (24 April), Primarolo, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 
Col. 248 1990 (24 April).
21 Harman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 174 Col. 1136 1990 (21 June).
22 The most clear use o f feminist discourse is made by Theresa Gorman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 
171 Col. 231 1990 (24 April): "[w]hat motivates those who persist in trying to amend a 
woman’s right in these affairs is theology ...Those motives form one o f the deepest, most 
misogynous strands in human society. For centuries theologians; have equated sex with sin 
and celibacy with grace. They have regarded women as little more than flower pots in which 
future generations of children, preferably boy children, are reared.”
23 Alton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 221 1990 (24 April). See also, Alton (1988), where 
he quotes at length from Paula Conor o f Feminists Against Eugenics, and Duffy, H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 171 Col. 252 1990 (24 April): ”[f]ree and easy abortion is in the interests o f men 
because it removes the problem of pregnancy, and women are well aware of that".
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First, the defenders o f the 1967 Act dispute the medical evidence of the anti-choicers. For 
example, Steel attacks Widdecombe for trying "to set herself up as a medical authority, 
greater than others on the time limit that the House should accept"24. Likewise, Dawn 
Primarolo argues that:
"[w]ith, perhaps, a few exceptions, hon. Members are not medically qualified. They are not 
consultants and they are not the best people to make medical decisions. We should recognise 
that"25.
Implicit here, is the assertion of abortion as a purely medical matter and a corresponding 
claim as to who should be allowed to speak about it.
Further, pro-choice supporters make good use o f medical knowledges and constructions to 
support their own arguments. Steel goes on later to cite an article in The Lancet (2 December 
1989), which showed that 75% of gyneacologists preferred a limit of 24 weeks. He argues 
that:
”[i]t would be a great mistake for the House to set aside the opinion of established medical 
bodies on the issue o f setting a limit o f 18 weeks...W e are not entitled to cast aside all these 
opinions as though they did not matter, or to pluck out of the air a figure that we think might
be better"26.
Here, the choice which he presents is one o f either accepting medical judgment or of 
complete arbitrariness.
The same medical framework was adopted in press coverage of the issue. For example, the 
day before the voting took place, The Guardian (23 April 1990), ran an article which was 
described as "an attempt to summarise the arguments". It was entitled: ‘Most doctors opt for 
24-week limit* and began:
24 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 201 1990 (24 April).
25 H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 248 1990 (24 April).
26 Steel, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 204 1990 (24 April); see also Steel, H.C.Deb. Voi. 171 
Cols. 206-7 1990 (24 April), Harman, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 262 1990 (24 April).
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"[tjhere are few supporters for retaining the present 28-week limit, as the medical consensus 
is that babies are viable from 24 weeks, given the intensive care and technology of modem 
premature baby units..."
Thus the perceived framework within which the issue o f  abortion should be decided was 
essentially structured by medical knowledges.
ii) The Adoption o f a 24 Week Upper Limit
The actual voting on the upper time limit in Parliament was done ‘pendulum’ fashion, 
swinging between the extremes in order to allow all opinion to be canvassed. The new clause 
drafted by the Government envisaged a time limit of 24 weeks, and various amendments were 

























o f 241 against 
of 169 against 
of 216 against 
of 46 against 
of 206 for
It is, of course, tremendously significant that the time limit eventually accepted (by a majority 
of 206 votes) is that recommended by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
in a report which is often referred to in the Parliamentary debates27. The limit adopted is 
that of 24 weeks - the point when the foetus is deemed to become ‘viable’ - capable o f  
sustaining independent life outside the womb. It seems conclusive that this limit 
recommended itself on these grounds. Patrick Wintow, political correspondent for The 
Guardian writes that:
"[m]any M.P.s appeared to have been swayed by the professional view o f the Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the British Medical Association and many family 
planning organisations, all o f which backed 24 weeks on the basis that the foetus is now 
considered viable at this stage" (1990).
The support for the lower limit of 22 weeks (defeated by only 46 votes) might be seen as
27 For example, Bottomley, H.C. Deb. Vo!. 171 Col. 173 1990 (24 April); Clarke, H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 267 1990 (24 April). See also the references in the previous footnote.
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a result o f assertions that viability in some cases occurs below 24 weeks, with in extreme 
cases, foetuses as o f little as 22 weeks in utero development having survived. However, as 
Harriet Hannan informed the House o f  Commons:
"[t]he time limit o f 24 weeks was not arrived at arbitrarily. When deciding on an abortion, 
doctors err on the side o f caution and, in practice, a 24-week limit would mean something 
like a 22-week limit or even a 20-week limit...For the future, doctors believe that they can 
increase the chances o f survival for babies after 24 weeks, but because of the insufficiency 
o f development, they do not expect to be able to keep babies born at 22 weeks alive in the 
foreseeable future"28.
Here then, viability takes on a force o f  its own, becoming accepted as the natural dividing 
line between those abortions which should (in some circumstances) be allowed by law, and 
those which should not. This construction completely obscures broader social issues 
(Franklin; 1991; 200, McNeil; 1991; 154). A s McNeil writes, the adoption o f viability as 
a dividing line:
"shifts the focus of decision-making away from women who, in opting for or against abortion, 
make complex evaluations o f their particular circumstances and o f the social sustainability of 
new life. Such decisions have little to do with what medical science can sustain 
technologically. Saying that it is theoretically possible to plug a 24-week-old fetus into life 
support apparatuses is very different from saying that you personally will take primary 
responsibility for supporting - in every sense - a child through to adulthood" (McNeil; 1991; 
156).
The adoption o f viability as the cut-off point for abortions has obvious attractions for pro- 
choice activists and has been put to effective political use in establishing a comparatively 
high upper limit. However, it also has limitations. The effect o f the 1990 debates has been 
to entrench in the public - and Parliamentary - consciousness that abortion is permissible prior 
to viability, but should be forbidden after this point29. One letter to The Times goes so far 
as to argue that the destruction of the handicapped viable foetus is no longer a matter of
28 Harman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 262 1990 (24 April). i
29 It is important to remember here that prior to 1990 there was no such limit in the text i
o f  the 1967 Act, and that the notion viability read into it by the Infant (Life) Preservation Act 1




abortion, but rather o f euthanasia30. This is a notion which future campaigns may find hard 
to dislodge. Whilst the present state o f medical science makes it impossible to sustain neo­
natal life at much less than 24 weeks o f  gestational development for reasons of lung 
development, it is surely not inconceivable that this limit w ill be gradually pushed downwards 
(Rhoden; 1985)31. If this happens, pro-choice groups will face a particularly bitter struggle 
to try and separate out the legitimacy of abortion from the notion o f viability. Even in the 
1990 Commons Debates, anti-choice M.P.s in Parliament several times emphasised the need 
to ‘legislate for the future* as:
’'medical techniques are advancing so rapidly that, long before 20 years is up, we shall regard 
a termination within 20 weeks as ludicrous...By that time, medical techniques will be so good 
that a foetus will be viable much earlier than that"32.
"Medical science will continue to advance, and more and more babies bom prematurely will 
survive. Surely we should legislate for the future and not for the past"33.
"we should take decisions that bear a relationship to the present situation but, having regard 
to the advances in medical science, to the situation that is likely to develop in the next 
decade"34.
Although various commentators have suggested that it is unlikely that it will ever become 
possible to sustain neonatal life much below the 24 week limit, due to the limited lung 
development, this is still a point o f concern.
30 The Times (2 June, 1990), letter from Nigel de S. Cameron, editor o f Ethics and 
Medicine: "do our legislators truly intend the unborn to be destroyed well beyond viability, 
for any other cause than to save the life of the mother? The answer may, of course, be "yes"; 
and - if so - we will have moved from discussion of abortion to that of euthanasia."
31 Nearly ten years ago, Stubblefield wrote that viability is occasionally possible at 23 
weeks (1985; 161-2).
32 Kellett-Bowman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col 241 1990 (24 April).
33 Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 216 1990 (24 April).
34 Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 215 1990 (24 April). See also Smyth, H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 171 Col. 241 1990 (24 April); Clarke, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Cols. 264, 267 1990 (24 
April); Amess, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 255 1990 (24 April); Alton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 
223 1990 (24 April).
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Moreover, it is also important to bear in mind that the notion o f  viability contained in the 
Abortion Act is not an entirely medical concept, but is rather a legal reconstruction of the 
same. From a medical viewpoint, it is impossible to fix one clear time limit at which 
viability will be achieved, rather viability will be achieved at a different stage o f development 
depending on the individual foetus. It is the law with its particular need for a precisely 
defined point (prior to which abortion is legal, after which illegal), which has provided this 
particular construction o f viability. Hence, whereas medically speaking different foetuses will 
achieve viability after different periods o f gestational development, the law introduces a fixed 
period for the purposes of certainty and precision. As a legal construction, viability may be 
subject to judicial as well as medical erosion. There are already some indications of the 
potential for such a trend in the courts. Whilst in C v S35, viability was seen as requiring 
the capacity of breathing either naturally or with the aid o f a ventilator and surviving for a 
reasonable period, there may be some authority for a less restrictive test in Ranee and another 
v Mid-Downs Health Authority and another36. Under Ranee, a foetus was deemed "capable 
o f being born alive" if when it was born, it was capable o f living and breathing through its 
own lungs without any connection to its mother. No requirement of sustaining life for a 
reasonable period was specified. Ranee was hailed several times in the 1990 Commons 
debates as establishing a lower gestational age o f viability. For example, Anne Widdecombe 
relates that:
"Mr. Justice Brooke said, ‘No the point at which a child is capable o f being born alive is the 
point at which it can survive independently o f its mother, even if only for a short period.’ If 
we take that as a definition, we are no longer talking about 22 weeks - we are talking about 
something substantially lower"37.
Jurisprudential erosion o f the time limit envisaged in the concept o f foetal viability can have 
no immediate effect on the provision o f abortion, as the 1990 Act foresees a fixed time limit 
o f 24 weeks and explicitly ‘de-couples’ the Abortion Act from the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act 1929 which uses the concept of ‘capable o f being born alive’. However, the threat may
35 [1987] 1 All ER 1230.
36 [1991] 1 All ER 801.
37 H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 191 1990 (24 April).
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be posed in case o f abortion once more being debated in Parliament. If Ranee is followed 
and this lower age o f  viability becomes accepted as the correct legal construction (of this 
medical event) then this might have possible repercussions in future Parliamentary debates.
A  more immediate cause for concern with increased médicalisation is that this can only 
further serve to entrench medical control o f abortion. The more abortion becomes viewed as 
primarily (or exclusively) a medical phenomenon, the more it seems inevitable that it must 
fall into the sphere of authority of doctors to maintain both the technical and decisional 
control which I outlined in chapter 4 (and thus the possibility to continue to exercise 
paternalistic and normalising control). The medical control of abortion is very much accepted 
within the debates, with the majority of pro-choice M.P.s emphasising that this is a decision 
that should be made by the woman in conjunction with her doctor38 39. In the 1990 debates, 
two amendments which addressed the medical control of abortion were tabled. The first, 
tabled by Conservative M.P. Emma Nicholson, which sought to allow abortion on request for 
up to twelve weeks of pregnancy, was not selected to be put to the vote. The second, tabled 
by Harriet Harman, sought to allow women to have abortion for up to twelve weeks with the 
approval of only one doctor. Pro-choice M.P.s argued very much in terms of reducing the 
number of late abortions, by facilitating procedures™, but eventually was defeated by 228 
to 200 votes.
b) Foetal Separation
"The fact that the unborn child is physically dependent on its mother prior to birth need not 
lead to the assumption that it has no relevant separate existence..." (Fortin; 1988; 82).
The other worrying trend highlighted during the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
debates is an acceptance of the foetus as a separate individual. This is no doubt closely
38 Gorman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 232 1990 0 : "I would far rather trust the woman and 
her medical adviser [to decide]”; Primarolo, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 248 1990 (24 April): 
”[a]bortion is a medical decision and a woman’s choice”; Nicholson, H.C. Deb Vol. 171 Col. 
250 1990 (24 April): "up to 12 weeks the mother’s wish, in conjunction with her general 
practitioner’s decision, should be sufficient to allow her an abortion".
39 See for example Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 187 1990 (24 April), Nicholson,
H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 250 1990 (24 April).
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linked with the médicalisation of the debates, for medical discourse itself increasingly reflects 
such assumptions40. In recent years a number of feminist writers on both sides of the 
Atlantic have started to point with concern to the developing doctrine of foetal autonomy 
(Gallagher; 1985,1987, Petchesky; 1987; Steinberg; 1991, Franklin; 1991, Hartouni; 1991) - 
‘foetal patienthood if  not foetal personhood' (Petchesky; 1987; 64)41 - and concomitant 
"fetalization" (Franklin; 1991) o f the abortion debate. The fear expressed is that the 
development o f technologies such as ultrasound, which have increasingly rendered the foetus 
visible to the outside world have opened up a Pandora’s box o f ills which may yet have very 
far reaching consequences. The visual symbols produced by such techniques have a 
particularly powerful purchase in a society so oriented to the visual, and in the current context 
of continued battles and fierce political debates over abortion their political importance is not 
to be under-rated. Combined with an increasing médicalisation o f the debate and even greater 
primacy accorded to medical knowledges, these developments have resulted in an 
entrenchment o f the centrality of the foetus in the abortion debates and the emergence of 
discourses o f foetal protectionism and foetal rights (see Gallagher 1985).
The conceptualisation of the foetus as an individual, separate from the body o f the pregnant 
woman dates back as far as the Old Testament, possibly even beyond42. What is novel is 
the increased possibility of relying on medical rather than religious knowledges to ground this 
construction. In 1989, SPUC spent £60,000 on producing half a million full-colour postcards 
showing a ‘baby’ (foetus) of 18 weeks gestational development sucking its thumb, and three 
million colour leaflets "showing the baby’s humanity in words and pictures". The latter were 
delivered to three million homes43. Although this campaigning tactic is not new, it is 
becoming increasingly effective due to the invention o f techniques which allow the
40 See Arney (1982); Petchesky (1987); Martin (1987).
41 See also Gallagher (1985) and the contributions to Franklin et al. (1991). Franklin
(1991) has written that the concept o f ‘foetal personhood’ is both ontological and teleological 
in that it focuses on not only the foetus’ present status, but also its human potentiality.
42 Joyce Outshoom cites the Book o f Jeremiah: "Before I formed you in the womb/I 
knew you/and before you were born/1 consecrated you" (1992; 1).
43 Information from SPUC leaflet, "White Flower Sunday".
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photographing o f the foetus in utero. These images emphasise all that is baby-like about the 
foetus - like a baby, it is shown as existing whole and separate from the body of the pregnant 
woman. The danger of such images in enhanced by their stamp of photographic ‘fact’ or 
‘truth* (Petchesky; 1987). Petchesky writes: ’'foetal imagery epitomizes the distortion inherent 
in all photographic images: their tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits wrenched out of 
real space and time" (1987; 62). She cites Barthes in order to argue that the appearance of 
the photographic image as a ‘mechanical analogue of reality*, without art or artifice, obscures 
the fact that the image is heavily constructed, or ‘coded’, it is grounded in a context of 
historical and cultural meaning (1987; 62).
Petchesky, writing with regard to the U.S.A. notes that the new foetal imaging techniques 
(such as ultrasound and in utero photography) have constructed the foetus as hanging in a 
void, like an astronaut dangling in space. Barbara Katz Rothman has similarly observed that:
"[t]he fetus in uterus has become a metaphor for ‘man* in space, floating free, attached only 
by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But where is the mother in that metaphor? She has 
become empty space” (1986; 134).
The construction o f the tiny yet intrepid ‘space hero* hanging fearlessly in ‘his’ void is 
present in the 1990 debates. The use of the space imagery is striking in this comment taken 
from the debates:
”[t]he stark and dreadful import of abortion is that what nature has successfully - in spite of 
all hazards - launched into the orbit o f life, human hands seek deliberately to arrest and 
destroy in mid-trajectory. To make such a terrible intervention in the course of nature 
demands compellingly good reasons. The further the foetus has got off the ground, so to 
speak, the more vital it is that human intervention should be geared to assisting and 
upholding, not to arresting and destroying”44.
Thus the debates have succeeded in combining two seemingly conflicting constructions o f the 
foetus - the image is of a "little creature...a human being not yet born, yet with all the hope 
and expectation o f life"45, vulnerable yet intrepid, already embodying all the characteristics 
of a true individual.
44 Alison, H.C.Deb. Vol. 174 Col. 1180 1990 (21 June).
45 Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 217 1990 (24 April).
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What is worrying here is the failure o f the pro-choice movement to actively counteract the 
construction of foetal separation on a political level (Petchesky; 1987; 58). The power of the 
visual image is being exploited solely by the anti-choice groups, and remains largely 
unchallenged by activists on the other side. This is emphasised by the strategy adopted by 
the Society for the Protection o f Unborn Children (SPUC) during the Parliamentary debates 
preceding the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. SPUC sent each M.P. a plastic 
replica o f a foetus at 20 weeks o f gestation. Although various M.P.s expressed their distaste 
at this strategy as "obscene”46 and "a gross act. of bad taste"47, not one commented on what 
for me is the most worrying aspect o f this tactic: that the foetus is represented in total 
abstraction from the body of the woman that carries it. It emphasises everything that is baby­
like and vulnerable about a foetus and hides the essential difference from a baby - whilst the 
baby is separate and can be independent of its mother (at least if someone else cares for it), 
the foetus is not and cannot be. The representation of the foetus as a free-floating and 
separate entity embodies a fundamental deceit, and one which has been inadequately 
contested.
One anti-choice M.P. commented:
”[w]hen I opened my parcel I found a legitimate and graphic piece of campaigning, because 
nobody disputes that is what a 20-week old foetus looks like. I f  somebody had been able to 
produce medical evidence that this was a grotesque mock-up that was totally inaccurate and 
grossly misleading, it would have been the most obscene piece of campaigning that anyone 
could indulge in. However nobody has suggested that. When 1 was in the Post Office 
yesterday an hon. Member came in, took his parcel, opened it, and threw it in the bin. I 
could not help thinking that this is what happens to many foetuses”48.
Worryingly, no one in the House of Commons challenged Cormack to suggest that this in 
abstracting the foetus from the body o f the woman, this "graphic piece of campaigning" was 
indeed a "grotesque mock-up" and "totally inaccurate and grossly misleading" and indeed, that 
it should not only be medical evidence that has the authority to challenge it. The failure to
46 Doran, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 213 1990 (24 April).
47 MacKay, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 243 1990 (24 April).
48 Cormack, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 208 1990 (24 April), my emphasis.
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dispute this essential deceit in SPUC’s representation o f the issue, reflects a startling 
unconscious acceptance of the construction of abortion as revolving essentially around this 
free-floating foetus, and what rights are to be attributed to it. Once the woman is abstracted 
from the equation in this way, then SPUC are already half-way to proving their argument and 
central claim that there is a negligible difference between a foetus in the last stages of 
gestational development and the newborn baby.
Such an assertion is made to the House o f  Commons by Anne Widdecome:
"[a]t the moment, a child in an incubator can be kept alive, loved and cherished with all the 
resources of medical science being devoted to saving it, while a child of identical age and 
identical gestation in the wcmb has no rights and can be destroyed. There is something 
wrong with a law which allows that degree o f inequity between two individuals who are 
exactly the same except that we can see one and we cannot see the other...we must bring 
about a situation in which there is at least equality. At present, we have a law which states 
that a child who is seen is protected but that a child at an identical stage who is not seen is 
not protected"49.
Widdecombe’s assertion that there is no difference between these two situations totally 
ignores the pregnant woman’s role, her needs and her interests. In concentrating attention 
entirely on the foetus, the essential difference between the two situations (that one is 
occurring inside a woman’s body) is hidden. She is challenged by Emma Nicholson, a vocal 
pro-choice advocate. However, Nicholson makes no mention of the total absence of 
consideration of the pregnant woman in Widdecombe’s argument, rather, she notes that:
"[t]he hon. Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe) talked o f identical babies whose only 
difference at 20 weeks was that one was visible and the other invisible to the naked eye. 
That is not true because the baby invisible to the naked eye may be hideously deformed and 
if born and brought to life, may face a future of unimaginable suffering. It may be visible 
to the naked eye through modern machinery and perhaps it can be kept alive, despite its 
wretched existence for many years"50.
Having implicitly accepted the central importance of the foetus and the absence o f any 
consideration of the pregnant woman, Nicholson adopts the terrain set out by Widdecombe
49 Widdecome, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 192 1990 (24 April), my emphasis.
50 Nicholson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 249 1990 (24 April).
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and uses an essentially eugenicist argument to argue against her, asserting that the essential 
difference in the foetus which w e cannot see is that it may be handicapped.
Steinberg argued that a eugenic dimension to the abortion debate would be a further legacy 
of the Alton Bill, with Anti-Alton M.P.s relying on the limitations of prenatal diagnostic 
technology in discovering foetal abnormality, in order to justify the continuing legality o f  
‘late’ abortions (1991; 187). It would obviously not be true to assert that the eugenicist 
rhetoric only appeared at the time of Alton, its presence is also clearly discernable in the 
1966-7 debates (see p. 57-8, especially footnote 36). However, Steinberg is right to indicate 
an increased reliance on this kind o f  argumentation on the part o f the pro-choice supporters 
post-1988. She points to some o f the problems caused by the adoption of eugenicist rhetoric 
which fails to challenge the adversarial construction o f abortion, with central place accorded 
to the status of the foetus, but rather implicitly supports and entrenches this premise. Women 
are seen as having the ‘right’ to ‘late’ abortions only on a special case basis, where the status 
of the foetus so allows. Here, once again, the high moral ground is ceded to the anti-choice, 
with pro-choice supporters seen as pitted not only against the foetus, but also against the 
disabled. In his book, David Alton demands:
"[w]hat does it say about a society that snuffs out a life that is not deemed to have worth 
because o f disease or disability? Ask the next disabled person you meet whether they are 
glad to be alive" (1988; 174).
It is interesting, nonetheless, to note the seeming success of this rhetoric in that since 1990, 
women are now theoretically allowed abortions until birth in the presence of a serious foetal 
handicap.
In practice, médicalisation of the debates and the increasing importance of foetal separation 
are integrally related and mutually supporting. As medical knowledges become more 
important in the abortion debate, the issue o f the (medically determined) status of foetal life 
becomes increasingly central. As the status of foetal life becomes increasingly central, the 
place of medical knowledges and the authority of medical experts becomes ever more 
entrenched. This is the vicious circle into which feminist campaigns must now break. 
Moreover, as I argued in chapter 4, developments in other areas o f obstetrics and gynaecology
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- have equally led to the emergence o f the foetus as a separate patient with the doctor the best 
placed to represent its interests. This conceptualisation of the medical role equally serves to 
reinforce the notion o f the doctor as the appropriate expert to also wield such authority in 
cases involving a request for abortion.
4. THE HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT,
5. 3 (PROHIBITIONS IN CONNECTION W ITH EMBRYOS)
s. 3(1) No person shall:
a) bring about the creation of an embryo, or
b) keep or use an embryo, 
except in pursuance of a licence.
s. 3(3) A licence cannot authorise
a) keeping or using an embryo after the appearance of the primitive streak.
Although, it is impossible here to deal with the other provisions of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (1990) in anything like the level of complexity which they deserve, it 
is important to include some mention of them here in so far as they may yet prove relevant 
to the abortion debate51. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act follows a report, 
commissioned by the Government and headed by Mary Warnock (1984), and is clearly 
informed by much o f the analysis contained within it. Much o f the moral argument regarding 
embryo research within the debates centred on ‘personhood’ (Morgan and Lee; 1991; 4) the 
idea being that one particular point may be chosen at which we can say that someone 
becomes a ‘person’, or entitled to receive the respect owed to a person. The position which 
Warnock appears to have held however is that there is no absolute point at which a person 
appears and has moral status, but that a person emerges as a gradually present moral entity 
and one which becomes possessed of more and more rights as a juridical person. Indeed, 
Warnock explicitly denied the need to fix on one point at which personhood could be said 
to begin and has been criticised for this (Fortin; 1988; 54, Lockwood; 1985). For Warnock, 
then, to make particular legal or political decisions, we have to select a point or a series of 
points. The solution she proposes with regard to embryo research was to choose a cut off 
point o f fourteen days, with some limits as to what research could be done on embryos before




The recommended cut o ff point o f  fourteen days took as its reference point the emergence 
of the primitive streak, which "marks the beginning of individual development of the embryo" 
(Warnock; 1984; 11.22). Wamock notes that taking such a time limit had the added 
advantage of being also consonant with the views o f those who favoured the end o f  
implantation stage as a limit (1984; 11.22). The primitive streak appears as a heaping-up o f  
cells at one end o f  the embryonic disc on the fourteenth or fifteenth day after fertilisation 
(1984; 11.5). Until this time, it is argued, the cells o f  the embryo are undifferentiated in 
terms of which will become the placenta and the embryo proper (Franklin; 1991; 198-9) and 
this is also the latest stage at which identical twins can occur. As Jo Richardson asserts in 
Parliament: "[the fourteen day limit] is a well known chronological event and that is why the 
Warnock committee chose it. It is a particular stage in the development of a human 
being"52. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act follows Warnock’s recommendation 
in taking the appearance of the primitive streak as the upper time limit on embryo research.
It is important also to note that the explicit linking of abortion and embryo research by the 
inclusion of this section in a statute dealing with "human fertilisation and embryology" shows 
how far abortion is accepted as revolving around the biological status of foetal life53. This 
assumption is reflected and has been entrenched in the reporting o f these issues in the media, 
with developments in the debates around abortion and embryo research consistently reported 
in the space of the same article. This can only have compounded the perceived connections 
between the two in the public consciousness. The most consistently pro-choice of the quality 
newspapers, The Guardian, reported the forthcoming Parliamentary debates under the title: 
"MPs to vote on two life issues" (23 April 1990). The problem faced in the two cases 
appears to be parallel - to choose one cut-off point after which the embryo/foetus is to be 
subject to a certain regime of protection. The solution adopted is also seen as parallel and 
resting upon a point o f biological development (which may or may not be constructed in
52 Richardson, in The Guardian, 24 April, 1990.
53 See Brazier (1988; 9) for discussion o f the invocation of abortion in the arguments used 
by opponents and proponents of research.
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terms of a fixed period for reasons o f legal clarity)54. The comments of Kenneth Clarke 
(then Secretary of State for Health) show how the debates have further compounded the 
understanding of the two issues as essentially linked:
"1 was not instinctively attracted to the idea of debating the abortion law at the same time as 
discussing the introduction o f law on embryo research. Even in the past month or two I have 
genuinely changed my mind, and today’s debate has confirmed that. These subjects are so 
closely related that this is a suitable opportunity for the House to have a day at the end o f  
which it can come to a conclusion, which should last a long time, on the time limits and 
future operation o f the 1967 Act and its relationship with the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act"55.
The two matters are, however, in another sense quite different - one is dealing with the 
control of medical research, the other with women who wish to end unwanted pregnancies. 
The commonality which exists is provided by a focus on the status o f the conceptus, with this 
narrow medical/biological issue seen as the determinate factor in both regulation o f  
embryology and abortion. This obscures consideration o f any broader social factors and o f  
women’s needs.
A worrying note for feminists is that once the crucial question is defined as the status o f the 
conceptus and the need to protect it from third parties (doctors or women), it may seem 
inconsistent to offer this protection at such different stages in foetal development. The linking 
o f embryology and abortion provides fuel to anti-choice activists, who were not slow to point 
out the incongruity o f protecting the conceptus from medical research at 14 days, yet not 
protecting it from abortion until 24 weeks.
"It seems illogical that such an illustrious committee [the Warnock Committee] should 
strongly condemn any experimentation on embryos after 14 days of growth, due to the 
possibility o f  pain, when, since 1967, over two million embryos, the majority with fully intact 
central nervous systems, have been fragmented by curettage/suction or forcibly expelled
54 It is interesting to note that s.37 (dealing with abortion) chose to adopt a fixed period 
o f 24 weeks, thus translating a medical event into a fixed period to meet the (legal) 
requirement for precision and certainty. However, s.3 (dealing with embryo research), wrote 
the biological event itself (the appearance o f the primitive streak) into the statute.
55 Clarke, H.C. Deb. Voi. 171 Col. 265 1990 (24 April).
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prematurely, a practice not only condoned but vociferously defended by society"56.
Similar arguments were also heard both in Parliament - "[i]s it not illogical of Parliament to 
provide protection for human embryos from two weeks on, yet not be concerned for the future 
of that pre-embryo at 18, 20, 24, 26 or 28 weeks?"57 - and, to a lesser extent, in academic 
literature. Fortin, writing before the introduction o f the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act, argues that the legislative changes recommended by the Wamock Committee would, if 
implemented, result in a situation where:
"the law might contain greater protection for the very early embryo in vitro, through controls 
on experimentation and restrictions on the period permissible for keeping the embryo alive, 
than the abortion law contains for the more developed foetus" (1988a; 55).
She suggests an alternative approach based on Michael Lockwood’s distinction between 
human organisms, human beings and persons. In Lockwood’s view the foetus only becomes 
a human being when the brain has developed to a certain extent at around ten weeks (1985; 
10). On this basis, Fortin recommends a common upper limit for both experimentation on 
embryos in vitro and abortion on demand58.
36 The Times, 24 July 1984. A  letter to The Times (17 July 1991) responding to a letter 
calling for a review of NHS referral procedures, which had been signed, inter alia by Mary 
Warnock, made the same point: "[t]hose who consider abortion as an option in the 
"management of pregnancy", a social service rather than a killing must deny the right of the 
unborn. So perhaps those three members o f the Warnock committee, including the chairman 
herself, who now so earnestly propose a "fully comprehensive abortion service", might ponder 
upon why they sat for so long and moralised so earnestly upon the rights o f a mere 14-day- 
old embryo".
57 Duffy, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171 Col. 252 1990 (24 April). See also Alton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 
171 Col. 223 1990 (24 April).
58 After ten weeks she suggests that the abortion law would be improved by the insertion 
of a direction requiring those involved in any abortion decision relating to a foetus of more 
than ten weeks development, to consider its particular stage of physical and mental 
development, with a view to assessing its claim to continued life, as opposed to the claims 
o f the pregnant woman. Fortin envisages that compliance with such a requirement in cases 
o f this kind could be ensured by the participation in the abortion decision by a fourth person, 
who would have to ensure that the claim o f the foetus to continued life is balanced against 
the claim o f the woman.
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The aims of provisions regarding control o f embryo research are obviously not condemnable 
in themselves. The issues involved are complex and difficult and I have not attempted to 
address the ethical merits of the legislation, nor indeed of the research it seeks to regulate. 
There are no easy, ‘correct’ answers to such questions. However, the problem which 1 have 
sought to highlight here is that o f whether recognition o f foetal rights may foster a climate 
o f foetal protectionism which eventually leads to an infringement of women’s reproductive 
autonomy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
"Abortion is, in the first order, something done to fetuses!'unborn childrenand only 
secondarily (at most), a procedure women undergo" (Steinberg; 1991; 180).
m
The developments outlined above and the underlying assumptions which inform them, are 
both indicative and constitutive of a changing climate which could have negative implications 
for women’s access to abortion. Whereas the courts and legislator have as yet resisted the 
extension of foetal rights where they would infringe on the application of the Abortion Act, 
the potential for such extension remains and is grounds for some concern. Whilst the pro- 
choice forces have been successful in defeating various attacks on the provision of abortion 
enshrined in the 1967 Act, considerable ground has been lost in popular assumptions about 
abortion (STSG; 1991; 147). From this point the agenda becomes set within an essentially 
medical framework and the issue o f what is at stake in the abortion debate centres essentially 
around the medical development o f the foetus to the exclusion o f broader, social issues. What 
seems to me to be still more worrying, however, is that the acceptance of a medical 
framework further entrenches medical control of abortion and stands against any initiative to 
claim decisional control for women. There is something startling in the fact that M.P.s would 
vote to allow abortion o f handicapped foetuses until birth, yet refuse to allow abortion in the 
first twelve weeks on the authority o f one doctor (as opposed to two). I have argued in the 
preceding chapters that it is medical control which now provides the most significant 
challenge to women’s access to abortion, yet it is precisely this which remains unaddressed 
(see especially chapters 4 and 5).
In chapter 3 , 1 argued that the construction o f the woman seeking abortion was crucial to the
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form taken by the regulations introduced in the 1967 Abortion Act. The importance of the 
construction of woman in earlier debates was no doubt due in part to a greater focus on social 
factors. Now, with a near exclusive focus on medical factors, the situation of the woman is 
pushed to one side and the foetus attains a greater centrality. Its construction as a small and 
vulnerable ‘unborn child’, divorced from the body o f the woman, and pitted against her in an 
essentially adversarial relationship serves to legitimate the role o f the doctor (backed by the 
State) to protect the foetus and represent its interests against those of the woman.
CHAPTER 7: THE REGULATION OF 
ANTIPROGESTIN TERMINATIONS
"These projections o f absolute autonomy and independence o f women is the reason why so 
many fight so hard against it.. A n anti-progestin drug could develop in the future in such a 
way that sudden decisions could be put into effect, so that spontaneous contacts from which 
no consequences are desired would become increasingly devoid o f risk of pregnancy. This 
would likely change the behaviour of women entirely around reproduction and their sexual 
behaviour. They would be in a position to act and react like men, meaning they would, in 
every single case, be able not to let the consequences o f sexual intercourse take place. I  am 
convinced that in this framework the intensity of the reaction to this new drug becomes 
intelligible. More autonomy with regard to decisions in matters o f reproduction and fertility 
always triggers fear"1.
”Mifegyne has been developed within both the spirit and the letter o f the law. In the UK, its 
usage as an abortifacient is strictly within the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967. This 
provides for the legal termination of pregnancy when clinically necessary and approved. The 
Mifegyneiprostaglandin in combination can therefore only be administered to women who 
fulfd the requirements of the 1967 Abortion Act. Usage is confined specifically to those 
hospitals and clinics approved and licensed under the Act for the termination of pregnancy, 
it is administered there only under medical supervision and only to women who agree to the 
treatment schedule. Mifegyne is therefore not available for general sale, nor through 
chemists nor on family doctors’ prescription...The supply of Mifegyne is strictly controlled by 
Roussel. It is available only to those hospitals and clinics which have received instructions 
in its use and which conform to Roussel’s specific conditions o f supply"2.
1 Ingeborg Retzlaff (1993; 24).
2 Roussel UK Company Statement, 1 June 1993, RU486 (mifegyne, mifepristone): 
Background on the Medical Abortifacient Licensed in July 1991 for Use in the UK.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters 1 have sought to demonstrate that the construction o f abortion as 
primarily a medical matter has had a substantial impact on the law which, in the last thirty 
years, has moved from a system o f criminal prohibition to a decentralised network o f medical 
control. This médicalisation has increasingly led to an apparent depoliticisation o f abortion, 
defusing the conflict and controversy surrounding it. The extent o f this depoliticisation in the 
1990s was illustrated in the last chapter. However, despite this appearance, I asserted that 
abortion remains very much a political issue: the regulations governing its availability are 
underpinned by quite specific, discernable values which reflect certain attitudes to women and 
a clear value judgment as to who should control female fertility. Moreover, it was seen (in  
particular in chapter 4) that the regulation o f abortion continues to serve as a focal point for 
the deployment o f power over women. Whilst the médicalisation of abortion law has had 
substantial benefits for ensuring women’s access to abortion, it also poses substantial 
problems for that access. In this chapter, 1 would like to illustrate these arguments by w ay  
of an examination o f  the decision to license RU486 for use in Britain.
Whereas in the U SA a storm of controversy has surrounded the drug (Chicoine; 1993, Lader; 
1990, Ricks; 1989), in Britain, RU486 was introduced with a minimum of discussion. This 
has prompted one commentator to compare the British and US situations in the following  
terms:
"[t]he NHS’s distribution of RU 486 to any woman who qualifies for it is convincing 
evidence that in Great Britain equitable access to health care is more important than political 
pressures brought to bear by a vocal minority" (Chicoine; 1993; 111-2).
The characterisation o f the availability o f RU486 as ‘NHS distribution to any woman who  
qualifies for it’ is obviously mistaken, and this will be clearly seen below. However, this 
analysis is interesting in indicating once again the difference between the more explicit 
politicisation of abortion in the USA, where the direct effect o f political pressures brought to 
bear by identifiable individuals and groups is clearly visible (see p. 165 below).
Having first offered a brief introductory sketch of RU486 (section 2), I shall go on to discuss 
reactions to the decision to license it for use in Britain (section 3). Although the political
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significance o f the debate as played out in Parliament (and to a lesser extent, outside it) was 
obscured by a focus on competing medical evidence as to the relative benefits o f the drug, 
I will argue that such depoliticisation is more apparent than real: fears regarding the control 
of abortion are the only convincing way o f explaining the opposition to the drug amongst 
anti-choice activists. Surprisingly, such fears also go some way to explaining opposition to 
the drug amongst pro-choice activists. This seems to present a paradox: how can it be that 
both those in favour o f restricting and extending women’s self-determination oppose 
antiprogestins for this reason? I seek to explain this with reference to the models of medical 
control which I developed in chapter 4. In a fourth section, I address another apparent 
paradox: given the seeming simplicity o f the antiprogestin procedure, why has this resulted 
in a stepped up regime o f supervision and control? Finally, I shift from an examination o f  
the present regulation o f antiprogestins to an assessment o f their potential to offer new ways 
o f challenging the medical control o f abortion (section 5).
2. BACKGROUND
a) The Development o f RU486
RU486 is an anti-hormone drug or, more specifically, an antiprogestin. Its action is to bind 
to the progesterone receptors in the woman’s uterus in order to block the production o f  
progesterone and thus impair the womb’s ability to hold onto a fertilized egg. The womb 
lining breaks down and the embryo is lost in the bleeding which follows. In order to 
improve its efficacy, RU486 has been combined with prostaglandins (PG), drugs which act 
to induce uterine contractions3. Subsequent research has combined varying doses of RU486 
with different types of prostaglandins administered either orally, as intramuscular injections 
or as vaginal suppositories. The formula which proved most successful and which has since 
been adopted in Britain is that of a first application of 600 mg o f RU486 (3 tablets), followed 
36-48 hours later by a 1 mg gemeprost (synthetic prostaglandin) vaginal suppository. This
3 Since 1970 prostaglandins have been used to initiate labour and to interrupt pregnancies. 
Initial optimism about their use was soon dampened by disappointing success rates and 
serious adverse effects on the women who have used them (see Klein et al; 1991; especially 
chapter 4). However, the dosage o f prostaglandins used in an RU 486/PG abortion need be 
only 10-20% of that used in prostaglandin only abortions and consequently the side effects 
are much less severe (Baird; 1990).
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combination has a 94-7% success rate4. In the cases where abortion is not successfully 
induced, the woman will have a surgical abortion, normally by vacuum aspiration.
RU486/PG was first released onto the (French) market in September 1988. Distribution was 
suspended the following month by the manufacturers, Roussel Uclaf, amidst fears of an 
economic boycott by Catholic and anti-abortion groups and pressure from Hoechst, its 
principal shareholder. It was, however, swiftly reintroduced following the intervention of the 
French Minister o f Health, Claude Evin, who maintained, in a phrase that has since become 
famous, that RU486 was the "moral property of women" (Nau and Nouchi; 1988). By the 
end of 1992, 25% o f all women terminating pregnancies in France were choosing to do so 
by way of RU486/PG (Reproductive Health Matters; 1993; 123). Roussel Uclaf, however, 
has shown a marked reluctance to distribute the product in other countries, and has declared 
itself unwilling to apply itself for a licence to market the drug, seemingly preferring to wait 
to be asked to apply by the relevant government (Kingman; 1989; 7)5. At the time of 
writing, only Britain and Sweden have followed France in licensing the drug, although 
negotiations are underway for the Netherlands, some other Scandinavian countries 
(Soderholm; 1993; 37) and the USA. However, as yet, a comparatively low number of 
abortions have been performed in Britain using RU486/PG6, and many GPs seem still to be 
unaware of the availability of RU486/PG. This greatly limits the number of women who can 
use this method, as quick referrals are an essential prerequisite for its use.
4 Rodger and Baird (1987) UK Multicentre trial (1990), Baulieu (1993), Baird (1993; 5), 
Aubeny (1993).
5 Roussel Uclaf list the following factors as prerequisites for a decision to apply for a 
product licence: abortion must be legal, the right to abortion must be accepted by public, 
political and medical opinion; the request must be made by official and medical bodies; the 
distribution circuit must be very strictly controlled; approved clinics must exist; a suitable 
prostaglandin must be available on the market; a strict medical follow-up o f the patient must 
be part o f  the clinical protocol (Roussel release; 29 July 1992). See Thoss (1993) and 
Retzlaff (1993) for the problems this has caused regarding the possible introduction of RU486 
in Germany.
6 Roussel estimate 10,000 (this figure excludes the women who used the drug during its 
trials in the UK). The method is available in 122 (of 265) NHS hospitals and 16 (of 74) non- 
NHS abortion clinics, Abortion Review, Spring (1994) no. 51.
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b) RU486/PG Compared to Conventional Abortion Techniques
In terms of effectiveness7, complications8, cost9 and the experience o f the women who have 
used it10, RU486 seems comparable to other early abortion techniques. It does however have 
some differences. One disadvantage is that, as will be seen below (pp. 174-7), an RU486/PG 
abortion takes more time than a surgical abortion, requiring two days or more, and three trips 
to the clinic/hospital. This delay can be distressing for the woman, and for this reason, a 
French gynaecologist involved with trials for RU486, Annie Bureau, has suggested that 
RU486/PG abortions are not suitable for all women (USPDA; 1990; 8). This has, on the 
other hand, also been cited as a positive part of the RU486/PG experience: "RU gives women 
time to separate themselves from the pregnancy which they are giving up" (USPDA; 1990; 
17). A pamphlet issued by the Swiss Union for the Décriminalisation of Abortion (USPDA) 
reports on the possibility to:
"transform the termination experienced as a failure into a positive reflection on one’s fertility 
and sexuality. The time taken allows the event to sink in better, as part of the continuum of 
the life of the woman" (1990; 17).
It is easy to imagine, however, that many might find the delay distressing and prefer the
7 Cameron and Baird (1988), UK Multicentre Trial (1990), Rodger and Baird (1987), 
Baulieu (1993), Baird (1993), Aubeny (1993).
8 Rodger and Baird (1987). Common side effects include bleeding, abdominal pain and 
cramping and possibly some nausea, vomiting or diarrhoea from the prostaglandin. 
Antiprogestins have the advantage of being non-surgical, requiring no anesthesia and putting 
women at no risk of perforation, damage to the cervix or infection from instruments. There 
has been one reported death resulting from an RU486/PG abortion: a thirty-one-year-old 
French woman, in her 13th pregnancy died o f cardiovascular complications resulting from the 
prostaglandin administered in conjunction with RU486 (The Lancet, 20 April 1991; 969). 
Clinical tests have not revealed any long term health effects on women who have used 
RU486/PG, and predict that such effects are unlikely to appear given the short time women 
are exposed to the drug.
9 Henshaw (1994; 42) puts the cost o f an RU486/PG in-patient termination at £340, as 
compared to £375 for a surgical termination. These figures relate to the NHS, and are higher 
than for the non-NHS sector.
10 See Baird (1993; 6), Templeton (1993; 26d), Urquhart and Templeton (1988, 1991), 
Furedi (1994), Henshaw (1993), Brewin and Bradley (1989) and Glasier (1993; 14). Some 
women’s experiences o f the method are examined in more detail below.
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speed of a surgical termination. This delay between the two stages of the abortion also means 
that it may be difficult to fit RU486/PG terminations into existing hospital schedules, which 
often allocate certain days of the weeks to performing terminations (Lloyd; 1993; 3, Baird; 
1993; 6, Stewart; 1994; 16). Antiprogestins do have one major advantage over other methods 
of termination: they can be administered to the woman as soon as she knows that she is 
pregnant and has decided that she wants to have an abortion. For a surgical abortion a woman 
has to wait until at least 6 weeks from her last menstrual period There seems to be some 
public consensus that early abortion is morally preferable to late abortion (Francome; 1991), 
as well as being safer, and often psychologically easier for the pregnant woman. One woman 
who had had an abortion using antiprogestins said that she chose it for this reason:
"I decided to choose the medical method because I could undergo the abortion much faster 
that if I had opted for a surgical abortion. I can’t remember how many weeks it was, but, 
when I was told, it seemed quite horrific - the amount of time I would have had to have 
waited to have seen a gynaecolgist" (Furedi; 1994; 43).
From the evidence available it would seem, on balance, that antiprogestins have proved as 
safe as other methods of performing abortions, and may be a preferable alternative for some 
(but not all) women. As with any new development, it is necessary to proceed with caution, 
and especially important to carefully monitor for any possible long term effects. However, 
most pro-choice commentators have come out cautiously in favour of the possibility o f  
RU486/PG abortions and many women’s groups are currently lobbying their governments and 
Roussel Uclaf for RU486 to be made available in their countries.
3. THE BRITISH LICENSING OF RU486
In Britain, with some few exceptions, it seem s that reactions to the drug have split down the 
traditional pro- and anti-choice'lines. Here I want to make two main points about these 
reactions: First, the level of opposition to RU486 in Britain was relatively slight and the 
majority o f arguments against the drug operated within a medical framework (a), however 
underlying reactions to the drug are hopes and fears regarding the control o f abortion (b).
a) Medicaltsation of the Political Debate
First then it is important to note that the introduction of antiprogestins did not provoke huge
165
controversy in Britain. In the United States, the debate surrounding antiprogestins has been 
far more explicitly political and far more acrimonious. The decision to make RU486 
available there was explicitly influenced by party politics: RU486 was opposed by both 
Presidents Reagan and Bush, who stopped all research on it at the National Institute of Health 
and forced the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to put the pill on the proscribed list, 
blocking its entry into the country. Moreover, one Republican representative, Robert Dornan, 
unsuccessfully introduced legislation aiming to prohibit RU486, and to prevent its approval 
by the FDA (Lader; 1990; 21). One o f the first actions of Bill Clinton (three days after 
assuming responsibility as President) was to authorise the Minister of Health to approve 
testing of the drug within the United States, with a view to granting it a product licence11. 
Claudia Mancina describes this act as: "undeniably solemn and binding, corresponding to a 
precise political line, assumed not only by Clinton but by the Democratic Party as a whole"
(1993).
In Britain, conflict over the drug has not been constructed as a matter for party politics. 
Opposition to it has been far more muted, but has been present nonetheless: a largely 
unsuccessful and low profile campaign was launched by the anti-choice groups, and the drug 
was debated in Parliament, although only after the decision to grant it a product license for 
the British market had already been taken. Product licences are granted by the Minister o f  
Health following advice from the Medical Control Agency (MCA) and RU486 was licensed 
on 1 July 1991, ten months after an application had been submitted12. The fact that RU486 
was licensed in Britain without any preceding discussion of the issue can itself be seen as a 
result of the fact that abortion is here again constructed as a medical rather than political issue 
- the decision was taken outside o f the political arena on medical and economic criteria 
(safety and potential savings to the NHS). Discussion o f the issue in Parliament was initiated 
by Kenneth Hind (Secretary of the All Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group).
11 It also seems likely that the FDA’s initial import ban on the drug was a direct result 
of pressure brought to bear by four US Congressmen, see Chicoine (1993; 94-5).
12 This provoked allegations that the drug had been ‘fast-tracked’, this period being 
substantially shorter than the normal 17 months: Winterton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 894  
1990 (22 July); Braine, H. C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 888 1990 (22 July); Hind H. C. Deb. Vol. 
195 Col. 885 1990 (22 July).
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The pro- and anti-choice split is clearly seen in the Parliamentary debates following the 
granting of a product licence to RU486, where the lines o f opponents and proponents of 
abortion are drawn clearly, with Jo Richardson joining the Under Secretary o f State for Health 
in speaking in defence of the granting o f  the product licence, and Kenneth Hind, Bernard 
Braine and Ann Winterton speaking against it1 *3. However, the rhetoric adopted by the latter 
three is quite different in emphasis from that normally used, focusing on considerations of the 
health of the pregnant woman with only scant mention o f the foetus. The arguments do not 
explicitly consider how the drug will effect women’s control over their fertility. Rather M.P.s 
phrase their arguments within an essentially medical framework. Anti-choice M.P.s argue 
that: "women in their dilemma may be subjected to [RU486]"14 with long term dangers to 
their health, and long term costs to the NH S15. This is countered by pro-choice M.P.s and 
government ministers who assert the safety o f the antiprogestin termination ("nothing could 
be simpler and safer than that"16), the saving to the NHS17 and the extra choice for women 
and doctors18.
This focus on arguments concerning women’s physical health marks a shift in the anti-choice 
rhetoric. One could not be thought overly cynical for seeing this concern as a strategy for 
attempting to block the introduction of the pill, and for believing that the real motivation for 
so doing lies elsewhere. This move is also interesting in providing further illustration of the 
shift in anti-choice rhetoric to a concentration on the medical, already evident in the 
Parliamentary debates at the time of the Alton Bill and the Human Fertilisation and
11 The exception to this is Campbell-Savours MP who, although a member o f the Life
lobby, spoke in favour of the pill as a means o f preventing later abortions.
14 Bernard Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 890, 1991 (22 July). Note the construction
of the traumatised and misguided woman, who needs to be protected from abortion.
15 See Hind, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Cols. 884-7, 1991 (22 July); Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 
195, Col. 888-892, 1991 (22 July); Winterton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Cols. 895-6, 1991 (22 
July).
16 Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 892, 1991 (22 July).
17 Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 893, 1991 (22 July).
18 Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Cols. 892, 894, 1991 (22 July); Thurnham, H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 195, Col. 897, 1991 (22 July); Dorrell, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 899, 1991 (22 July).
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Embryology Act (see chapter 6). Again, both sides o f the debate in Parliament increasingly 
make use o f medical rhetoric and knowledges as the best way o f putting across their 
. arguments. This shift in focus away from the foetus also offers some support for an argument 
that I shall make below: antiprogestins make it more difficult for the anti-choice movement 
to rest their arguments on considerations of a foetus which cannot be constructed as a 
recognisable ‘baby* at this stage o f gestational development (see pp. 182-4). And again the 
anti-choice run into problems in adopting medical rhetoric, as they fall open to challenge for 
lack of medical expertise19. Moreover, they face specific problems in that the weight o f  
medical opinion stands against them. In an attempt to justify their opposition to the research 
claiming to have established the safety and efficacity o f  the RU486, anti-choice M.P.s imply 
that the tests done have not been scientifically objective, as they have often been financed by 
Roussel or have involved at least one Roussel scientist20.
b) Understanding Opposition to Antiprogestins
It is abortion as an end rather than the means used to achieve it which has been the traditional 
focus of political dispute. The introduction o f vacuum aspiration as an alternative to dilation 
and curettage (D&C) terminations provoked no debate. Moreover antiprogestins only work 
early in the course o f a pregnancy, and this should be a factor to recommend them to 
everyone. Why then did antiprogestins encounter any opposition? In this section, I shall be 
looking in particular to the perceived need for medical control to explain opposition to the 
drug.
i) Anti-Choice Groups
The anti-choice campaigning groups have fought antiprogestins on all fronts, maintaining a 
more traditional line of argumentation, as well as seeking to deploy medical knowledges:
19 "I am surprised that lay persons should so question the work of the Medicines Control 
Agency, which is held in the highest regard and undertook proper testing" Thurnham, H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 897, 1991 (22 July).
20 See Hind, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 884 1991 (22 July). M.P.s make similar accusations 
o f partiality on the part of the French government’s decision to licence the pill, given that 
they own a 36% share in Roussel: Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 888 1991 (22 July); 
Winterton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 895 1991 (22 July). See also SPUC (undated), RU486: 
Update and implications.
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"[w]e believe [RU486] will be physically and psychologically damaging to the women who 
take it” (Nuala Scarisbrick, administrator o f Life, in Prentice; 1990; 4);
”[w]e see it as a return to the days of backstreet abortions, except that dirty knitting needles 
and caustic soda will be replaced by dangerous chemicals" (Keith Davis, national campaign 
co-ordinator, Life in Lees; 1991);
"[t]here will be more pressure on women to have abortions" (Scarisbrick in Prentice; 1991); 
"[RU486 is] chemical warfare on the unborn"21.
Also present in some statements is an undercurrent of the need for abortion to be unpleasant 
as a deterrent to those women who take the decision to terminate a pregnancy too easily, and 
here the clearer expression of fears of the control of abortion emerges. Phyllis Bowman 
(director o f SPUC) said:
"[w]e want to see the abortion law tightened up in this country and this drug is going to make 
people think it’s easy to have one. We’re against this philosophy of making abortions easier 
and easier" (Moorhead; undated; 1).
SPUC’s expert on RU486, Catherine Françoise, comments:
”[y]ou take a tablet to get rid of a headache. You take a tablet to stop getting pregnant. And 
now you take a tablet to get rid o f a child...Terrifyingly, some people now talk of the death 
and destruction of the tiny unborn human life by a powerful chemical steroid as being more 
convenient” (Sapsted; 1991; 41).
A more extreme reaction comes from the U.S. where a pro-life congressman stated that:
"proponents o f abortion want to replace the guilt suffered by women who undergo abortion 
with the moral uncertainty of self-deception...[Wjith the ‘death pill’, the taking of a pre-born 
life will be as easy and as trivial as taking an aspirin" (Ricks; 1989; 92).
Several commentators have raised the possibility that it is the belief that the abortion pill will 
make abortion less unpleasant which has created the hostility towards it. Dall’Ava Santucci 
asks "are they suggesting that women need to suffer to stop them ‘reoffending’?" (1988, see 
also Ricks; 1989, Cook; 1990, Sapsted; 1991).
Underpinning the anti-choice opposition both inside and outside of Parliament would seem 
to be certain worries about the issue o f control. If the technical aspect of having an abortion
21 SPUC leaflet, A Dose of Lies: False claims about RU486, the Abortion Drug.
169
becomes as easy as ‘taking an aspirin’ (and this construction implicitly carries with it the 
images of self-treatment and even self-diagnosis), how is it to be controlled? This, I believe, 
is the real motivating force behind anti-choice opposition to antiprogestins. Whereas some 
feminists have long advocated the practice of self-help terminations by menstrual extraction 
(see chapter 4, pp. 79-80), antiprogestins seem to bring the possibility o f self-induced abortion 
much closer to reality. Abortion by menstrual extraction relies on women who have 
experience with the method, working as part of a group, with access to certain equipment. 
More importantly, menstrual extraction presupposes the acceptance o f a level o f intimacy with 
one’s own body and with the bodies o f other women, that would be difficult for many. 
Menstrual extraction would be less acceptable to many women than antiprogestins. As in the 
image conjured up above, it sounds as easy as taking an aspirin. So the introduction of  
RU486 seems to strike at the very basis o f medical control of abortion - the level of technical 
control. Antiprogestins seem to embody the potential to render doctors redundant, and their 
monopoly untenable. One gynaecologist involved with the French trials for RU486 enthused 
that antiprogestins are revolutionary, as for the First time the doctor
"loses his/her primordial role. (S)he contents him/herself with saying if there is or is not a 
contraindication to taking RU and to overseeing the development _of the abortion from a 
distance" (Aubeny; 1991; 33).
She goes on to argue that RU486 will lead to the disappearance o f hospitalisation and any 
invasive procedures, and the possibility for women to take control o f their own abortions, as 
it is their own action which will bring about the abortion (1991; 33). If this is true then anti­
choice fears seem well founded.
As will be seen below, however, the present regulation o f RU486 in those countries where 
it has been introduced is strict, so the hopes expressed by feminists such as Elisabeth Aubeny 
have little prospect o f realisation. However, her ideas do present exactly the kind of image 
that seems to underlie the fears o f the anti-choice activists. Opposition to the pill does seem  
for the most part to reflect the (internationally) expressed idea that RU486 may ‘privatize’ 
abortion. A leader in the Daily Telegraph referred to RU486 as "abortion on request"22.
22 21 July 1991. Cited by Richardson, H.C. Deb. 1991 Vol. 195, Col. 892, 1991 (22 
July).
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The American Journal, The New Republic, carried an article which described RU486 as
"enabling] women to perform abortions privately at home...a woman could take RU-486 
safely and privately very soon after missing her period without ever knowing whether she was 
actually pregnant" (Kaye; 1986).
These ideas have been summed up in The New Scientist:
"[w]hat is different about RU486 is that it offers women throughout the world a technique 
that not only promises many advantages over surgery, but could also give women greater 
autonomy in choosing when and where an abortion was to be performed. These advantages, 
it seems, are precisely where the problem lies" (reprinted in NAC; undated; 10).
These fears have also been raised specifically in connection with one of the amendments 
introduced by s.37 o f  the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act which gives the Secretary 
of State the power to authorise classes o f  places for the administration o f  such drugs (as 
opposed to having to issue individual licences, as is the case for other forms of termination, 
see pp. 186-7 below). Anne Widdecombe noted in the Houses o f Commons that:
"[this amendment] gives the Secretary o f State powers to enlarge the classes o f premises that 
will be licensed. I believe that that is merely a paving measure - even if it is not intended 
as such - for self-administered home abortion"23.
It seems that opposition to antiprogestin terminations is underpinned by fears regarding the 
implications for control over abortion - that too much control may ultimately come to rest in 
the hands o f the pregnant woman. After all, "[h]ow could a state control swallowing?" 
(Goodman in Klein et al.; 1991; 29).
ii) Pro-Choice Reactions
"If this is a private and de-medicalized abortion experience, then the word ‘private ’ has lost 
its definitional moorings” (Klein et ai; 1991; 112).
The majority o f pro-choice supporters, who have expressed an opinion, seem to have come 
out in favour o f the decision to license RU486 for use in Britain. In particular, both the 
National Abortion Campaign and the Birth Control Trust supported this move. Given the 
fears of the anti-abortionists that antiprogestins might result in freer access to abortion, this
23 Widdecombe, H.C. Deb. Vol. 174 Col. 1193, 1990 (21 June).
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is not surprising. What is perhaps more puzzling is the idea o f pro-choice opposition to 
antiprogestins. Although there has also been some evidence of feminist opposition to RU486 
in Europe24, this has originated mainly in the USA, where there is a stronger school of 
feminist thought which is unequivocally anti-technology/anti-medical power. Arguments 
which have been made against the pill is that it is less safe than conventional methods of 
early pregnancy termination such as vacuum aspiration, that it has as yet been inadequately 
tested, that women are being used as guinea pigs for industry and that the long-term effects 
of the drug will remain unclear for many years (Aktionsforum MoZ et al.; undated, Klein et 
al.; 1991, Raymond; 1991). These arguments are similar to those made by anti-choice M.P.S 
in Parliament (although in Parliament, specific opposition was expressed to the fact that it was 
British women who were being used as guinea pigs25 and the dangers of long term effects 
were expressed not only in terms o f  dangers for women but also in terms of cost to the NHS).
The arguments put forward by those feminists who have proved hostile towards the licensing 
of the drug also focus in part on control - that whereas RU486/PG terminations have been 
presented as involving a detechnicalisation and loosening of medical control, in fact quite the 
converse is true. Klein et al. put their claim strongly:
”[i]n reality, the RU486/PG abortion method increases, rather than decreases the lack of 
privacy and the lack of women’s control over the abortion experience. The only different 
about an RU486/PG abortion is the rhetoric of control which hardly matches the reality of 
strict and prolonged medical supervision. Measured by the number of doctor’s visits, and the 
duration of time from visit one to visit three, or four (at which point the woman is back to 
square one o f conventional abortion), we are talking about a non-private, extensively 
medicalized, and complicated abortion method" (Klein et al.; 1991; 29 - emphasis in 
original).
24 Aktionsforum et al. (undated), Raymond (1991). At the 1992 International Planned 
Parenthood Federation conference on medical abortion services (see Newman; 1993; 45) and 
the 1992 European Network for Women’s Right to Abortion and Contraception conference, 
such opposition seemed to be most loudly voiced by Dutch feminists, who have reservations 
as to what antiprogestins can do to improve abortion services in the Netherlands, which would 
seem to be superior to those in Britain.
25 Hind, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 888, 1991 (22 July); Braine, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 
889, 1991 (22 July), Winterton, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 895 1991 (22 July), Amess H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 898 1991 (22 July).
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Whilst this criticism originates from outside Britain, it seems to be no less applicable here, 
and indeed has been advanced in much the same form in an article in Spare Rib, by one of 
the book’s authors, Janice Raymond (1991). It is this seeming paradox - that worries 
regarding control are central to both pro- and anti-choice opposition to the drug - which I 
attempt to untangle in the following section regarding the regulation of antiprogestin 
terminations.
4. ANTIPROGESTINS AND PARADOXES OF MEDICAL CONTROL
I have argued above that the appearance of detechnicalisation offered by antiprogestin 
terminations has fuelled controversy at the introduction of RU486 and has drawn the lines 
between its opponents and proponents. Although arguments have been framed primarily in 
terms of medical safety, I have maintained that opposition has been motivated in large part 
by the fear that RU486 will give more control to women. Equally, where putting more 
control into the hands of women is seen as a positive thing, this has served as an argument 
in favour of antiprogestins.
In the UK, Roussel Uclaf, doctors involved in the trials of RU486 and politicians alike, have 
all been at great pains to dispel the idea that RU486 will contribute to increasing women’s 
control over termination. In Parliament, every M.P. who spoke to support the introduction 
of RU486 emphasised that it would have to pass through the Abortion Act in the same way 
as other kinds of termination, and would be subject to exactly the same level of medical 
control:
"[RU486’s] use will be confined to approved places and, as with other methods of abortion, 
will require the agreement of two doctors who will have to give their signature in good faith. 
It is not abortion on request"26.
"We are discussing a method of abortion. As it should be seen clearly as an abortion method, 
its use must be governed by the provisions of abortion legislation, and principally the 
Abortion Act. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made it clear that he is
26 Richardson, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195 Col. 892, 1991 (22 July). See also Thurnham, H.C. 
Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 897, 1991 (22 July); Clarke, H.C. Deb. Vol. 174 Col. 1199 1990 (21 
June).
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licensing the drug only for use in conditions that are clearly set out in law - that is to say, 
that the prospect of an abortion must be agreed to by two doctors. It must be on defined 
grounds within the terms of the Act, it must be in licensed establishments - there is no 
question of it being available for use in unlicensed establishments by general practitioners”27.
"To maintain safety you require extremely close medical supervision . " 28
"Usage is confined specifically to those hospitals and clinics approved and licensed under the 
Act for the termination of pregnancy, it is administered there only under medical supervision 
and only to women who agree to the treatment schedule. Mifegyne is therefore not available 
for general sale, nor through chemists nor on family doctors* prescription...The supply of 
Mifegyne is strictly controlled by Roussel. It is available only to those hospitals and clinics 
which have received instructions in its use and which conform to Roussel’s specific 
conditions of supply"29.
All of this would seem to support Klein et al. and other feminists who have opposed the 
introduction of antiprogestins in their assertion that RU486 does not challenge the medical 
control of abortion. What particularly angers them is that RU486 has been extensively 
represented as an essentially demedicalising procedure which will give more control to 
women whereas they contend that, on the contrary, it actually extends and entrenches medical 
control:
"[a]ll of the researchers and clinicians agree that RU486 will never be given without this 
medical management, yet they speak out of both sides of their mouths in simultaneously 
stating that RU486 gives women more control over abortion. The kind of medical supervision 
that RU486 requires is not physician oversight from afar, but a highly medicalized treatment 
regimen which is multi-stepped, time consuming, and for many women, pain-producing and 
long-suffering" (Raymond; 1991; 35).
Klein et al. give the following example of the contradictions in the way that the drug has been 
presented, citing the pill’s inventor, Emile-Etienne Baulieu who, in the space of one article, 
writes both that: "...RU486 could be a prototype of the second generation of ways of giving 
women more control of their fertility" and also that "it should be given under strict medical
27 Don-ell, Under-Secretary of State for Health, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 899, 1991 (22 
July).
28 Allan Templeton, Professor of obstetrics and gynaecology at the University of 
Aberdeen, who headed the British trials of RU486-, in Klein et al.; 1991; 29.
29 Roussel Uclaf, company statement, 1 June 1993
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supervision in specialized centers" (in Klein et ah; 1991; 25). Whilst for Klein et ah these 
two statements form a clear contradiction, I feel that it may be more usefully viewed as an 
apparent paradox which might be untangled with regard to the different forms of medical 
control which I outlined in chapter 4. Antiprogestin abortions fall squarely within the terms 
of the Abortion Act, and are subject to all the same regulations as surgical abortions. As 
such, decisional control remains firmly in the hands of the medical profession: a woman 
seeking abortion will still need the certification of two doctors that her situation falls within 
one of the categories laid out in s .l of the 1967 Act. What may be more interesting are the 
implications for technical, paternalistic and normalising control.
a) Technical Control
As was noted above, antiprogestins seemingly have the potential to detechnicalise the 
provision of abortion: their administration does not require the same level of training as a 
surgical abortion (although expertise will be necessary as back up cover in case of 
complications). At present, however, it is true that in an important sense, as Klein et al.
(1991) contend, antiprogestins serve to médicalisé (rather than demedicalise) abortion. The 
increased medical control which forms the focus of Klein et al.’s critique is represented by 
increases in a basic level of technical control: the woman requires more visits to 
hospital/clinic (i) and, like other terminations, the procedure must be performed at specifically 
authorized medical centres, under medical supervision which is, if anything, closer than that 
required for surgical terminations (ii). One can add to this that the supply of the drug is very 
closely controlled (iii) and is subject to an extra level of administrative regulations introduced 
by the Secretary of State for Health (iv). So contrary to fears often expressed in the months 
preceding its introduction, RU486 will not be available over the chemist’s counter without 
prescription, or with a prescription signed by a doctor. Neither will it be possible for the 
woman to take the drug to use ‘in the privacy of her own home’. Even the enthusiasm of 
Elisabeth Aubeny (cited earlier as foreseeing the doctor as losing his/her primordial role) is 
dampened sufficiently for her to admit that "the price paid for [RU486] is the increased 
médicalisation of medical terminations for women" (1991; 34).
i) Number of hospital!clinic visits
Once a woman’s request for termination has been granted, she will face three visits to the
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hospital/clinic where the termination takes place as opposed to one visit for a surgical 
termination (Jones; 1994; 21)30:
* the woman will be referred to a licensed clinic where she will be physically examined and 
given a pregnancy test. The number of weeks since her last menstrual period will be 
ascertained, either from information that the woman can provide, or, in cases of doubt, by 
other means such as ultrasound. RU486 is available only within the first nine weeks of 
pregnancy31. The woman’s medical history will be screened for contraindications to the use 
of RU486/PG32. If there are none, she can be given RU486 in the form of three pills of 200 
mg each. Roussel specify that these pills must be swallowed in the presence of doctor. Most 
women will start to bleed the following day.
* Between 36 and 48 hours later the woman must return to the clinic to receive the 
prostaglandins which will complete the abortion. In Britain, this is administered by way of 
vaginal suppository, which is believed to be safer than injection. The woman will stay at the 
clinic for the next 4-6 hours. Most (up to 90%) abort there; a small number will abort after 
leaving the clinic.
* The woman must return several days later for a medical examination to make sure the 
abortion is complete and to monitor if she has experienced any side effects. Bleeding similar 
to a heavy period usually lasts from 7-12 days. With an RU486/PG termination, there is a 
4% chance of incomplete abortion. In such cases, the woman will need to undergo a surgical
30 In France, where the law imposes a week long waiting period between the woman’s 
request for termination and the medical procedure to induce it, the number of visits necessary 
will be at least four.
31 In France the treatment is available only until 7 weeks. This would seem to follow 
indications of reduced efficiency of the treatment after this time: see, for example, Templeton 
(1990), UK multicentre trial (1990).
32 Women who cannot use RU 486/PG include: those who have been receiving long-term 
corticosteroid therapy, those who have a blood clotting disorder, those with chronic adrenal 
gland failure, those with an ectopic pregnancy, those who have any contradiction to 
prostaglandins, women over 35 and heavy smokers. Some studies have also suggested that 
women who are overweight should be excluded (see Klein et al, 1991, 34-7).
termination (normally by vacuum aspiration)33.
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There was some initial confusion as to what stages o f the antiprogestin termination come 
within the term ‘treatment* (per s.l(3) o f the 1967 Act) and must therefore take place in a 
hospital or approved place. This point has since been clarified in a Department o f Health 
circular:
"[a]s with any other treatment for termination of pregnancy, both stages of this method 
(antiprogesterone tablets followed by prostaglandin pessary 36-48 hours later) must be 
administered in an NHS hospital/NHS Trust hospital or in one of the places approved by the 
Secretary of State under Section 1(3) of the 1967 Abortion Act, as amended, and specifically 
authorised to use this new method"34.
Therefore both antiprogestin and prostaglandins must be given in accordance with the 
restrictions imposed by the 1967 Act. This interpretation is not one which would be self- 
evident from a reading of the legislation as only in a very few cases will the antiprogestins 
themselves provoke the termination: they might could rather be seen as a pre-treatment, with 
the second stage (prostaglandins) being responsible for causing the termination. This 
interpretation is the one which imposes the closest medical control. However, administration 
on an out-patient basis is in accordance with the Abortion Act, even in the small number of 
cases where the woman actually aborts outside the clinic.
The third foreseen visit (for check-up) to the hospital or clinic is not a requirement when the 
woman has a surgical abortion. In the latter case, the check up can be done by her GP or at 
a family planning clinic or advisory centre. David Baird, who is professor of reproductive 
endocrinology at the University of Edinburgh and who participated in many of the UK trials 
involving RU486, writes that if it will not be possible for the woman to come back for this 
check up, medical termination will not be offered to her (Baird; 1993; 5). He contends,
33 In France the woman is made to sign a form agreeing to have a surgical termination, 
should the medical one fail. This reflects concern that the treatment may be teratogenic. 
Although there is no such legal requirement in Britain, David Paintin advises that prior to the 
treatment that it should be certain that the woman understand and agree that in the event of 
failure the pregnancy must be terminated by another method (1994a; 11).
34 Department o f Health, PL/CMO (91) 9, PL/CNO (91) 4, issued by the Chief Medical 
Officer.
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however, that in medical terms this is not always necessary, if you search for the products of 
conception by examining the woman vaginally before she leaves the hospital35. David 
Paintin (Emeritus Reader in Obstetrics and Gynaecology at St Mary’s Hospital Medical 
School in London) comments that:
"[t]he development of medical services both within and outside the NHS is being restricted 
by prescribing rules, Department of Health regulations and the legal requirement to provide 
abortion within an NHS hospital. Clearly some regulation is necessary for patients’ safety 
in relation to the use of drugs and the organisation of non-NHS facilities. But many of the 
regulations have been imposed for political reasons because ministers who are in charge of 
health and pharmaceutical manufacturers fear the small, but vehement, anti-abortion lobby" 
(1994b; 48).
ii) Medical Surveillance
Secondly, regulations ensure a closer level of medical surveillance over the woman while she 
is actually at the clinic/hospital. It is specified by Roussel that RU486 must be taken in the 
presence of the prescribing doctor. Further, the woman must be observed for at least two 
hours following administration of the drug and Roussel’s conditions for issuing the drug 
prescribe that throughout the time a patient is on the premises a doctor must be present (not 
a requirement for surgical terminations). It seems that this level of control is unsupported by 
medical needs. Marge Berer argues that:
"[i]n the vast majority of cases, neither a gynaecologist nor a hospital setting...is required, as 
long as back-up is at hand in the few cases where something goes wrong" (Berer; 1993b; 16, 
see also Lloyd; 1993).
The regulations imposed by the Department of Health and Roussel may seem excessive not 
only in terms of medical need, but also in terms of the existing law. Following the case of 
RCN v DHSS, it would seem that where the initial examination of the woman is done by 
doctors, pills could probably be handed over by a nurse acting under the doctor’s supervision. 
As was seen in chapter 5, terminations are included within the terms of the Abortion Act 
where, per Diplock, LJ: "a registered medical practitioner...[accepts] responsibility for all
35 Although he does feel that a follow up visit is necessary for post abortion counselling 
and contraceptive advice (1993; 6 ).
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stages of the treatment"36. Accordingly, so long as a doctor prescribed the treatment for the 
termination, remained in charge, accepted responsibility throughout, it seems that the 
pregnancy would be "terminated by a registered medical practitioner" for the purposes of the 
1967 Act, and any person taking part in the termination would be entitled to the protection 
afforded by s .l( l) . This does not imply the need for a doctor to be present on the premises, 
to be the one who gives the woman the pills or supervise her following administration, so 
long as there was cover provided in case of an emergency. Indeed, in the RCN case, Woolf 
J noted obita dicta with explicit reference to the future possibility of chemical terminations 
that:
"the registered medical practitioner must decide on the termination; the process must be 
initiated by him, and he must remain throughout responsible for its overall conduct and 
control in the sense that any actions needed to bring it jto a conclusion are done by 
appropriately skilled staff acting on his specific instructions, but not necessarily in his 
presence, though he or another registered medical practitioner must be available to be called 
if required"37.
This would suggest that it is probable that a far less strictly controlled regime would still meet 
the existing statutory requirements. Again, restrictions on access to antiprogestin terminations 
are not so much caused by statutory prohibition, as by the administrative and medical 
regulations governing their use.
iii) Supply of RU486
There is a very tight control over the supply of the drug and to whom it may be given. 
Roussel are proud to claim that they can trace every individual pill from the factory through 
the hospital or clinic to the GP prescribing it. Each package of three RU486 tablets is 
labelled with three numbered stickers. One sticker goes on factor records, the second is 
retained in the hospital or clinic pharmacy, and the third goes on the woman’s medical chart. 
It must be possible for the doctor or hospital pharmacist to account for all labels at any time. 
Roussel refuse to supply the drug unless doctors from a clinic attend a training seminar in its
36 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1 All ER [1981] 545, at 571.
37 Ibid, at 553, my emphasis.
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use. Further, they make detailed specifications as to how drugs must be stored, delivered and, 
if for any reason they are unused, returned38. One U.S. doctor who requested a pack of 
RU486 as a last attempt to save a patient with advanced breast cancer, was requested to return 
the drug, when she eventually died before using it (Chalker and Downey; 1992; 220). These 
provisions speak clearly to fears that a black market may develop in the drug, and that it may 
thus become available outside of strict medical supervision.
iv) Ministry o f Health Regulations
The Minister of Health has issued some special regulations regarding the use of 
antiprogrestins which would also seem to imply a tightening rather than loosening of medical 
control (see Jones; 1994; 20). First, outside of the NHS, antiprogestins are available only to 
women who live within one hour’s travelling time of the clinic. This regulation is important 
as it serves to exclude non-resident women from using the drug. According to Chalker and 
Downey, provisions limiting the drug to British nationals were requested by Roussel (1992; 
2 1 ), presumably to avoid further publicity of women travelling to the UK in order to receive 
early abortions. However, Marie Stopes clinics have now declared that they are able to offer 
early medical abortion to women from overseas, provided they are prepared to be treated on 
an in-patient basis and return to the clinic one week later for a check-up39. Secondly, it 
seems that antiprogestins may only be offered if the woman agrees for her own GP to be 
notified40, and he/she must be left sufficient time to respond with anxieties about the 
proposed treatment. Thirdly a GP (not necessarily the woman’s own) must agree to provide 
overnight cover. This is intended to ensure medical supervision following the termination.
With regard to the current regulations governing the use of antiprogestins then, it seems that
38 See Roussel release: Conditions of Supply for Mifegyne (Mifepristone).
39 Abortion Review, Spring (1994), no. 51.
40 There seems to be some confusion on this point. The Department of Health states that 
there is no requirement that the woman be referred by her GP, rather the relevant procedure 
is rather that the woman must demonstrate that she has medical cover for follow up (letter 
to Lloyd, 26 April 1993). However, it seems that (at least some) clinics are applying this to 
mean that they must inform her GP (for example, Paintin; 1994a; 10).
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basic technical control of the abortion procedure has been tightened, despite some evidence 
that such a degree of control is neither medically nor legally necessary. It seems likely that 
this very potential to demedicalise or detechnicalise abortion is responsible for the concrete 
increase in control, as it is this seeming potential of the drug which has fostered the fears 
surrounding its introduction, and led to the build up of bureaucracy. However, the 
foundations of such control seem less solid in this instance. Medical control of abortion is 
legitimated by the appearance of necessity to ensure safety: the promise that only the medical 
professional can promise health. With antiprogestins it may become apparent that these two 
levels are out of step, and the medical monopoly seem untenable.
c) Paternalistic and  Normalising Control
Whilst antiprogestins increase the level o f basic technical control and medical surveillance 
over abortion, they may nonetheless be important at the level of making women feel more 
in control of their own abortions as the procedure depends more on their own active 
participation. As a leading feminist gynecologist involved in the French trials leading to the 
introduction of the abortion pill there noted "with the abortion pill the woman isn’t 
hospitalised or even undressed and at the moment of the abortion" (Bureau; in Simmonot; 
1993b). Although women have to go through the same interviewing process to secure 
authorisation for their terminations, this may nonetheless have a significant effect on their 
experience of the abortion, and their relationship with the medical professionals involved in 
it. All ten of the women in Chantal Birman’s (1989) study reported that their relationship 
with the medical profession was different and more positive than in the case of a surgical 
termination. Two women attributed this to the fact that they were part of a trial to test the 
drug and consequently things were better explained. Three others, however, asserted that the 
relationship was really different because they themselves were taking charge. One even 
talked of ‘collusion’ with the doctor. Further, three of them noted that it was an advantage 
not to be so much at the mercy of the doctors who "often want to make women suffer 
because they are usually against abortion and they inflict abortion as a punishment" (Birman; 
1989; 8 ). Another woman cited by Chalker and Downey compared her RU486 termination 
with an earlier abortion: "[t]his time, I felt like I was in control, and taking the pills felt so 
much safer than having anesthesia and having some doctor poke at you with instruments." 
(1992; 211).
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Abortion is also symbolically removed from medical control in that women are normally 
alone when they abort. Janet Callum relates her impression of a French clinic where women 
were having RU486/PG abortions:
"[s]ome women felt that because there was no instrumentation, RU-486 was gentler and less 
intrusive, and they also appreciated not having to disrobe and lie down before a stranger. I 
observed women sitting quietly in a room together, reading magazines and talking. 
Occasionally one would excuse herself, walk into the bathroom and within about five minutes, 
emerge, her abortion completed. All expressed a profound appreciation at being ‘in control’, 
and several watched with rapt attention as the technician examined the products of conception 
(undated; 6 )41.
According to another study, the women who opted for medical termination were distinguished 
by their desire to be in control (Bachelot et al; 1991; 38, see also Sapstead; 1991; 41). 
Elisabeth Aubeny studied seventy five women who had Osed this method of abortion. She 
notes that:
"[a]ll emphasize the responsibility that they have to take...Instead of being passive as they are 
in vacuum aspiration, they manage their own abortions. By taking the tablet, the woman acts 
to trigger the process and supervises evacuation at home. In the vacuum technique, a doctor 
is in sole control. A woman can be virtually absent if she chooses general anesthesia. But 
RU 486 fits the needs of responsible patients who can cope by themselves, as many women 
want to do" (cited in Lader; 1990; 54)42.
Whilst RU486 may lead to a present increase on the level of technical control, it 
simultaneously (paradoxically?) may increase the woman’s feeling of power and this may 
effect the nature of her relationship with the medical professionals she encounters - if not her 
GP, then the consultant who will be responsible for her termination. Further, RU486 may 
also have the potential to challenge the technical level of medical control of abortion in the 
future. As I have argued above, it is perceptions of this possibility which has provoked the 
fears motivating anti-choice opposition to it and led to the very tight regulation of the drug.
41 The privacy might, also be experienced as a more negative thing. Birman notes that 
"by increasing the sense of individualism, RU 486 may well make the women’s isolation and 
solitude worse, at a time when they are battling with a painful and harrowing situation." 
(Birman; 1989; 8 ).
42 Not all women will experience such control as a positive thing. One woman told Dr 
Aubeny that: "[y]ou see everything that takes place and that’s difficult, I would have preferred 
the doctor to have taken complete charge of everything" (in Lader; 1990; 55).
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5. POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGING MEDICAL CONTROL
'Today, a strictly controlled pill, taken at hospital But tomorrow, will it always be possible 
to exercise such a control?” (Aubeny; 1991; 34),
In chapter 6 , 1 discussed the perceived need to protect the foetus from the pregnant woman, 
and the appointment of the doctor as the appropriate expert to represent the foetus’ interests. 
This is closely related to the construction o f abortion as an essentially medical event, 
requiring specialised knowledge and the idea of the woman as too irrational or irresponsible 
to be in control of her own termination. Whilst not wanting to overstate the importance of 
antiprogestins, I believe that they do have the potential to effect the abortion debate positively 
by challenging at least some of these assumptions (sections a and b). Further, antiprogestin 
terminations may yet provide an extra impetus for streamlining medical procedures in a way 
that would further loosen medical control and improve women’s access to early terminations 
(sections c and d).
a) ‘Foetal protectionism’ and antiprogestins
Early abortions were traditionally seen by women as ‘bringing on a late period’ and various 
products were advertised in newspapers and magazines in this way. Antiprogestins to a 
certain extent recreate this image of abortion. Berer writes that RU486 fulfills women’s need 
when facing an unwanted pregnancy: to get a period (1993b; 18). Commentators have 
described the final stage o f the antiprogestin termination as "a heavy period which expels the 
fertilised egg" (Sapsted; 1991; 41), calling RU486 "an ‘unpregnancy pill’, a non-surgical 
means of menstrual regulation, or an ‘MR drug’" (NAC; undated; 11), or the "latest 
contraceptive miracle" (Halpern; undated; 8 ). Coulet reports that some French women 
requesting antiprogestin terminations have described RU486 as "the drug which brings periods 
back" (1993; 20), and Couzinet notes that:
"[m]any women think of it as an induction of a menstrual period. Compared with classical 
abortion, the procedure is so much better tolerated emotionally by women" (in Cahill; 1987;
7).
The abortion debate in the UK seems to have centred very much on the status of the foetus 
and its (non) personhood. An important anti-choice strategy has been to focus attention on
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fully formed foetuses in later pregnancy, and much of their campaigning literature contains 
images of the developed older foetus. As has been seen, one anti-choice success of the 1988 
Alton Bill campaigns was to shift attention onto ‘late’ abortions (Steinberg; 1991). 
Antiprogestins, on the contrary, focus on early pregnancy. Abortion becomes more clearly 
part of a continuum which also includes contraception - the line between the two starts to 
blur, especially given that RU486 is in pill form and works in a way similar to the "morning- 
after" pill (Outshoom; 1990, see also Murphy; 1991). Baulieu describes his invention as a 
‘contragestive*, ("to diffuse the strength of the word abortion"), arguing that it falls between 
abortion and contraception (Baulieu; 1993; 4,1991). In an article which examines the ethical 
implications of antiprogestins, Cahill argues that this is one of the more worrying implications 
of the drug:
"the line between abortifacient and contraceptive methods of birth control is obscured by 
rhetoric designed to make the drug more acceptable to those who already accept contraception 
prevention" (1987; 7).
However, what Cahill’s argument conceals is that a clear line drawn between abortion and 
contraception is not a natural or inevitable boundary, but is itself historically specific and 
socially constructed, dating from the 1920s (Brookes; 1988; 6 ). What changes with 
antiprogestin terminations is the following: with surgical abortion, the pregnant woman has 
to wait until at least 6 - 8  weeks from her last menstrual period before the termination can take 
place. This gap has served to separate the two categories of abortion and contraception, 
keeping them distinct in both public consciousness and law. Indeed, British law has failed 
to provide any explicit distinction as to where contraception ends and abortion begins, a grey 
area long existing between the two41. Antiprogestins seem to have bridged this gap, to form 
a continuum between forms of contraception which prevents the egg from being fertilised 
(e.g. condom, spermicides, diaphragm, female condom), those which may prevent fertilisation 
or implantation (combined pill), those which may prevent implantation, or may dislodge the 
implanted embryo (IUD), and antiprogestins which cause the womb to shed its lining and 
hence the implanted embryo. Sara Ricks suggests that the similarity between the functioning 
of antiprogestins and an IUD is strong: both interfere with the nurturing uterine environment *72
43 See Tunkel (1979), Douglas (1991; 95-6), Kennedy (1988; chapter 3). Ricks (1989;
72) makes the same point with regard to U.S. law.
184
sufficiently to prevent the continuation of pregnancy, and to induce menstruation (1989; 80).
This has already been, noted as a problem for the anti-choice movement in the United States, 
where National Right to Life Committee president, John Wilke noted that: "[w]e’re really 
very simplistic, visually-oriented people, and if what we destroy in there doesn’t look human, 
then it will make our job more difficult" (Kaye; 1986; 5). Richard Glasgow, education 
director for the U.S. National Right to Life, writes:
"[sjince opinion polls show that the public supports contraception but is deeply split over 
abortion, proponents of RU-486 are eager to tie it to the former. Moreover, if RU-486 
becomes identified in the public’s mind with contraception, then right-to-Iife opposition to the 
drug could be portrayed as ‘reactionary’ and ‘out-of-touch’ with the mainstream of 
Americans" (Halpern; undated; 9).
Also in Parliament, there seemed to be some confusion as to the nature of antiprogestin 
terminations, with one (anti-choice) M.P. referring to the drug as a "morning-after pill"44. 
Indeed, the first claim that the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) seek 
to challenge in their leaflet on RU486, is that "RU486 brings on a menstrual period or natural 
miscarriage"45.
b) Demystification of abortion as a specialised medical event
The role of the doctor in the medical termination changes from active to a more passive one. 
The doctor becomes a background figure, needed to supervise and step in if anything goes 
wrong. It seems to me that although the basic technical and bureaucratic control of abortion 
is currently greater in the case of antiprogestin terminations, that this control somehow 
becomes somehow emptier and more artificial - it depends much more on stringent rules and 
bureaucracy than on accepted medical need. This is reflected in that in practice, doctors do 
not always strictly abide by the rules. Baird writes that:
"[djuring the administration of the mifepristone, minimal supervision is required, and although 
the manufacturers tell us that the woman should be observed for two hours, in practice after 
the swallowing of the tablets the patient is allowed to leave after five to ten minutes. In the
44 Campbell-Savours, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 898, 1991 (22 July).
45 SPUC, A Dose of Lies: False Claims about RU486, *The Abortion PilV.
inimnmM
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UK we have to administer these tablets in a licensed premises or in an NHS hospital. There 
is really no medical reason for this. This is purely a product of the legal requirement for 
termination of pregnancy" (1993; 5).
Logan (1994; 34) describes how a significant part of the RU486/PG termination is carried out 
by nurses: they administer the prostaglandin and do the vaginal examination with speculum. 
Likewise, Jones (1994; 22) notes: ”[t]he use of mifepristone has enabled other doctors to 
distance themselves form the practice of abortion by leaving the work to nurses or junior 
medical staff." It would seem to be just as safe for a nurse, midwife or trained lay person 
to administer both courses of treatment, given access to specialised medical help in case of 
need. This means that the traditional justification for the need for medical technical control - 
safety - would no longer ring true here. Antiprogestins seem then to offer greater future 
potential for arguing for safe abortions, performed by trained lay personnel with medical 
personnel necessary only as backup.
c) Challenging Referral Procedures
A letter in The Times (9 July 1991) shortly after the UK licensing of RU486 called for a 
review of the existing referral procedures of the NHS46. As the letter points out, in the NHS 
in England and Wales, only 21% of all abortions are performed within the first nine weeks 
of pregnancy, because of the lengthy procedures in some area health authorities. The 
signatories argue that the introduction of early medical abortion, which can be used only until 
nine weeks from the woman’s last menstrual period, provides the NHS with an exceptional 
opportunity to review its referral procedures so as to provide a fully comprehensive abortion 
service. Thus the importance of antiprogestins here is to provide an impetus for existing 
referral procedures to be expedited in order to make their use a possible option. This is an 
administrative matter and so has the advantage of not having to put abortion back onto the 
Parliamentary agenda47. Some excellent examples in the UK already exist to show how 
successful a streamlining of referral procedures can be (see Glasier; 1993).
46 Signed inter alia by MPs, members of the Birth Control Trust, Mary Warnock and Janet 
Radcliffe Richards.
47 In this sense the response from Bernard Braine MP was incorrect when he accused the 
signatories of the letter as "by implication...calling for a change in the law to allow abortion 
on demand" (The Times, 17 July 1991).
A more radical step would be to propose again the streamlining of referral procedures in 
Parliament. As was seen above (chapter 6 ), in the 1990 Parliamentary debates, the 
amendment tabled by Harriet Harman which sought to allow a woman to have an abortion 
following referral by just one doctor (as opposed to two) failed by a slim margin of only 28 
votes. Harman argued for this amendment in the name of a speeding and streamlining o f 
NHS procedures. As antiprogestin terminations are dependent on an early referral, their 
existence within the NHS might provide one more argument for such an amendment in future 
debates and thus swing the balance48. Claims that women should have the absolute right to 
elect to terminate early pregnancies might benefit in the same way. It is unlikely, however, 
that these issues will again receive Parliamentary time in the near future.
d) Licensing of Other Premises
Under the terms of the Abortion Act, s.l(3)(a) (introduced by s.37(3) of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990), the Secretary of State has power to authorise the 
use of specified abortifacient drugs in classes of places other than NHS hospitals. Although 
ministers have said that they have no immediate plans to make use of these powers4*', as this 
amendment was introduced specifically by the government, the possibility of future licensing 
of other premises is obviously already on the agenda50. This might mean that GPs’ surgeries 
and eventually family planning clinics could be licensed to supply either the first or both 
courses of treatment. This would be beneficial for women, given that typically one will live 
nearer to a GP than to a hospital/clinic. It also has a broader significance in driving a wedge
48 In a study conducted by Victoria Hartnell (1993), two thirds of the 156 women 
included had requested abortion before 63 days of gestation, but only 17% actually had their 
abortion within 63 days. The average delay between request and referral from GP was two 
days, and from referral and operation was 20 days. Hartnell concludes that strong arguments 
exist for clinics dedicated to pregnancy termination as more efficient and effective and having 
lower long term complication rates.
49 Dorrell, H.C. Deb. Vol. 195, Col. 899, 1991 (22 July), letter of 9 March 1993 from 
Department of Health to Leonora Lloyd.
50 "A question was asked earlier about what type of premises would be used for 
administering such a drug. It is possible that the pill could be administered in a G P’s surgery 
under the supervision of a registered medical practitioner. The patient would still have tG 
return two days later to be given the pessary", Clarke; H.C. Deb. Vol. Col. 1199 1990 (21 
June).
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into the power o f the hospital doctors who, as was seen in chapter 4 , have a de facto 
monopoly on the provision of NHS terminations: it is this regulation that the abortion must 
be performed on specially licensed premises which restricts the number of doctors who can 
perform abortions.
David Bromham (senior lecturer in obstetrics and gynaecology at St James’ Hospital, Leeds) 
has suggested that family planning clinics might be particularly suitable for the provision of 
antiprogestin terminations (1994; 14, see also Baird; 1993; 6 ). The desirability of extending 
permission for treatment to be administered there or at GPs’ surgeries will depend on the 
results of clinical trials and on medical opinion about the safety of such a move. If thought 
desirable, achieving this would depend on the political will o f the Minister of Health (Colvin; 
1990)51. Given the current composition of the Government, the likelihood of such political 
will existing is probably limited. One Scottish organisation recently asked the Scottish Home 
and Health Department whether it could set up an abortion service in Edinburgh where 
women who presented for abortion to a large family planning clinic could be given the RU 
486 in that clinic and then admitted 48 hours later to the hospital for the administration of the 
prostaglandins. This would have meant that the family planning clinic would have had to 
have been recognised by the Secretary of State for Scotland as an approved place for 
termination of pregnancy. The Scottish Home and Health Department were reluctant to allow 
this to happen, for reasons which according to Glasier are political: namely "they do not want 
to rock the boat" (1993; 15).
6 . CONCLUSION
Klein et al. argue that "RU486/PG represents the epitome of a reproductive politics that 
makes no connection to the sexual politics of women’s lives" (1991; 120). This is true in the 
sense that any kind of abortion does not address the wider social (sexual) context within
51 If the Minister failed to take such action in the face of overwhelming evidence that it 
would be medically safe to do so, it might be possible to challenge his decision in public law 
if it could be shown that he was exercising his discretion wholly unreasonably and against 
overwhelming evidence. Ministers have a wide discretion however, and courts are reluctant 
to overrule their discretion (Colvin; 1990; 20).
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which women get pregnant. The availability of abortion is only ever part of the story and it 
can only be one part of a feminist politics o f reproduction. However, in another sense, Klein 
e ta l. are also wrong. Antiprogestin terminations may connect with women's needs and 
perceptions in important ways. In particular, the availability of such an early method o f 
abortion may have a positive effect on a woman's experience o f her abortion. Further, whilst 
antiprogestins are indeed a method which currently entail a tighter level of technical control, 
this control seems in an important way to be more ‘hollow’ in that it is more dependent on 
rules and bureaucracy and less on a commonly perceived medical need. This increased 
technical control seems to be a result of fears generated by the seeming potential o f  
antiprogestins to strike at the basis of this technical power.
Here it has been seen that the decision to license RU486 for use in Britain had little of the 
explicit political significance of the same measure in the USA. What debate occurred here 
was rather cast within an essentially medical framework. Despite this, however, I argued that 
the dispute which existed could only be adequately understood within a context of control and 
dispute as regards who should make reproductive decisions. Moreover, whereas RU486 was 
introduced with comparatively little controversy and contestation, it has been introduced only 
within a rigid framework of medical control and supervision. This is hardly a situation o f 
"NHS distribution of RU 486 to any woman who qualifies for it", as it was enviously 
described by the US commentator whom I cited in the introduction to this chapter.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
"What I mean is this: in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are 
manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and 
these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented 
without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse...We are 
subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth n1.
'Yet law remains a site of struggle. While it is the case that law does not hold the key to 
unlock patriarchy, it provides the forum for articulating alternative visions and accounts. 
Each case of rape, sexual abuse, domestic violence, equal pay, and so on provides the 
opportunity for an alternative account to emerge. This account may not emerge in court 
(indeed it would be silenced there), nor in the media, nor in the formulation of reformed 
legislation, but it can and does emerge in women’s writing and feminist groups...These 
resistant discourses are growing in power, and it is often law that provides a focal point for 
the voice to be heard"1 2,
1 Michel Foucault (1980b; 93).
2 Carol Smart (1989; 8 8 ).
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1. SYNOPSIS: "INTO THE HANDS OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION"
In chapter 1  I laid down a thesis which I sought to sustain in the pages which followed. I 
have argued that the shift from a model of law based on criminal prohibition to a decentred 
network of medical control has (re)cast abortion as a narrow medical matter. Whilst it is true 
that threats to the 1967 Act remain both in the form of periodic attacks in Parliament, and the 
emergence of more militaristic, anti-choice tactics outside it, increasingly it seems that a status 
quo has been broadly accepted and within this abortion has become established as a matter 
for medicine rather than politics. This depoliticisation is real to the extent that important 
decisions regarding the provision of abortion have been shifted out of the public arena and 
left in the hands of medical professionals. However, 1 have argued that nonetheless abortion 
remains an important political issue. This is true both in terms of the values underpinning 
the existing rules governing the availability of abortion, and also in the sense that the 
regulation of abortion provides particular sites and modes for the deployment of power over 
women. It seems to me that in Britain the most serious problem currently facing a pro-choice 
politics is the relative powerlessness of women in the face of medical authority and the 
problems which stem from this.
In chapter 2, I began my study of the law regulating abortion with some consideration of the 
statutory basis for legal terminations in Britain. I located the 1967 Abortion Act within the 
terms of the broad shift to ‘governmentality’ described by Foucault (1979a), as a tactic o f 
management, surveillance and control o f the population. In this instance, this is instituted 
through the medical profession who operate as ‘parallel judges’, able to offer a close 
evaluation of every individual case. I argued that, far from representing a straightforward 
loosening of power over women or being motivated by a desire to extend female autonomy 
and self-determination, the Abortion Act was actually in part motivated by a desire to regain 
control of a situation of mass, de facto resistance to the law and to assert a medical monopoly 
over the control of reproduction. The form of legislation adopted operates to fulfil these 
aims, strenuously avoiding the granting of substantive rights to women seeking abortion and 
passing almost total control to the medical profession. The Act represents a shift from a legal 
regulation based on criminal prohibition, to one based on a decentralized network of medical 
control over women. This is not to deny that the 1967 Act represented a gain for women,
nfrmmftMwinrn
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but rather to note that it simultaneously grounded a particular modality of power over them.
Foucault has contended that the new visibility of the population achieved through tactics of 
govemmentality succeeded in constituting the individual for the first time as a 'case study’, 
an object of inquiry and a new target o f power. In chapter 3, I examined the ‘peripheral 
subject’ (re)constructed within the Abortion Act. The woman seeking abortion was 
constructed in terms of irrationality and instability: as either a selfish minor or a downtrodden 
and deranged victim of circumstance. Her very nature renders her unsuitable to make her 
own reproductive decisions; her inherent pathology grounds the need for the calm, rational 
and responsible figure of the doctor to take control of the situation. She is inherently in need 
of normalising medical supervision. The statute avoids challenging the notion of maternity 
as the female norm, rather abortion is only permitted when an exception can be made to this 
general rule. The constructions of unwanted pregnancy as an instance of individual pathology 
and of abortion as a wholly medical event have been integrally connected with the extension 
of a network of medical control.
In chapter 4, I moved from a focus on the spirit of the legislation to a consideration of how 
the medical control over abortion actually functions in practice. In an attempt to provide a 
more differentiated model of power, I distinguished between: technical control (the medical 
monopoly over the performance of legal abortions); decisional control (the doctor decides who 
shall have access to abortion); paternalistic control (the sympathetic doctor imposes his/her 
own views) and normalizing control (the doctor has access to details of the woman’s ‘private* 
world, and the power to locate her in a broader framework of understanding in order to 
produce an authorised account of her reality). It was noted that some individual doctors have 
attempted to minimise the extent of this control over women, seeing the woman’s desire for 
a termination as grounds enough for authorising it. In leaving control of abortion in the hands 
of the medical profession, women’s access to abortion services becomes dependent on 
doctors’ discretion. In practice this has had significant and enduring negative consequences 
for such access.
The médicalisation and medical control o f abortion have been entrenched and extended by 
law. Whilst not denying that abortion has medical aspects, I criticised the fact that the
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colonisation of law by medical knowledges has operated to the exclusion of other accounts 
and perspectives. The courts both accept and reinforce the medical control of abortion - and 
hence medical power over women - as was seen in chapter 5. The jurisprudence displays a 
clear judicial deference to medical authority and itself illustrates the influence of 
médicalisation, making use of medical constructions. As the law becomes dependent on 
medical concepts and definitions (e.g. viability), or creates its own constructions based on its 
perceptions of medical reality (e.g. good medical practice) then expert medical witnesses are 
necessarily drawn into the courts to guide judicial interpretations. Judicial respect for medical 
authority has not been entirely negative for women: it was significant here that medical 
control of abortion has in many ways served to protect, rather than to impinge upon, female 
autonomy. The law operates to protect the medical relationship from outside challenge. 
Where it is less useful is in protecting women within this relationship - this has been seen in 
cases such as Re S and Re W. In terms of the regulation o f abortion, the case of Barbara 
Whiten has staged a confrontation between medical discretion and female autonomy to 
provide a challenge which, at the time of writing, the law has yet to answer.
In chapter 6 , I examined section 37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990 
in the light of the broader assumptions which underlie it. I argued that the reforms introduced 
by this section display the same tension with regard to médicalisation as the case law: 
although they have been widely greeted as a pro-choice victory, on another level they also 
constitute a defeat. In this sense I argued that the framework for debate has shifted away 
from a broader social framework which includes discussion of women’s circumstances and 
needs to a predominantly medical framework, focusing on the (medically defined) status of 
the foetus. I highlighted two specific problems. First, I argued that the Parliamentary debates 
display a worrying assumption of foetal separation which has remained largely unchallenged. 
Secondly, whilst the acceptance o f abortion as an area of medical knowledge has helped to 
defend the ambit of the 1967 Act, and to secure a comparatively high upper time limit for 
terminations of 24 weeks, it cannot but have contributed to the climate which saw the failure 
of proposed amendments which sought to loosen medical control over access to abortion and 
allow women greater autonomy in early pregnancy.
In the final chapter, I looked at antiprogestins (available in Britain since July 1991) and the
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legal and medical framework which has been established to regulate their use. I argued that 
what discussion there was about the decision to license RU486 for use in Britain was 
conducted primarily in medical terms and this obscured the drug’s political significance and 
contributed to the relative lack of controversy which greeted its licensing for the British 
market. However, I also contended that such depoliticisation remains an appearance and not 
a reality: whilst phrased in medical terms, the reactions of pro- and anti-choice groups can 
only be understood within a context of an ongoing struggle over control of women’s fertility. 
Further, I noted that although RU 486/PG terminations were initially seen as a way of de- 
medicalising abortion, their introduction has resulted in an increased degree of medical control 
and supervision. I sought to explain this with regard to the different models of control 
outlined in chapter 4. I argued that the regulations governing the use of antiprogestins were 
a reaction to fears regarding the potential of the drug to .decrease medical control. Over and 
above these regulations, however, I argued that RU 486 may yet have significant potential for 
challenging certain aspects of medical control and médicalisation.
In the light of this analysis, it seems clear that the médicalisation of abortion has served to 
largely remove it from the public sphere, whilst also greatly influencing what discussion of 
it remains within that sphere. However, it is still relevant to view the regulation of abortion 
in Britain as a political issue. This is true in two senses. First, the existing legal rules 
governing the availability of abortion were predicated on the desire to establish a network of 
control capable of regulating both abortion and the women who seek it, whilst safeguarding 
the medical monopoly over it. This is seen in terms of the statute (chapters 2, 3 and 6 ), the 
judicial protection of the medical monopoly (chapter 5), and in the administrative rules and 
regulations, as was seen particularly in discussion of antiprogestin terminations (chapter 7). 
Secondly, the form taken by the regulations ensures that women are constantly vulnerable to 
medical power: the element of control inherent in the doctor-patient relationship is entrenched 
and extended (chapter 4).
However, a rather different model than such as that suggested by Catharine MacKinnon 
(1983a, 1983b, see p. 4) which focuses on violence or coercion is essential for such an 
analysis. The model of power which has emerged in this work is one not of state prohibition,
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but a more regulatory model: a shifting and decentralised network of medical power, the 
operation of which is justified by specific gendered constructions of the nature of the woman 
seeking to terminate a pregnancy and the expert knowledge of medical professionals. Legal 
regulation stands not in opposition to this medical regulation, but functions in a symbiotic 
relationship with it, adopting medical knowledges and norms, legitimating and entrenching 
a sphere of medical discretion. The operation of power has been largely concealed in that the 
encoding of abortion law in medical terms contributes to a growing appearance o f 
depoliticisation - abortion becomes a site for scientific knowledge and expert control. This 
serves to protect the status quo, with the legal framework for such medical control, and the 
exceptional judicial intervention serving to legitimise the normal run of medical practice and 
control. As Dreyfus and Rabinow comment:
"[political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing 
it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. 
Once this is accomplished the problems become technical ones for specialists to debate” 
(1982; 196).
Although law retains ultimate authority for itself, its power is deployed only in exceptional
cases.
Abortion activists on both sides of the political fence have embraced médicalisation, working 
within the medical framework and adopted medical knowledges and rhetoric where this has 
seemed the most effective way of influencing the political debate and legislation. Anti-choice 
activists have used medical knowledges very effectively, using medical accounts of the 
physiological development of the foetus and photographs which purport to show it at an 
advanced stage of pregnancy. The pièce de résistance of this genre is the (largely 
discredited3) pseudo-scientific film, The Silent Screamy which purports to show an ultrasound 
imaging of a twelve week foetus being aborted. Narration is provided by Dr Bernard 
Nathanson, "sober, bespectacled, leaning professorially against the desk”, providing medical
3 A panel of New York medical experts have contested the scientific validity of the film, 
on the grounds that, inter alia, the frantic movements of the foetus are caused by the speeding 
up of the film and that the size of the foetus as it appears in the film is nearly twice the size 
of a normal twelve week foetus (Petchesky; 1987; 60-1).
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authority for the images (Petchesky; 1987; 59, see also Hartouni; 1991; 36-7). Likewise, in 
chapter 6 , 1 noted that in 1989, SPUC produced half a million full-colour postcards showing 
a ‘baby’ (foetus) of 18 weeks gestational development sucking its thumb, and three million 
colour leaflets "showing the baby’s humanity in words and pictures". I argued that although 
this is not a new campaigning tactic, its power has been increased due to the invention of 
techniques which allow the photographing of the foetus in utero. Advanced medical 
technology is used to produces an image which emphasises all that is baby-like about the 
foetus - like a baby, it is shown as existing whole and separate from the body of the pregnant 
woman. This mirrors the shift in the political debate, which I argued above has come to 
revolve around the (medically defined) status of the foetus, with the pregnant woman 
completely occluded. The anti-choice movement has also produced expert witnesses to testify 
to a medically proven form of illness following termination: ‘post-abortion trauma’ or 
syndrome. This has the object of a recent private Commission organised by anti-choice M.P.S 
under Lord Rawlinson4 and a repeated subject of Parliamentary questions by anti-choice
M.P.s5. Anti-choice M.P.s have also tabled many Parliamentary questions dealing with 
various other medical aspects of abortion. To take January of 1993 alone, David Alton 
requested information on the links between abortion and chlamydia6, infertility7 and 
spontaneous miscarriages in subsequent pregnancies8, maternal deaths9, how often it was 
necessary to give blood transfusions following abortion10, the incidence of perforations and
4 Members of the Commission include David Alton, Margaret White and Catherine 
Françoise. See National Abortion Campaign (1993b) and Abortion Review, Spring 1993, no. 
47.
5 Alton, H.C. Deb. Voi. 209 Col. 603w 1992 (17 June), Spink, H.C. Deb. Voi. 212 Col. 
69w 1992 (19 October).
6 H.C. Deb. Voi. 217 Col. 477w 1993 (22 January).
7 H.C. Deb. Voi. 217 Col. 813w 1993 (28 January).
8 H.C. Deb. Voi. 217 Col. 813w 1993 (28 January).
9 H.C. Deb. Voi. 217 Col. 722w 1993 (27 January).
10 H.C. Deb. Voi. 217 Col. 477w 1993 (22 January).
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ruptures of the uterus11 and the procedures for reporting o f physical complications following 
abortion12.
Nevertheless, it seems that the weight of medical opinion in Britain is in favour of allowing 
abortion (within certain medically controlled circumstances and limits) and that, on balance, 
médicalisation has led to a facilitation of women’s access to abortion. Britain was among the 
first Western countries to legalise abortion and the medical framework adopted by the law 
helped to minimise potential political controversy. Since 1967, doctors have grown 
increasingly liberal in the provision of abortion and the courts have refused to check this 
development. Specialist non-NHS clinics have been established in areas where (senior) NHS 
doctors are less liberal and block the performance of abortions in ‘their’ hospitals. 
Administrative attempts to restrict the number of abortions (for example where the 
Department of Health altered notification forms to omit reference to the woman’s 
environment) seem likewise to have been unsuccessful (see chapter 5, p. 113). Britain has 
a relatively high upper time limit for abortion, which was enshrined in statute in 1990 because 
it coincided with viability (primarily a medical event). Finally, that antiprogestins arrived on 
the British market with only minor protests preceding their introduction, testifies to the extent 
to which abortion has come to be seen as an essentially medical, rather than political, matter.
2. W HAT’S WRONG W ITH  MEDICALISATION?
Given that médicalisation has brought such obvious gains, why would one seek to challenge 
it? Although it has been seen above that médicalisation has in many ways served to improve 
and protect women’s access to abortion, it has also become clear that it presents two 
integrally connected but nonetheless analytically distinguishable problems. First, there is the 
problem of the medical framework itself: in the same way that the adoption of a rights 
framework for debate has been criticised for the marginalisation of consideration of broader 
social issues, so crucial to earlier pro-choice campaigns, so too has the pre-eminence of
11 H.C. Deb. Vol. 217 Col. 698w 1993 (26 January).
12 H.C. Deb. Vol. 217 Col. 536w 1993 (25 January).
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medical knowledges and the acceptance of a consensual medical framework for debate. As 
the law has been colonised by medical knowledges, other understandings of abortion have 
been excluded from it (section a). Secondly, this acceptance o f a medical framework seems 
to make any possibility of loosening the medical grip on the control of abortion appear ever 
more remote and thus contributes to the maintenance of the concrete problems which stem 
from such medical control, outlined in chapter 4 (section b).
a) Marginalisation of non-medical factors
The first problem which I want to raise here with regard to médicalisation echoes that which 
some feminist writers have outlined with regard to the use of rights discourse in abortion 
debates13. Whilst feminist commentators have recognised that the language of rights has 
been useful and politically empowering for the women’s movement (as for many minority 
groups), recent years have seen an increasing degree of unease with regard to its invocation. 
The use of rights in the formulation of claims has been criticised for a number of reasons 
including its focus on individuals as opposed to social structures (Himmelweit; 1988; 42, 
Kingdom; 1991; 62) and on narrow legal solutions rather than wide-ranging social reform. 
Thus, if and when such rights are attained, this can present a problem as solved (Smart; 
1989), although history clearly shows that an improvement in women’s formal legal position 
does not automatically lead to an improvement in women’s social and economic position 
(Kingdom; 1991; 47). I would argue that médicalisation poses similar problems. 
Furthermore, the analysis of this thesis would suggest that, certainly at the Parliamentary level 
and to a large extent also within the rhetoric of the campaigning groups, the rights discourse 
is being superseded by the use of medical discourse and a deployment of medical knowledges 
(see especially chapters 6 and 7).
As Carol Smart has contended, law has a particular claim to truth which is indivisible from
13 See especially Liz Kingdom (1985,1991,1992); Carol Smart (1989); Sue Himmelweit;
(1988); Lucinda Finley (1983) and Ros Petchesky (1984a). For a defence of the use of 
rights, see especially Adelaide Villmoare (1991); Martha Minow (1989) and Patricia Williams
(1988). Joyce Outshoom (1992) has argued that this preoccupation with rights may be a 
peculiarly Anglo-American one. She cites the very different formulation of claims by the 
German and Dutch women’s movements, which focus more on control over one’s body 
(1988; 207).
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its expression of power, operating not simply in its material effects (judgments), but also in 
its ability to disqualify other knowledges and experiences (1990a; 5). This gives great 
significance to the colonisation of law by medical knowledges. The 1967 Act marked a 
landmark victory for the medical discourse or paradigm, constructing abortion as falling 
primarily within the sphere of medical, rather than - say - moral or religious authority (as in 
Ireland), or as a matter of the conflict between a woman’s right to privacy and the state’s 
interest in protecting foetal life (as in the United States). This victory has been consolidated 
in more recent years: the médicalisation of abortion has become so grounded in our 
commonsense perception of it, that it is now difficult for many even to imagine an alternative 
legal context to that of medical control (Gordon; 1980; 515). In this sense a clear evolution 
between the Parliamentary debates of 1966-67 and those of 1990 has been seen. Whilst the 
former contain much discussion of women and broader social factors, the latter are 
characterised by their strong medical focus (see chapters 2, 3 and 6). The acceptance of 
abortion as something which falls within the realm of the medical has become so firmly 
entrenched that any voice wishing to make itself heard in the debates is under pressure to 
adopt medical discourse. Neatly illustrating this, Fyfe reports a comment made to her: "how 
can you do any research on abortion, you’ve never studied medicine!" (1991; 169).
One example of the ability of medical knowledges to disqualify other accounts was seen in 
chapter 6 with the adoption of 24 weeks as the upper time limit for abortion in 1990. As was 
seen this rested on the significance attributed to the medical construction of ‘viability’ and 
the assertion that any other cut off point would simply be "arbitrary". As I asserted above, 
to accept this one factor of viability as the decisive cut off point ignores women’s complex 
decision making and awareness of broader social considerations. As Maureen McNeil argues, 
the adoption of viability as a dividing line:
"shifts the focus of decision-making away from women who, in opting for or against abortion, 
make complex evaluations of their particular circumstances and of the social sustainability of 
new life. Such decisions have little to do with what medical science can sustain 
technologically. Saying that it is theoretically possible to plug a 24-week-old fetus into life 
support apparatuses is very different from saying that you personally will take primary 
responsibility for supporting - in every sense - a child through to adulthood" (1991; 156).
Other examples were found in the jurisprudence. In chapter 5, I discussed the case of C v
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5, which concerned Robert Carver’s attempts to prevent his pregnant ex-girlfriend from 
terminating her pregnancy. The major issue to be debated in court was neither S’s situation, 
nor her claim to self-determination and how that can be weighed against Carver’s interests. 
Rather the legal issue was constructed as a narrow medical one, again revolving around the 
point of viability and the boundaries of medical discretion. Again, this led to a favourable 
(legal) result for S, however the tremendous political importance of the decision is defused. 
The legal problem to be decided is encoded in medical terms.
The process of focussing a debate is inevitably also one of narrowing it: any way of 
formulating a question equally occludes other possible formulations. This is an essential 
process for law, which is not able to deal with infinite complexity. It must simplify and 
reduce an issue to manageable proportions before it can begin to deal with it (Teubner; 1-983; 
249). However, whilst it is not ‘wrong’ to view abortion as a medical phenomenon, other 
important ways of conceptualising it are obscured by the dominance of the medical 
framework. I would contend that the current statute does more than simply omit 
consideration of social factors. Rather, as was seen in chapter 3, by its very structure, the law 
focuses attention onto what is different and medically (broadly construed) significant about 
the particular woman’s situation. Abortion is illegal: the question is what is peculiar about 
this woman or this pregnancy that should justify its performance? This obscures 
consideration of much of what has been central to feminist accounts of abortion: what may 
be similar in the situation of women which contributes to the existence of unwanted 
pregnancy14. Even in so far as the Abortion Act does take account of social factors (in that 
the doctor can take account of the ‘woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable circumstances’), 
these are individualised, reconstructed as exceptions which are particular to the situation of 
the individual woman and only by virtue of this fact gain their medical (and hence legal) 
relevance. As was seen in chapter 5, this is true even where doctors make their 
recommendation for termination on the grounds of the so-called ‘statistical argument’15: they
14 Compare this with the French law, as drafted by Simone Veil, which foresees that legal 
abortion should be accompanied by a coherent policy on contraception, abortion and improved 
education, see Allison (1994; 230).
15 I.e. statistically speaking, to continue a pregnancy poses greater risk to the woman’s 
health than an early termination.
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are required to take an individualised decision (see p. 114). It remains implicit in the law that 
women should only be allowed to have abortions if they fit into one of the ‘abnormal* 
categories: if they are somehow distinguished from the ‘normal* family oriented, maternal 
woman with a normal pregnancy.
In dealing with social problems which particularly affect certain individuals, the makers of 
public policy have always to make a choice, or to strike a balance, between dealing with the 
problem on a social level (through welfare measures, preventative campaigns) and on an 
individual level (through treating the individual, criminal sanctions, individual benefits etc.). 
For example, unemployment can be seen as social, structural problems: for whatever reason, 
there is inevitably a class of people in our society who are without work. Alternatively, it 
can be seen as an individual problem: the individual is unemployed because s/he is under 
skilled or insufficiently motivated. The way in which unemployment is conceptualised has 
vital implications for how we seek to deal with it. If it is due to structural factors, it is only 
by addressing these that unemployment will be eradicated or mitigated. If it is because of 
an individual fault, then effort must be directed at the individual. In fact, our system of 
welfare benefits rests on a dual conception which incorporates aspects of both of these 
viewpoints: accepting the inevitability of unemployment and hence the need to pay benefits, 
but at the same time introducing carrot and stick measures to encourage the individual into 
the labour market, or schemes to enhance her/his chances within it.
Central to feminist writing on abortion has been an emphasis on the broad, structural factors 
which contribute to the incidence of unwanted pregnancy and which make abortion more than 
an individual matter - a refusal to abstract the issue of abortion from the context of women’s 
concrete situation(s) in society. Such writings have raised not merely individual, medical 
considerations (are the requirements for abortion justified by this case history?) but also 
reflect the more general, social issues involved in discussion about unwanted pregnancy. The 
problem of understanding abortion has thus been one of simultaneously grasping both 
individual and social factors, of understanding that abortion is at once a decision arising from 
intimate and personal circumstances, yet at the same time is influenced by important structural 
givens which relate to the particular situations of women in a given society at a given time. 
As Petchesky writes, the nature of reproduction is simultaneously social and individual,
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operating both at the core of social life, as well as within and upon women’s individual 
bodies (1984a; 2).
Socialist feminist writers like Ros Petchesky in the USA and Liz Kingdom in Britain have 
suggested that pro-choice campaigns might be usefully reformulated with a focus on women’s 
needs (Petchesky; 1984a) or circumstances (Kingdom; 1992). Within these general categories 
they would include the need to consider such matters as the availability of safe and efficient 
contraception; sex education; the difficulty for women to take control of their own sexuality 
and refuse intercourse where it is not desired; social pressures such as stigma attached to 
mothering outside of marriage; financial and economic considerations; and the massive loss 
of freedom experienced by individual women on having a child (see Petchesky; 1984a; 1-21). 
Within the present, medicalised legal construction, the essential problem is one of how far 
doctors’ freedom to terminate pregnancies should be legally controlled. Once some provision 
has been made in this direction and an acceptable ‘compromise’ reached, the problem seems 
solved, the State’s responsibilities fulfilled. When the problem is relocated within the context 
of women’s lives, the issue becomes one of unwanted pregnancy and attention is 
uncomfortably refocused onto problems which are less easily (and cheaply) addressed: poor 
child benefits, lack of childcare facilities, inadequate social provision for the physically and 
mentally handicapped, failure to provide adequate sex education and contraception and, above 
all, women’s lack of control in sexual relations and hugely disproportionate share in the costs 
and responsibilities of childcare16. Médicalisation (and the casting of law in medical terms) 
has aided the apparent depoliticisation of abortion by structuring debate in such a way that 
attention is not focussed on such factors.
b) Entrenchment of Medical Control
The acceptance of a medical framework for debate works against any loosening of medical 
control: the more abortion becomes seen as a medical decision, the more difficult it becomes 
to see this decision as one which fundamentally belongs to women rather than doctors. In 
1990 M.P.s voted to maintain a relatively high upper limit in the law and in certain instances
16 One might also think here of the costs that childcare imposes on individual families 
(even in the exceptional cases of two or more adults genuinely sharing childcare 
responsibilities) as opposed to costs borne by the wider society.
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(including in cases of foetal handicap) they voted that abortion should be allowed until the 
moment of birth, in this respect marking the Abortion Act amongst the most liberal of 
Western abortion statutes (see chapter 6). A t the same time, M.P.s refused to allow abortions 
prior to 12 weeks either on request or where authorised by only one doctor, retaining the 
strictest medical control and situating the Abortion Act amongst the least liberal o f Western 
abortion statutes. This voting pattern is consistent, however, if one locates it within this 
context o f médicalisation and medical control. Law leaves a broad scope for medical 
discretion, but this implicit acceptance o f abortion as a site of privatised, expert, medical 
knowledge can only have contributed to the failure of the proposals to loosen such control 
in early pregnancy. Likewise, antiprogestins were licensed for use in the UK on the basis of 
repeated assurances that they would be issued only through the most strictly controlled 
medical channels. As a result, women in Britain may have the possibility to use this method, 
but only within very the tight limits o f a cumbersome, highly medicalised system of 
supervision and control (see chapter 7). The licensing of RU486 thus widens the medical 
choices open to women acting in conjunction with their doctors, but allows the exercise of 
this choice only under an even tighter medical control. !
It has been evident that medical control of abortion brings its own attendant problems, and 
these were outlined in chapter 4. It remains true that one’s chance of obtaining NHS funding 
for a termination is dependent on where one lives, and the bias o f the senior doctors in local 
NHS hospitals. Further, it seems that there is little control over how women will be treated 
by the GP and hospital workers they encounter in their attempt to obtain an NHS termination. 
There are also problems of underfunding which are integrally linked to the power of senior 
hospital doctors. Finally, whereas the woman acting in conjunction with her doctor is 
comparatively well legally protected against outside interference (by State or third party), it 
seems that she has less protection against her doctor (see chapter 5). In practice, this resulted 
in a situation where women who are sufficiently knowledgeable to approach a clinic, and who 
have the necessary money to fund their own terminations, will have access to safe, legal 
abortion, normally in a more sympathetic environment. The same is not necessarily true for 
younger women, women of minority ethnic groups or others who are lacking the same 
resources in terms of money and knowledge of how the system operates. The entrenchment 
of medical control leaves women’s access to termination as discretionary, and the treatment
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which they receive as dependent on medical goodwill. Inevitably, the worst consequences 
of the this will fall upon the most vulnerable groups of women. With the possibility of 
obtaining NHS funding for a terminations dependent on geography, and the likelihood of a 
sympathetic reception from one’s GP largely a matter of luck, it seems to me that the most 
pressing problem now facing a feminist politics of abortion is that of medical control.
3. CHALLENGING MEDICALISATION AND MEDICAL CONTROL:
THE ROLE OF LEGAL REFORM
The above analysis raises a clear problem for a pro-choice politics. It seems that the most 
effective way of protecting and entrenching women’s access to abortion services has been to 
embrace an essentially medical framework, deploying medical knowledges and constructions. 
This is a language and argumentation which seems to have been most effectively ‘heard’ 
within the existing legal structures and which is least susceptible to challenge or dispute. To 
phrase claims in the language of medical need also serves to depoliticise them, giving an 
appearance of neutrality. However, it is difficult to see how medical knowledges can be 
deployed without reinforcing the construction of abortion as essentially a medical 
phenomenon, thus marginalising other accounts and entrenching the idea that control should 
rest in medical hands. Moreover, addressing medical power is especially difficult given the 
form that it takes and the fact that its operations are often barely apparent: only in the most 
extreme cases can such power be understood in the terms proposed by writers such as 
MacKinnon as coercion or violence against women. Its operation is rather grounded in 
medical knowledge, and the medical claim to define the patient’s best interests. For abortion, 
moreover, such power is grounded not only by the notion of the doctor as the expert most 
able to help the pregnant woman, but equally by the idea that he/she is most in touch with 
the interests of the foetus, and by his/her construction in other areas of obstetrics and 
gynaecology as the ‘foetal protector’ (see pp. 74-5).
The problem of the power imbalance inherent in the medical relationship is not confined to 
discussion of abortion, however in this instance it is still more acute. Confronted with an 
unwanted pregnancy, the doctor may be hostile to the woman’s request and decide not to 
authorise her termination. And only for abortion (and some infertility treatments) does the
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doctor have the right to refuse to treat on the grounds of conscientious objection. On a 
general level, patients’ representation groups have fought for certain legal structures and 
procedures which aim to restrict medical discretion and to protect the patient. Academic 
commentators have likewise called for a statute to lay down the rights of patients 
(Montgomery; 1992; 94ff.) or for the transformation o f John Major’s Patients' Charter into 
more specific, enforceable rights (Longley; 1993; chapter 5). What is perhaps not evident, 
however, is how far law is capable of addressing such operations of medical power and how 
far the acquisition of legal rights is sufficient for ensuring women’s access to abortion 
services. In the remaining pages, I would like briefly to assess how useful recourse to law 
can be in this instance. I will very briefly outline some of the potential legal reforms which 
might serve to improve the position of the ‘patient’ within the specific case of the regulation 
of abortion (a). I will then go on to question whether law is the most effective way of 
addressing the problems which have been highlighted above. Should legal reform provide the 
basis for feminist campaigns in this area? Or would a focus on medical practice be more 
beneficial (b)? In a final section, I will return to consideration of legal reform as a focal 
point for feminist campaigns, this time from a slightly different perspective (c).
a) Legal Reform
Various possible legal reforms have been suggested as ways of improving the power 
imbalance within the medical relationship or giving women some legal protection within it.
i) Giving women more autonomy in (early) pregnancy.
The central demand of the woman’s movement (and, in particular, the National Abortion 
Campaign) has been that women should be credited with the responsibility and maturity to 
make their own reproductive decisions, and thus should be entitled to authorise their own 
terminations. Doctors should be seen as technicians, who will perform the terminations as 
and when women request them. This would obviously have a significant effect on the power 
relationship between the woman seeking abortion and her doctor, not only in terms of 
removing his/her decisional control, but also lessening the potential exercise of paternalistic 
and normalising control. Women are currently vulnerable to the exercise of such power as 
a result of being dependent on the doctor for a referral. Recognising this decision as one 
which belongs fundamentally to all women would also focus attention on abortion as a
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collective issue, involving all women rather than just a marginal and deviant minority.
Such a reform has at least two shortcomings. First it leaves doctors’ technical control (and 
the problems which stem from it) intact. Secondly, it has little possibility of success in the 
current political climate. Amendments suggested in 1990 attempted far more limited 
measures: to give women more autonomy in early pregnancy and even these were 
unsuccessful (see chapter 6 , p. 147). The limiting of these demands to the first twelve weeks 
of pregnancy was no doubt designed to maximise support - opinion polls have consistently 
shown that a greater number support a ‘woman’s right to choose’ when this is confined to the 
first trimester (Francome; 1991). Moreover, elective termination in early pregnancy is now 
the norm in Western Europe. Such reforms might be achieved by limiting the doctor’s 
responsibility under the Abortion Act to certifying that* the pregnancy had not exceeded a 
certain number of weeks. Another measure, and one which came close to succeeding in 1990, 
was to remove the requirement of a second signature, and to thus allow women to decide in 
conjunction with just one doctor. This was narrowly defeated (by 228 votes to 200). I noted 
that the introduction of antiprogestins provides one more argument in favour of such reform 
(pp. 185-6).
ii) The problem of conscientious objectors
A still more recent initiative was the Abortion Clinics (Access) Bill introduced into Commons 
in May 1993 by Harry Cohen M.P.17. The Bill was introduced at a time of concern at 
arrival in the UK of ‘Operation Rescue’ and more militaristic, US style tactics on the part of 
anti-choice activists, and its main thrust was the prohibition of interference with and 
intimidation or harassment of clients or employees entering abortion clinics. However, the 
Bill also contained a clause which put the onus on general practitioners to inform women 
what sort of counselling is available and might be helpful to them. Such a requirement might 
provide a small step towards attempting to address the power imbalance within the medical 
relationship, refusing to allow the doctor complete agenda-setting power, and giving the 
woman greater information. Statute could provide that a doctor, acting as a conscientious 
objector under the Act would not be able simply to refuse a woman’s request for abortion but
17 See H.C. Deb. Vol. 225, Cols. 241-4, for the Bill’s first reading.
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at that point would have to inform her o f the reason for such refusal and refer to her a 
colleague who is not a conscientious objector. This would protect doctors who wished to 
exercise their right to conscientious objection, whilst mitigating the impact of this on the 
women who approach them for terminations. An alternative to this was a suggested 
amendment to s. 37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990 which foresaw that 
doctors wishing to exercise their right to conscientious objection under s. 4 of the Abortion 
Act would have to register on a list which would be available to women before approaching 
a GP. This was rejected, seemingly on the grounds that it might lead to discrimination 
against doctors who hold such views. The utility of any such changes is again limited, 
however, unless introduced in conjunction with a loosening of doctors’ decisional control as 
suggested in i) above. Under the current legislation the doctor can, without claiming to be 
a conscientious objector, still block the woman’s request: the power to certify whether the 
conditions laid down in s.l of the Abortion Act are fulfilled remains his/hers.
iii) Increasing the number of individuals who are legally entitled to perform terminations.
As was seen in chapter 4 (p, 77), abortion is one of the only specified cases where treatment 
must be performed by a registered medical practitioner. This technical control has been 
important in grounding the other types of medical power seen in chapter 4. Doctors’ 
decisional control over access to abortion services and the authority which enhances their 
paternalistic and normalising control is closely tied to their technical expertise and control of 
the performance o f abortions (Barrett; 1988; 168, Oakley; 1987; 10). The question which 
now arises is whether this technical monopoly should be removed, and (early) abortion 
governed in the same way as any other medical operation: i.e. that it is not illegal, unless the 
practitioner holds him/herself out as having skills or qualifications which he/she does not. 
A first problem and area for closer investigation would be the possibility of ensuring the 
safety of women seeking termination. Again, however, such a reform would have no chance 
of success at the present time.
There may, however, be a possibility for challenging doctors’ monopoly of technical control 
over terminations, by allowing them to be performed within established medical structures 
by a wider group of individuals. It has been seen that prostaglandin terminations are already 
largely performed by nurses, with the doctor in a largely background, supervisory role
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(chapter 5, footnote 41). I have also argued that antiprogestins may in the future provide a 
basis for a larger number of people to be able to perform terminations: the most obvious first 
step would be to allow the administration of the first stage of treatment by GPs in their 
surgeries or in family planning clinics. This kind of potential extension was clearly in the 
minds of ministers in 1990, when Geoffrey Howe proposed an amendment which now allows 
the Secretary of State to authorise classes of places to carry out terminations (see chapter 7 ). 
If antiprogestins continue to prove safe, their administration might also be entrusted to a 
broader group in the future, with the doctor fading into the background as merely providing 
cover in case of emergency. Increasing the number of potential providers loosens the medical 
monopoly. Also, it would have a significant effect on the power context were the abortionist 
to be a nurse or midwife rather than a doctor. The executive board of the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has just recommended that non-physicians be trained to 
do abortions in ‘collaborative settings alongside physicians’ - at present nearly all states have 
laws which, like the Abortion Act, limit the performance of abortions to trained medical 
practitioners18.
b) Non-Legal Reform
However, whilst the above proposals accept a focus on legal reform as the most effective 
means of achieving change, it is by no means clear that this is the case. Neither is it clear 
that the acquisition of legal rights would be sufficient to secure women’s access to abortion. 
It seems to me that those reforms which have even the slightest chance of success in the 
current political climate would be seriously limited in their impact. It remains a dilemma for 
feminist campaigns that once enacted, legislation is in the hands of individuals and agencies 
far removed from the values and politics of the women’s movement. It is thus never possible 
to know with any certainty what effect a certain reform will have in practice. This has led 
Carol Smart to warn feminists to beware the "siren call of law". Even where feminists are 
critical of law, she argues, we are all too often seduced by it, attempting to use it
18 Abortion Review, Spring 1994 no. 51. Unlike the UK, US law contains no 
specifications to where terminations may be performed. This means that the potential of 
RU486 to privatise abortion becomes much more real. Doctors will be able to perform 
terminations in their surgeries. This has obvious advantages in a country where abortion 
clinics have become such focal points for dissent.
208
pragmatically in the hope that new law or more law might be better than the old law (1989; 
160). Whilst this does not lead Smart to the conclusion that law must remain unchallenged 
(and I shall come baick to this below), it does suggest that it is important not to resort 
unproblematically to law. It is possible that other (non-legal) strategies might be more useful.
Something which has emerged clearly during this thesis is the importance of medical practice. 
Indeed, it has been seen that legal developments have often followed changes at this level, 
rather than vice versa: not only in the sense that medical groups have had an important 
influence on the development of legislation, but also that the judiciary has adopted medically 
determined standards of ‘good practice’ in judging medical conduct, and the law has become 
ever more dependent on medical concepts and knowledges. As such, it may be that the 
authority of medicine is more significant than the precise content of legal rights. It is medical 
practice which will have the greatest influence on the availability of abortion, in terms of 
doctors’ willingness to perform and authorise terminations, and their treatment of the women 
who approach them.
That the acquisition of legal rights may be insufficient to address such problems can be seen 
in the French situation. French law grants women the right to define themselves as in a 
‘situation of distress’ and thus to authorise their own abortions within the first twelve weeks 
of pregnancy. All French women have the right to have such terminations funded by the 
State. However, women are still dependent on doctors for the performance of such abortions, 
and this combined with the low time limit foreseen by the law and public spending cuts, 
means that 65% of abortions in the Paris region are privately funded and 5,000 French women 
travel abroad each year (to Britain or the Netherlands) to terminate their pregnancies 
(Simonnot; 1993a, 1993b, see also Allison; 1994). The situation of practical access to 
abortion would thus appear to be worse in France than it is in Britain, despite the more liberal 
statutory provisions regarding early termination. Joni Lovenduski and Joyce Outshoorn argue 
that the effects of abortion legislation are far less important than a network of good medical 
facilities. They point to the examples of Sweden and the United States, both countries with 
liberal legislation. In Sweden, the scrupulous provision of adequate facilities makes access 
to abortion a reality for women. In the United States, on the other hand, access to abortion 
is often severely restricted (1986; 4, see also Ketting and van Praag; 1986). It is particularly
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important to think about how improvements can be made at the level of medical practice. 
i) Deprivatisation o f knowledge.
An important aspect of the médicalisation of reproduction is the privatisation of knowledge - 
knowledge regarding reproduction in general has become concentrated in medical hands. One 
priority is a deprivatisation or proliferation of knowledge: an attempt to readdress the power 
imbalance inherent in the medical relationship, by strengthening the position of the 'patient* 
within it. Greater awareness of the practical realities of access to abortion, of reproductive 
biology and of different abortion techniques are essential here. This has long been part of 
feminist strategies: it is the aim of books such as the Boston Health Collective’s Our Bodies; 
Ourselves, and more recently A Book of Women*s Choices (see chapter 7, p. 80). The idea 
is that knowledge will strengthen women and lessen the power imbalance within the medical 
relationship, reversing the process of the privatisation of knowledge. This is especially 
important where women have least knowledge and are thus most vulnerable: for example, 
young women and ethnic minority women - especially those who do not speak English. The 
most effective way to reach such women may be (as a first step) through public information 
campaigns, better and earlier sex education in schools and well-women clinics (see Gardner; 
1981, Cooke and Ronalds; 1987). i)
ii) Exploiting and supporting elements of resistance within the medical profession.
The medical profession consists of different groups and individuals, and instances of 
resistance to the hegemonic medical control over abortion have also come from within it. A 
few  noteworthy doctors have been amongst the leading campaigners who have fought for 
women to be allowed more control. Many more, at the grass roots level, have allowed 
women to make their own reproductive decisions, and have viewed their role as one of 
facilitating such choices. Especially important is the fact that non-NHS charitable clinics 
developed precisely to oppose the monopolistic power o f senior gynaecologists who were in 
a position to deny the possibility of NHS terminations in the hospitals which they control. 
These clinics have provided inexpensive terminations and have guaranteed a more sympathetic 
reception and a more woman-centred service. Thus, the situation of practical access to 
abortion has improved over the last 30 years in no small part because of the actions of some 
doctors and sections of the medical profession who have done much to try to further women’s
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reproductive autonomy, taking as starting point the need to listen to women (and often being 
very much marginalised within the profession for so doing19). As such, both the greater 
education o f doctors and the support of such clinics remain important.
c) A Return to Law: Challenging Médicalisation and the Construction of Alternative 
Visions
However, an appreciation of the limits of law reform and a recognition of the importance of 
medical practice is not in itself an argument that one should abandon the law as a site of 
struggle. As 1 argued above, the law regulating abortion cannot be understood only in terms 
of its concrete, material effects but must be seen also in terms of its importance as an 
institutionalised and formalised site of power struggles, with a power to prefer certain 
accounts, to define and to disqualify (Smart; 1989, 1990a). Moreover, law does not merely 
reflect reality, it also contributes to constructing our perception of it. Law lies at the root of 
some of the most commonplace assumptions which people make in ordering their daily lives 
(Gordon; 1984; 109). Equally, it will have influence on doctors: it is surely true that the 
more liberal provisions of the Abortion Aci contributed to doctors’ changing attitudes towards 
abortion. Smart has thus argued that feminists do need to engage with the law, maintaining 
that it is precisely law’s power to define which must become the focus of feminist strategies: 
it is in its ability to offer a redefinition or alternative truth that feminism offers political gains 
(Smart; 1989; 164-5). Law operates as an important "authorised discourse" which silences 
women by privileging other accounts of reality (Eisenstein; 1988; 4, Smart; 1989, 1990a). 
Engagement with the law is thus important as a process of the public formulation of claims 
and alternative visions (Smart; 1989, Drakopoulou; 1994).
In this thesis, I have attempted to show the specific understanding which has been fostered 
by the law: abortion is seen as a medicalised phenomenon, with the doctors as the natural 
experts to manage this problem and the women who seek it, by virtue of the very fact that 
they wish to terminate a pregnancy, seeming in need of medical supervision and support. The 
possible legal reforms outlined above (section a) are not in themselves sufficient for
19 As the Wendy Savage case clearly demonstrated, see Savage (1986), and footnote 12, 
chapter 4, above.
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countering the problems of medical power and ensuring women’s access to abortion. 
However, the challenge they pose to the current status quo in terms of their 
reconceptualisation of women, women’s role in society, abortion and the medical relationship 
is important. Indeed, in this sense, the challenge they pose to the status quo is radical.
In the 1960s, abortion law reformers spoke in powerful and angry terms of the hypocrisy of 
a law that effectively allowed abortions for the rich but not to the poor, the latter being forced 
to choose between unwanted maternity or the danger of the backstreets. Today, with 
improved access and an apparent depoliticisation of abortion, such tones are muted and 
alternative accounts of abortion are often lacking. Abortion law remains a particular site of 
conflict for definitional struggle. However, what seems to have become central to such 
dispute is the definition of the conceptus - as foetus or baby, embryo or ‘unborn child’, Fixing 
one point where it can be said to acquire humanity (Albury; 1993, Dworkin; 1990, Williams; 
j 9 9 4 )2° ancj increasingly, medical science has been accepted as the final arbiter of this point. 
The attribution of one status to the foetus, of one point whereby its rights can be seen to 
override those of the woman is, however, only one possible construction of the crucial issue 
of what is at stake in the abortion debate. It is important to dislodge the foetus from its 
central place in the debates and to reintroduce consideration of pregnant women and their 
lived experiences. The introduction of broader, social circumstances will implicitly involve 
a challenge to the médicalisation of the debates, and a (re)emphasis of knowledges other than 
the strictly medical. It will also require a challenge to the way in which the female subject 
upon which the law is currently predicated is to be constructed (see chapter 3).
Arguably the most powerful speech in the 1990 debates, came from the New Right 
Conservative M.P. and vocal advocate of abortion rights, Theresa Gorman. Gorman refused 
the medical framework and rather attacked those who oppose abortion:
"What motivates those who persist in trying to amend a woman’s right in these affairs is 20
20 Noonan sums this up concisely: ”[i]s the foetus a person? If so, then any interference 
at any point of the pregnancy constitutes murder. Is the fetus simply part of the woman’s 
body? If this is the case, then the woman has a prior claim to treat an unwarranted intrusion 
into her lifespace as an ‘invasion’ and forcibly reject it” (1985; 8 ).
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theology ...These motives form one of the deepest, most misogynous strands in human society. 
For centuries theologians have equated sex with sin and celibacy with grace. They have 
regarded women as little more than flower pots in which future children, preferably boy 
children, are reared. Time and again we hear people pay lip-service to a woman’s rights in 
this, yet when it comes down to it they legislate to give priority to the rights of the foetus that 
she carries...The concept of a woman having a right to control her sexuality, let alone enjoy 
it, is anathema to them...If the Pied Piper o f Mossley Hill [David Alton] had his way, he 
would lead the House and the country back to the time when women were the victims of their 
sexuality - perpetually pregnant, physically worn down, old before their time, unable to find 
time to develop the other talents with which they were born and always subservient to a man 
and to the demands of the family ...This is supposedly a liberal society and we should accord 
to the women of that society the maturity and ability to make decisions about such matters 
for themselves"21.
Whilst anti-choice M.P.s inaeasingly deploy medical argumentation, Gorman here asserts that 
their underlying motivation is actually religious or moral - hence she implicitly challenges its 
relevance. She insists on a repoliticisation of abortion, relocating it within a context of (male) 
power over women’s lives. However, this speech, where a pro-choice position is overtly 
informed by feminist arguments, remains the exception rather than the rule in Parliamentary 
debates22. Moreover, outside Parliament, the pro-choice movement has a low profile. 
Compared with the anti-choice groups, its membership is very small, and it operates on a tight 
budget (Lovenduski; 1986). Its strategy has been essentially one of reactive campaigns, with 
a capacity to mobilise large numbers of women only when the 1967 Act is challenged. The 
pro-choice movement is, in one sense, a victim of its own success; the establishment of a 
status quo which seems to ensure relatively good access to safe, legal abortion. However, in 
the absence of a more pro-active stance on the part of the pro-choice movement, it is difficult 
to see how medical power can be effectively challenged.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, I have described the pre-eminence of medical knowledges, the consequent 
marginalisation of other accounts and shift to a medical model of control. The choice of 
terminology has been deliberate - it is not a question of the complete replacement of religious,
21 Gorman, H.C. Deb. Vol. 171, Cols. 229-33, 1990 (24 April).
22 Indeed, as I noted in chapter 6 , it is perhaps anti-choice MPs who have made the 
greater use of explicitly feminist rhetoric in Parliament (see p. 141).
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moral and social discourses by the medical, but rather a matter of the gradual readjustment 
of the balance between them and recodification of the law in these terms. Î have here 
expressed concern that such médicalisation has been inadequately challenged, and that its pre­
eminence has been established on the basis o f the occlusion of other accounts. At the same 
time, I have recognised the problems and dangers inherent in challenging it.
Diane Munday, an early and active member of the Abortion Law Reform Association, was 
recently interviewed in an article commemorating 25 years of the entry into force of the 
Abortion Act. She expresses her sadness that
"Britain, which pioneered abortion legislation, now lags behind the rest of Europe where 
abortion on request in the first three months of pregnancy is available in 13 countries. Here, 
‘rigid’ legal requirements remain in place, which led to many abortions being carried out 
much later in pregnancy than necessary" (Hunt; 1993).
Various factors are implicated here including the one which Munday goes on to highlight: the 
existence of a well-organised and active anti-choice campaign. Whereas pro-choice activists 
and academics have been most alert to the risks posed by the anti-choice groups, the church 
or the state, however, less attention has been paid to the problems posed by the highly 
medicalised model of British abortion law. Women have, in effect, been delivered "into the 
hands of the medical profession". Whilst médicalisation has helped to extend access to 
abortion, such access remains tightly grasped in the deadlock of medical control and this is 
an essential focal point for a pro-choice politics.
Médicalisation has been the greatest strength of the British abortion law (depoliticising the 
extension of women’s access to abortion services and hence defusing political conflict), and 
its greatest weakness (leaving women dependent on medical discretion and good will). Smart 
has written that law is often an important focal point against which resistant voices can be 
raised (1989; 8 8 ). The current regulation of abortion and the situation of practical access to 
it gives a much clearer focal point for opposition to the anti-choice groups. In this sense it 
is important for feminists to make explicit the gender politics which underlies the current 
regulation of abortion: to argue that who controls abortion remains a deeply and inherently 
political matter. It is political because it concerns how women are able to live their lives and
control their own fertility, and this is a choice of fundamental importance in terms of how we 
wish to order our society. If the law regarding abortion is to be improved, I feel that it is 
essential for the feminist movement to take a more pro-active stance towards it. An essential 
part of this is to challenge the basic assumptions underlying the current regulation of abortion: 
the médicalisation and the construction o f woman seeking abortion which underpin it. This 
inevitably involves an attack on the status quo.
-c
APPENDIX 1
THE ABORTION ACT, 19671
1967 Chapter 87. An Act to amend and clarify the law relating to termination of pregnancy 
by registered medical practitioners. [27 October 1967]
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: -
Medical Termination of Pregnancy
1 . ( 1 ) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence 
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith -
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any 
existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury 
to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection ( 1 ) of this section, account may be 
taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably forseeable environment.
(3) Except as provided by subsection (4) of this section, any treatment for the termination of 
pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital vested in the Minister o f Health or the Secretary 
of State under the National Health Service Acts, or in a place for the time being approved for 
the purposes of this section by the said Minister or Secretary of State.
(4) Subsection (3) of this section, and so much of subsection (1) as relates to the opinion of 
two registered medical practitioners, shall not apply to the termination of a pregnancy by a 
registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that 
the termination is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury 
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.
Notification
2 .-(l) The Minister of Health in respect of England and Wales, and the Secretary of State in
respect of Scotland, shall by statutory instrument make regulations to provide-
(a) for requiring any such opinion as is referred to in section 1 of this Act to be certified
1 Taken from Hindell and Simms (1971, appendix 2, 249-53).
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by the practitioners or practitoner concerned in such form and at such time as may be 
prescribed by the regulations, and for requiring the preservation and disposal of 
certificates made for the purposes of the regualtions;
(b) for requiring any registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy to give 
notice of the termination and such other information relating to the termination as may 
be so prescribed;
(c) for prohibiting the disclosure, except to such persons or for such purposes as may be 
so prescribed, of notices given or information furnished pursuant to the regualtions.
(2) The information furnished in pursuance of regulations made by virtue of paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) of this section shall be notified solely to the Chief Medical Officers of the 
Ministry of Health and the Scottish Home and Health Department respectively.
(3) Any person who wilfully contravenes or wilfully fails to comply with the requirements 
of regulations under subsection ( 1 ) of this section shall be liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
(4) Any statutory instrument made by virtue of this section shall be subject to annulment in 
pursuance o f either House of Parliament.
Application o f Act to visiting forces etc.
3. omitted
Conscientious Objection to Participation in Treatment
4. -(l) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any duty, whether 
by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment 
authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection:
Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection 
shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall affect any duty to participate in treatment 
which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of a pregnant woman
(3) In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by any person to the 
effect that he has a conscientious objection to participating in any treatment authorised by this 
Act shall be sufficient evidence for the purpose of discharging the burden of proof imposed 
upon him by subsection ( 1 ) of this section.
Supplementary provisions.
5. -( l)  Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 
(protecting the life of the viable foetus).
¡flirt
(2) For the purposes of the law relating to abortion, anything done with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of a woman is unlawfully done unless authorised by section 1 of this Act.
Interpretation
6 . In this Act, the following expressions have meanings hereby assigned to them:-
"the law relating to abortion" means sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion;
"the National Health Service Acts" means the National Health Service Acts 1946 to 
1966 or the National Health Service (Scotland) Acts 1947 to 1966.
Short title, commencement and extent
7. -(l) This Act may be cited as the Abortion Act 1967.
(2) This Act shall come into force on the expiration of'the period of six months beginning 
with the date on which it is passed.





THE ABORTION ACT, AS AMENDED IN 19901
Medical Termination o f Pregnancy
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence 
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are o f the opinion, formed in good faith -
(a) th a t the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and tha t the 
continuance o f the pregnancy would involve risk, g rea ter than if the pregnancy 
w ere term inated, or of injury to the physical o r m ental health of the pregnant 
woman o r any existing children o f her family; or
[that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman or any existing children o f her family, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated; or]
(b) tha t the term ination is necessary to prevent grave perm anent injury to the 
physical o r m ental health of the pregnant woman; o r
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life o f the 
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were term inated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury 
to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) o r  (b) of subsection ( 1 ) of this section, account 
may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably forseeable environment.
(3) Except as provided by subsection (4) of this section, any treatment for the termination of 
pregnancy must be carried out in a hospital vested in the Minister of Health or
the Secretary of State under the National Health Service Acts, or in a place for the time being 
approved for the purposes of this section by the said Minister or Secretary of State.
(3A) The pow er u n d e r subsection (3) of this section to approve a place includes power, 
in relation to treatm ent consisting prim arily  in the use of such medicines as may be 
specified in the approval and carried  ou t in such m anner as may be so specified, to 
approve a class of places.
(4) Subsection (3) of this section, and so much of subsection ( 1 ) as relates to the opinion of 
two registered medical practitioners, shall not apply to the termination of a pregnancy by a 
registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that 
the termination is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury 
to the physical or mental health o f the pregnant woman.
1 The Amendments introduced to s.l by s.37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act, are recorded in bold. Sections which were repealed in 1990 are.included in the text in 
square brackets []. S.37 also ‘uncoupled’ the Abortion Act from the Infant Life Preservation 
Act.
REFERENCES
Aitken Swan, I. (1977); Fertility Control and the Medical Profession; London; Croom Helm.
Aktionsforum MoZ (1992); RU 486 - un choix qui n’en est pas un; leaflet.
Alberman, E. and Dennis, K. (Eds.) (1987); Late Abordons in England and Wales; London; 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.
Albury, R. (1993); Women and the Duty of the State: Deployment of Expert Knowledges; 
unpublished working paper.
Allison, M. (1994); The right to choose: abortion in France; 47 Parliamentary Affairs; no. 2, 
April; 222-37.
Alton, D. (1988); What Kind of Country?; Basingstoke; Marshall Pickering.
Andrews, L.B. (1986); Remaking conception and pregnancy: how the laws influence 
reproductive technology; in IX Frontiers no. 1; 36-40.
Armstrong, T. (1992); Michel Foucault Philosopher; New York; Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Amey, W. (1982); Power and the Profession of Obstetrics; Chicago; University of Chicago 
Press.
Aubeny, E. (1991); Introduction à la table ronde sur l’avortement précoce par Ru 486 + 
prostaglandines; in Neuvièmes journées nationales d ’études sur l ’avortement et la 
contraception; Creil; Association Nationale des Centres d ’interruption de Grossesse et de 
Contraception; 33-5.
Aubeny, E. (1993); Clinical experience in France - new developments in medical abortion; 
in Medical Abortion Services: European Perspectives on Anti-progcstins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); 
London; International Planned Parenthood Federation; 9-12.
Bachelot, A., Cludy, L. and Spira, A. (1991); IVG par RU 486 et IVG par aspiration; in 
Neuvièmes journées nationales d ’études sur l ’avortement et la contraception; Creil; 
Association Nationale des Centres d ’interruption de Grossesse et de Contraception; 37-40.
Bainham, A. (1987); Protecting the unborn - new rights in gestation; 50 Modern Law Review; 
361-8.
Baird, D. (1990); What it is, how it works and its development; in The Abortion Pill 
(MifepristonelRU 486): Widening the Choice for Women; London; Birth Control Trust; 12-15.
Baird, D. (1993); Clinical trials - the UK experience; in Medical Abortion Services: European 




Barrett, M. (1988); Women*s Oppression Today, London/New York; Verso.
Barrett, M. and Roberts, H. (1978); Doctors and their patients: the social control of women 
in general practice; in Women, Sexuality and Social Control; Smart, C. and Smart, B. (Eds.) 
41-64; London, Henley and Boston; Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Baulieu, E.-E. (with Rosenblum, M.) (1991); The Abortion Pill; London, Sydney, Auckland 
and Johannesberg; Century.
Baulieu, E.-E. (1993); Putting anti-progestins in context: how RU 486 works; in Medical 
Abortion Services: European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; 
International Planned Parenthood Federation; 2-4.
Beech, B. (1985); The politics of maternity: childbirth freedom versus obstetric control; in 
Gender, Sex and the Law; Edwards, S. (Ed.); London; Croom Helm; 50-78.
Berer, M. (1988); Whatever happened to ‘a woman’s right to choose?’; Feminist Review; no. 
29, Spring; 24-37.
Berer, M. (1993a); Abortion in Europe from a woman’s perspective; in Progress Postponed: 
Abortion in Europe in the 1990s; London; International Planned Parenthood Federation 
(Europe Region); 31-46.
Berer, M. (1993b); Women’s views on anti-progestin abortion; in Medical Abortion Services: 
European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; International Planned 
Parenthood Federation; 16-19.
Birman, C. (1989); The experiences of women having an abortion with RU 486; Women’s 
Global Network for Reproductive Rights, October-December; 7-9.
Birth Control Trust (1990); The Abortion Pill (Mifepristone!RU 486): Widening the Choice 
for Women; London; Birth Control Trust.
Boston Women’s Health Book Collective (1971); Our Bodies; Ourselves; New York; Simon 
and Schuster.
Bourne, A. (1962); A Doctor's Creed: The Memoirs of a Gynaecologist; London; Gollancz.
Brazier, M. (1988); Embryo’s "rights": abortion and research; in Medicine, Ethics and the 
Law; Freeman, M.D.A. (Ed.); London; Stevens & Sons; 9-22.
Brazier, M. (1992); Medicine, Patients and the Law; Harmondsworth; Penguin.
Brewin, C.R. and Bradley, C. (1989); Patient preferences and randomised clinical trials; 299 
British Medical Journal; 313-5.
221
Bridgeman, J. (1993a); Old enough to know best?; 13 Legal Studies; 69-80.
Bridgeman, J. (1993b); Medical treatment: the mother’s rights; Family Law; 534-5.
Bridgeman, J. (1993c); Demanding reproductive control?; in Body Politics: Control v 
Freedom: the Role of Feminism in Women*s Personal Autonomy; Feminist Legal Research 
Unit (University of Liverpool) (Ed.); 31-49.
Bromham, D. (1994); Setting up services; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; 
Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 13-15.
Brookes, B. (1988); Abortion in England 1900-1967; London, New York and Sydney; Croom 
Helm.
Buckley, M. and Anderson, M. (Eds.); Women, Equality and Europe; London; Macmillan.
Cahill, L.S. (1987); ‘Abortion pill’ RU486: ethics, rhetoric and social practice; Hastings 
Center Report; October-November; 5-8.
Callum, J. (unpublished); RU-486 and Early Termination Abortion; Federation of Feminist 
Women’s Health Centers, Atlanta.
Cameron, I.T. and Baird, D. T. (1988); Early pregnancy termination: a comparison between 
vacuum aspiration and medical abortion using prostaglandin or the antiprogestogen RU 486; 
95 British Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology; March; 271-6.
Cavadino, P. (1976); Illegal abortions and the Abortion Act 1967; 16 British Journal of 
Criminology; no. 1, January; 63-70.
Chalker, R. and Downer, C. (1992); A Woman*s Book of Choices: Abortion, Menstrual 
Extraction, RU 486; New York and London; Four Walls, Eight Windows.
Chicoine, D. (1993); RU486 in the United States and Great Britain: a Case Study in Gender 
Bias; XVI Boston College International and Comparative Law Review no. 1; 81-113.
Clarke, L. (1990); Abortion: a rights issue?; in Birthrights: Law and Ethics at the Beginnings 
of Life; Lee, R. and Morgan, D. (Eds.); London and New York; Routledge; 155-70.
Colvin, M. (1990); The legal situation; in The Abortion Pill (MifepristonelRU 486): Widening 
the Choice for Women; London; Birth Control Trust; 18-21.
Cooke, M. and Ronalds, C. (1987); The Manchester Experience III, Rusholme Well Women 
Clinic; in Women's Health in the Community; J. Orr (Ed.); Chichester; John Wiley & Sons.
Cook, R. (1990); ‘The moral property of women?’; 17 People; no. 3; 12.
Cossey, D. (1982); Abortion and Conscientious Objection; London; Birth Control Trust.
Cossey, D. (1990); The politics o f the ‘abortion pill*: breaking down barriers; in The Abortion
Pill (MifepristonefRU 486): Widening the Choice for Women; London; Birth Control Trust;
52-58.
Coulet, M.-F. (1993); Anti-progestins in France: questions women ask; in Medical Abortion 
Services: European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; International 
Planned Parenthood Federation; 20-22.
Dahlerup, D. (1986); The New Women*s Movement: Feminism and Political Power in Europe 
and the USA; London; Sage.
Dall’Ava Santucci, J. (1988); Punition; Le Monde; 29 October.
Daud, S. (1993); Abortion, contraception and ethnic minorities; in Progress Postponed: 
Abortion in Europe in the 1990s\ London; International Planned Parenthood Federation; 148- 
56.
Davies, C. (1975); Permissive Britain: Social Change in the Sixties and Seventies; London; 
Pitman.
Davies, V. (1991); Abortion and Afterwards; Bath; Ashgrove Press.
Davis, K. (1988a); Power Under the Microscope: towards a Grounded Theory of Gender 
Relations in Medical Encounters; Amsterdam; Foris Publications.
Davis, K. (1988b); Paternalism under the microscope; in Gender and Discourse: The Power 
of Talk; Todd, A.D. and Fisher, S. (Eds.); Norwood and New Jersey; Ablex Publishing 
Company; 19-54.
Diamond, I. and Quinby, L. (Eds.) (1988); Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance; 
Boston; Northeastern University Press.
Dickens, B.M. (1966); Abortion and the Law; Bristol; MacGibbon and Kee Ltd.
Diggory, P. (1991); Abortion - an Introduction: Guidance on Technique, Complications and 
the Provision of Services; London; Birth Control Trust.
Donnison, J. (1988); Midwives and Medical Men: a History of the Struggle for the Control 
of Childbirth; London; Historical Publications Ltd.
Donzelot, J. (1979); 77ie Policing of Families: Welfare versus the State; London; Hutchinson 
and Co Ltd.
Douglas, G. (1991); Law, Fertility and Reproduction; London; Sweet and Maxwell.
Douzinas, C. and McVeigh, S. (1992); The tragic body: the inscription of autonomy in 
medical ethics and law; in Law, Health and Medical Regulation; Wheeler, S. and McVeigh,
— 1—
223
S. (Eds.) Altershot and Brookfield, Vermont; Dartmouth Publishing Co.; 1-34.
Drakopoulou, M. (1993); Feminism and the siren call o f law; Feminist Approaches to Law 
and Cultural Diversity; Conference: European University Institute, Florence; 26-27 November.
Draper, H. (1993); Women, forced caesarians and antenatal responsibilities; in Body Politics: 
Control v Freedom: the Role of Feminism in Women’s Personal Autonomy; Feminist Legal 
Research Unit (University of Liverpool) (Ed.); Liverpool; University of Liverpool; 1-16.
Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. (1982); Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics; Brighton; Harvester.
Duncan, S. (1994); Disrupting the surface of order and innocence: towards a theory of 
sexuality and the law; 2 Feminist Legal Studies; 3-28.
Dworkin, A. (1983); Right Wing Women: The Politics of Domesticated Females; London; The 
Women’s Press.
Dworkin, R. (1993); Life’s Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia; London; 
Harper Collins.
Easlea, B. (1981); Science and Sexual Oppression; London; Wiedenfeld and Nicolson.
Ehrenreich, B. and English, D. (1976); Witches, Midwives and Nurses: A History of Women 
Healers, London; Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative.
Ehrenreich, B. and English, D. (1979); For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice 
to Women; London; Pluto.
Eisenstein, Z. (1988); The Female Body and the Law; Berkley, Los Angeles and London; 
University of California Press.
Farrant, W. (1985); W ho’s for Anmiocentesis? The Politics of Prenatal Screening; in The 
Sexual Politics of Reproduction; Homans, H. (Ed.); Hampshire; Gower; 96-122.
Feminist Legal Research Unit (University of Liverpool) (Ed.) (1993); Body Politics: Control 
v Freedom: the Role of Feminism in Women’s Personal Autonomy; Liverpool; University of 
Liverpool.
Feminist Review (1980); No right to choose; 4 Feminist Review; 57-79.
Feminist Review (Ed.) (1987); Sexuality: A Reader; London; Virago.
Ferris, P. (1966); The Nameless: Abortion in Britain Today; London; Hutchinson;
Finley, L.M. (1989); Breaking silence in law: the dilemma of the gendered nature of legal 
reasoning; in 64 Notre Dame Law Review, 886-910.
Fitzpatrick, P. (1987); Racism and the Innocence o f Law; in Critical Legal Studies; 
Fitzpatrick, P. and Hunt, A. (Eds.); Oxford; Basil Blackwell.
Fitzpatrick, P. (forthcoming); Foucault's case: subject and subjection in law; in Smart, B. 
(Ed.); London; Routledge.
Fitzpatrick, P. and Hunt, A. (Eds.) (1987); Critical Legal Studies; Oxford; Basil Blackwell.
Flax, J. (1990); Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the 
Contemporary West; Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford; University of California Press.
Fortin, J. (1988a); Legal protection for the unborn child; 51 Modern Law Review; 54-83.
Fortin, J. (1988b); Can you ward a foetus?; 51 Modern Law Review,; 768-775,
Foucault, M. (1979a); Governmentality; mlf; no. 3, July, 5-21.
Foucault, M. (1979b); The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction; Harmondsworth; 
Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1980a); Body/power; in Michel Foucault: PowerlKnowledge. Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977; Gordon, C. (Ed.); Hemel Hempstead; Harvester 
Press; 55-62.
Foucault, M. (1980b); Two lectures; in Michel Foucault: PowerlKnowledge. Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977; Gordon, C. (Ed.); Hemel Hempstead; Harvester 
Press; 78-108.
Foucault, M. (1980c); Truth and power; in Michel Foucault: PowerlKnowledge. Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977; Gordon, C. (Ed.); Hemel Hempstead; Harvester 
Press; 109-33.
Foucault, M. (1980d); The politics of health in the eighteenth century; in Michel Foucault: 
PowerlKnowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977; Gordon, C. (Ed.); 
Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Press; 166-83.
Foucault, M. (1980e) Confessions of the flesh; in Michel Foucault: PowerlKnowledge. 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977; Gordon, C. (Ed.); Hemel Hempstead; 
Harvester Press; 194-228.
Foucault, M. (1981a); Questions of method: an interview with Michel Foucault; I&C; 
Spring; 3-14.
Foucault, M. (1981b); Is it useless to revolt?; in Philosophy and Social Criticism; Spring; 5-9.
Foucault, M. (1982); The subject and power; in Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics; 
Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, R. (Eds.); Brighton; Harvester; 1982.
225
Foucault, M. (1989a); Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason; 
London and New York; Tavistock and Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1989b); The Birth of the Clinic; London and New York; Routledge.
Foucault, M. (1991); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison; London; Penguin.
Francke, L. (1980); The Ambivalence of Abortion; Harmondsworth; Penguin.
Francome, C. (1984); Abortion Freedom: A Worldwide Movement; London; Allen and Unwin.
Francome, C. (1986); Abortion Practice in Britain and the United States; London; Allen and 
Unwin.
Francome, C. (1991); Abortion and Public Opinion; London; Abortion Law Reform 
Association and National Abortion Campaign.
Franklin, S. (1991); Fetal fascinations: new dimensions to the medical-scientific constructions 
of fetal personhood; in Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies, Franklin, S., Lury, C. and 
Stacey, J. (Eds.); London; Harper Collins Academic; 190-205.
Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds.) (1991); Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural 
Studies; London; Harper Collins Academic.
Freeman, M.D.A. (Ed.) (1988); Medicine, Ethics and the Law; London; Stevens & Sons.
Friedson, E. (1970); Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge; 
Chicago, London; University of Chicago Press.
Furedi, A. (Ed.) (1994); Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; London; Birth Control 
Trust.
Fyfe, W. (1991); Abortion Acts: 1803 - 1967; in Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies; 
Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds.);London; Harper Collins Academic; 160-174.
Gallagher, J. (1987); Prenatal invasions and interventions: what’s wrong with fetal rights; in 
10 Harvard Women's Law Journal 1987, 9-58;
Gardner, K. (1981); Well women clinics: a positive approach to women’s health; in Women, 
Health and Reproduction; Roberts, H. (Ed.); London; Routledge and Kegan Paul; 129-143.
Gautier, A. and Heinen, J. (Eds.) (1993); Le sexe des politiques sociales; Paris; Côté-femmes.
Gelsthorpe, L. and Morris, A. (Eds.) (1990); Feminist Perspectives in Criminology; Milton 
Keynes; Open University Press.
Gillespie, R.M. and Hubbard, R. (1986); Contraception in Context; IX Frontiers; no. 1; 3-8.
i
226
Glasier, A. (1993); Provision of medical abortion in the UK - organisation and uptake; in 
Medical Abortion Services: European Perspectives on Anti~progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); 
London; International Planned Parenthood Federation; 13-15.
Gordon, C. (Ed.); Michel Foucault: Power ¡Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 2972-1977; Hemel Hemstead; Harvester Press.
Gordon, L. (1980); Review of James Mohr’s Abortion in America: the Origins and Evolutions 
of National Policy; in 13 Journal of Social History; Spring; 514-7.
Gordon, R. (1984); Critical legal histories; 36 Stanford Law Review; 57-125.
Graycar, R. (Ed.) (1990); Dissenting Opinions: Feminist Explorations in Law and Society; 
Sydney; Allen and Unwin.
Graycar, R. and Morgan, J. (1990); The Hidden Gender of Law; Annandale; Federation Press.
Greenwood, V. and Young, J. (1976); Abortion in Demand; London; Pluto.
Grice, E. (1988); A matter of conscience; The Sunday Times; 31 January.
Grubb, A. (1990); Abortion law in England: the medicalization of a crime; 18 Law, Medicine 
and Health Care; nos. 1-2, Spring - Summer; 146-61.
Hall, M.H. (1990); Changes in the law on abortion; 301 British Medical Journal; 17 
November; 1109-10.
Halpern, S. (undated); RU-486: the unpregnancy pill; in RU486: a Collection of Articles and 
Press Cuttings on the *Abortion PillV London; National Aboriton Campaign; 8-10.
Hartnell, V.H. (1993); Medical termination of pregnancy and the future provision of 
termination services; 19 British Journal of Family Planning 143-4.
Hartouni, V. (1991); Containing women: reproductive discourse in the 1980s; in 
Technoculture; Penley, C. and Ross, A. (Eds.); Minneapolis and Oxford; University of 
Minnesota Press; 27-56.
Harvard, J.D.J. (1958); Therapeutic abortion; Criminal Law Review; 600-13.
Henshaw, R. (1993); Comparison of medical abortion with surgical vacuum aspiration: 
women’s preferences and acceptability of treatment; 307 British Medical Journal; 714-7.
Henshaw, R. (1994); The acceptability of medical abortion; in Running an early medical 
abortion service; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 38-42.
Himmelweit, S. (1987); Abortion: individual choice and social control; in Sexuality: A 
Reader; Feminist Review (Ed.) 98-104; London; Virago;
227
Himmelweit, S. (1988); More than *a Woman’s Right to Choose’?; Feminist Review; no. 29, 
Spring; 38-55.
Hindell, K. and Simms, M. (1971); Abortion Law Reformed; London; Peter Owen.
Hoggett, A.J.C. (1968); The Abortion Act 1967; Criminal Law Review, 247-58.
Holdsworth, A. (1990); Out of the DolVs House; London; BBC Books.
Homans, H. (1985) (Ed.); The Sexual Politics of Reproduction; Hants; Gower.
Homans, H. (1985); ‘Discomforts in pregnancy: traditional remedies and medical 
prescriptions’ in The Sexual Politics of Reproduction; Homans, H. (Ed.); Hants; Gower; 139- 
162.
Hordern, A. (1971); Illegal Abortion: the English Experience; Oxford, New York; Pergamon 
Press.
Hiihn, C. (1992); Under pressure you can’t talk freely. Compulsary counselling for women 
with unwanted pregnancy; Conference: European Network for Women ’s Right to Abortion and 
Contraception; Geneva; September 1992.
Hudson, D. (1987); You can’t commit violence against an object: women, psychiatry and 
psychosurgery; in Women, Violence and Social Control; Hanmer, J. and Maynard, M. (Eds.); 
Hampshire, Macmillan; 110-121.
Hunt, L. (1993); Stigma and secrecy that marked a different world; The Independent; 27 
April.
Illich, I. (1977); Disabling Professions; London; Marion Boyars Publishers Ltd.
Jacobus, M., Fox Keller, E. and Shuttleworth, S. (1990); Body Politics: Women and the 
Discourses of Science; New York; Routledge.
Jenkins, A. (1960); Law for the Rich; London; Victor Gollancz.
Joffe, C. (1984); Comments on Mackinnon; Radical America; March-June; 68-9.
Jones, 1. (1994); Setting up the services; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; 
Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 19-23.
Kane, A. (1990); Anti-abortionists defeated; 7 Socialist Action; May-July, 18-20.
Kaye, T. (1986); Are you for RU486?; The New Republic; 27 January.




Keown, J. (1988); Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of 
Abortion in England from 1803 to 1982; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
Ketting, E. and van Praag, P. (1986); The marginal relevance of legislation relating to induced 
abortion; in The New Politics of Abortion; London; Sage Publications; 154-69.
Kingdom, E. (1985); Legal recognition of a woman’s right to choose; in Women-in-Law: 
Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality; Brophy, J. and Smart, C. (Eds.); London; 
Routledge and Kegan Paul; 143-161.
Kingdom, E. (1991); What’s Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law; 
Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press.
Kingdom, E. (1992); Problems with rights; Conference: The Rights of Women, European 
University Institute, Florence; 17 October 1992.
Kitzinger, S. (1978) Women as Mothers', Oxford; Martin Robertson.
Klein, R.D. (Ed.) (1989); Infertility: Women Speak Out About Their Experiences of 
Reproductive Medicine; London; Pandora.
Klein, R., Raymond, J. G. and Dumble, L. J, (1991); RU 486: Misconceptions, Myths and 
Morals; Melbourne; Spinifex.
Kravaritou, Y. and Sheldon, S. (Eds.) (1994); Abortion: Challenges to the Status Quo; 
European University Institute; Working Paper Law 94/1.
Lacey, N., Wells, C. and Meure, D. (1990); Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process; London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Lader, L. (1990); RU 486: The Pill That Could End the Abortion Wars and Why American 
Women Don’t Have 1t; Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Ltd.
Laing, B. (1970); The Labour Government 1964-70; Harmondsworth; Penguin.
Laqueur, T. (1990); Making Sex: Body and Gender From the Greeks to Freud; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London; Harvard University Press.
Lee, R. and Morgan, D. (Eds.) (1990); Birthrights: Law and Ethics at the Beginnings of Life; 
London and New York; Routledge.
Lees, C. (1991); Abortion pill available in the autumn; The Sunday Times; 30 May.
Lewis, J. (1984); Women in England, 1840-1950; London; Wheatsheaf Books;
Lloyd, L. (1993); What is happening about RU486?; in 1 Women’s Choice: a Magazine of 
Reproductive Rights; no. 3, Spring; 2-6.
229
Lobel, J. (Ed.) (1988); A Less than Perfect Union; New York; Monthly Review Press.
Lockwood, M. (1985); Where Does a Life Begin in Moral Dilemmas in Modem Medicine; 
Lockwood, M. (Ed.); Oxford; Oxford University Press.
Lockwood, M. (Ed.) (1985) Moral Dilemmas in Modem Medicine; Oxford; Oxford University 
Press.
Logan, A. (1994); Provision and practice; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; 
Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 33-5.
Longley, D. (1993); Public Law and Health Service Accountability; Buckingham and 
Philadelphia; Open University Press.
Lovenduski, J. (1986); Parliament, pressure groups, networks and the women’s movement; 
the politics of abortion law reform in Britain (1967-83); in The New Politics of Abortion; 
London; Sage Publications; 49-65.
Lovenduski, J. and Outshoorn, J. (1986a); The New Politics of Abortion; London; Sage 
Publications.
Lovenduski, J. and Outshoorn, J. (1986b); Introduction: the new politics of abortion; in The 
New Politics of Abortion; London; Sage Publications; 1-4.
Luker, K. (1984); Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, Berkeley and Los Angeles; 
California University Press.
Lukes, S. (Ed.) (1992); Power; Oxford; Blackwell.
McDonnell, K. (1984); Not an Easy Choice: A Feminist Re-examines Abortion; Toronto; The 
Woman’s Press.
MacIntyre, S.J. (1973); The Medical Profession and the 1967 Abortion Act in Britain; 7 
Social Science and Medicine; 121-34.
MacIntyre, S.J. (1977); Single and Pregnant; London; Croom Helm.
MacKinnon, C. (1982) Feminism, marxism, method and the state: an agenda for theory, 7 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society; no. 3; 515-44.
MacKinnon, C. (1983a); The Male Ideology of Privacy: A Feminist Perspective on the Right 
to Abortion; 17 Radical America; July-August; 23-35.
MacKinnon, C. (1983b); Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence; in 8, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1983, 635-58;
MacKinnon, C. (1984a); Reply by Mackinnon; Radical America; March-June; 69-70.
230
MacKinnon, C. (1987); Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law; Cambridge, 
Massachussets and London; Harvard University Press.
MacKinnon, C. (1991); Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law; 100 Yale Law Journal; 
March, no 5; 1281-328.
Macnaughton, M. (1990); Preface; in The Abortion Pill (MifepristonelRU 486): Widening the 
Choice for Women; London; Birth Control Trust; 5.
McNeil, M. (1991); Putting the Alton Bill in context; in Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural 
Studies; Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds); London; Harper Collins Academic; 149- 
159.
McKnorrie, K. (1985); Abortion in Great Britain: one Act, two laws; Criminal Law Review; 
475-88.
•
McNally, R. (undated); A Foucauldian Analysis of Abortion for Foetal Handicap; unpublished 
MA thesis, Brunei University.
Mancina, C. (1993); La scelta americana sull’aborto è quella giusta; L*Unita; 25 January.
Marques-Periera, B. (1993); La multiplicité des rapports sociaux dans le cheminement d ’une 
décision: le cas de l’avortement en Belgique; in Le sexe des politiques sociales; Gautier, A. 
and Heinen, J. (Eds.); Paris; Côté-femmes; 125-44.
Martin, E. (1987); The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Reproduction; Milton 
Keynes; Open University Press.
Mason, K. (1990); Medico-Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood; Altershot; 
Dartmouth; 1990.
Merchant, C. (1980); The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution; 
San Francisco; Harper and Row.
Minow, M. (1989); Beyond universality; University of Chicago Legal Forum; 115-38.
Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (Eds.) (1986a); The Rights and Wrongs of Women; 
Harmondsworth; Penguin.
Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (Eds) (1986b); What is Feminism?; Oxford; Blackwell
Montgomery, J. (1992a); Rights to health and health care; in The Welfare of Citizens; Coote, 
A. (Ed.); London; Rivers Oram Press; 83-108.
Montgomery, J. (1992b); Doctors’ handmaidens: the legal contribution; in Law, Health and 
Medical Regulation; Wheeler, S. and McVeigh, S. (Eds.); Aldershot; Dartmouth; 141-69.
231
Moorehead, J. (undated); Boycott call for abortion pill firm’s products; in RU486: a 
Collection of Articles and Press Cuttings on the Abortion Pill’; National Abortion Campaign 
(Ed.); London; National Abortion Campaign; 1.
Morgan, D. (1988); Foetal sex identification, abortion and the law; 18 Family Law; 355-62. 
Morgan, D. (1990); Abortion: the unexamined ground; Criminal Law Review; 687-694. 
Morgan, D. (1992) Re S; New Law Journal, 1448.
Morgan, D. and Lee, R. (1991) Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act; 
London; Blackstone.
Morris, J. (1991); Abortion: whose right to choose?; Spare Rib; October; 16-18.
Murphy, J. (1991); Cosmetics, eugenics and ambivalence: the revision of the Abortion Act 
1967 in Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law; no. 5; 375-93.
National Abortion Campaign (1993a); New anti-abortion bill; For Urgent Action; 12 February.
National Abortion Campaign (1993b); Anti-abortionists’ fake commission; For Urgent Action; 
12 February.
National Abortion Campaign (undated); RU486: a Collection of Articles and Press Cuttings 
on the Abortion Pill'; London; National Abortion Campaign.
Nau, J.-Y. and Nouchi, F. (1988); Une loi providentielle...; Le Monde; 31 October.
Neustatter, A. and Newson, G. (1986); Mixed Feelings: The Experience of Abortion; London, 
Sydney and New Hampshire; Pluto.
Newman, K. (Ed.) (1990); Progress Postponed: Abortion in Europe in the 1990s; London; 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (Europe Region).
Oakley, A. (1981); Subject Woman; Oxford; Martin Robertson.
Oakley, A. (1984); The Captured Womb: A History of the Medical Care of Pregnant Women; 
Oxford; Blackwell.
Oakley, A. (1986a); Wisewoman and medicine man: changes in the management of childbirth; 
in The Rights and Wrongs of Women; Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (Eds.); Harmondsworth; 
Penguin; 17-58.
Oakley, A. (1986b); Feminism, Motherhood and Medicine - Who Cares? in Mitchell, J. and 
Oakley, A. (Eds); What is Feminism?; Oxford; Blackwell; 127-50.
Oakley, A. (1987); From Walking Wombs to Test-Tube Babies; in Stanworth, M. (ed);
232
Reproductive Technologies; Gender, Motherhood and Medicine; London; Polity.
O ’Neill, P. T. and Watson, O. (1975); The father and the unborn child; 38 Modern Law 
Review; 174-85.
Outshoorn, J. (1988); Abortion law reform: a woman’s right to choose?; in Women, Equality 
and Europe; London; Macmillan; 204-19.
Outshoorn, J. (1990); Changing meanings of abortion and gender in the light of recent 
developments in reproductive technology in the Netherlands; Conference: Social and Political 
Science Conferences London.
Outshoorn, J. (1992); The body and reproductive rights; Conference: The Rights of Women; 
European University Institute, Florence; 17 October 1992.
Paintin, D. (1994a); Introduction; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; Furedi, A. 
(Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 9-12.
Paintin, D. (1994b); Conclusions; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; Furedi, A. 
(Ed.); London; Birth Control Trust; 47-8.
Penley, C. and Ross, A. (Eds.) (1991); Technoculture; Minneapolis and Oxford; University 
of Minnesota Press.
Petchesky, R.P. (1984a); Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and 
Reproductive Freedom; New York and London; Longman.
Petchesky, R.P. (1984b); Abortion as violence against women: a feminist critique; in Radical 
America; March-June; 64-8.
Petchesky, R.P. (1987); Foetal images: the power of visual culture in the politics of 
reproduction; in Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine; Stan worth,
M. (Ed.); London; Polity; 57-80.
Pfeffer, P. (1985); ‘The hidden pathology of the male reproductive system’; in The Sexual 
Politics of Reproduction; Homans, H. (Ed.); Hants; Gower; 30-44.
Pollack, S. (1985); Sex and the contraceptive act; in The Sexual Politics of Reproduction; 
Homans, H. (Ed.); Hants; Gower.
Prentice, T. (1990); French hope to market abortion pill in Britain; The Times; 23 July.
Radcliffe Richards, J. (1980); The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry; London; 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Randles, T. (1991); The Alton Bill and the media’s consensual position; in Off-Centre: 
Feminism and Cultural Studies; Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds.); London; Harper
»•f * • i- #***« ̂  |¥í*515
233
Collins Academic; 206-218.
Raulet, G. (1983); Structuralism and post-structuralism: an interview with Michel Foucault; 
in 55 Telos; 195-211.
Raymond, J. (1991); RU 486: a medical miracle?; Spare Rib; February; 34-7.
Reproductive Health Matters (1993); Research Round Up; Reproductive Health Matters; no. 
2, November; 123-9.
Retzlaff, 1. (1993); Anti-progestins - a feminist medical view; in Medical Abortion Services: 
European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; International Planned 
Parenthood Federation; 23-5.
Rey, A.-M. (1994); Abortion in Switzerland: a law more and more disregarded; in Abortion: 
Challenges to the Status Quo; Kravaritou, Y and Sheldon, S. (Eds.); European University 
Institute Working Paper Law No. 94/1; 53-61.
Ricks, S. (1989); The new French abortion pill: the moral property of women; 1 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism; no. 1 (Spring); 75-99.
Roberts, H. (1981); Women, Health and Reproduction; London; Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Roberts, H. (1985); The Patient Patients: Women and Their Doctors; London, Boston, 
Melbourne and Henley; Pandora Press.
Rodger, M. and Baird, D. T. (1987); Induction of therapeutic abortion in early pregnancy with 
meifepristone in combination with prostaglandin pessary; The Lancet; 19 December; 1415-8.
Rose, N. (1990); Governing the Soul: the Shaping of the Private Self; London and New York; 
Routledge.
Rothman, B. K. (1986); The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of 
Motherhood; New York; Viking.
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (1985); Report on Fetal Viability and 
Clinical Practice; London; Royal College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians.
Sapsted, A.-M. (1991); Abortion: the new pill; The Sunday Times Magazine; January 6.
Savage, W. (1982); Taking liberties with women: abortion, sterilization, and contraception; 
12 International Journal of Health Services; no. 2; 293-307.
Savage, W. (1986); A Savage Enquiry: Who Controls Childbirth?; London; Virago.




Science and Technology Sub Group (University of Birmingham) (1991); Feminism and 
abortion: pasts, presents and futures; in Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies; Franklin, 
S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds.); London; Harper Collins Academic; 214-8.
Scully, D. (1980); Men Who Control Womenys Health: the Miseducation of Obstetrician- 
Gynecologists; Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company.
Scully, D. and Bart, P. (1973); A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Orifice: Women 
in Gynecology Textbooks; 78 American Journal of Sociology; 1045-9.
Showalter, E. (1987); The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980; 
London; Virago.
Simms, M. (1980); Abortion in Britain before the Abortion Act: a Survey of the Historical 
Evidence; London; Birth Control Trust.
Simms, M. (1981); Abortion: the myth of the golden age; in Controlling Women: the Normal 
and the Deviant; Hutter, B. and Williams, G. (Eds.); London; Croom Helm; 168-84.
Simms, M. (1985); Legal Abortion in Great Britain; in The Sexual Politics of Reproduction; 
Homans, H. (Ed.); Hants; Gower; 78-95.
Simonnot, D. (1993a); Avortements: le retour a l'étranger; Libération; 3 March.
Simonnot, D. (1993b); Avortement: la loi Veil appliquée a reculons; Libération; 16 March.
Skegg, P.D.G. (1974); Justification for medical procedure performed without consent; 90 Law 
Quarterly Review; 512-30.
Smart, B. (1988); Michel Foucault; London and New York; Routledge. 1
Smart, C. (1976); Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist Critique; London and Boston; 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
;y ■
Smart, C. (1989); Feminism and the Power of Law; London; Routledge.
Smart, C. (1990a); Law’s power, the sexed body, and feminist discourse; 7 Journal of Law 
and Society; no. 2, Summer; 194-209.
Smart, C. (1990b); Law’s truth/women’s experience; Dissenting Opinions: Feminist 
Explorations in Law and Society; Graycar, R. (Ed.); Sydney; Allen and Unwin; 1-20.
Smart, C. (1991); Analyzing law: the challenge o f feminism and post-modernism; Conference: 
Women's Studies in the European Community; European Culture Centre at the European 
University Institute, Florence; 17-19 January.
Smart, C. (Ed.) (1992a); Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood
235
and Sexuality; London and New York; Routledge.
Smart, C. (1992b); Disruptive bodies and unruly sex: the regulation of reproduction and 
sexuality in the 19th century; in Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on Marriage, 
Motherhood and Sexuality; Smart, C. (Ed.); London and New York; Routledge.
Smart, C. (1992c); The woman of legal discourse; in 1 Social and Legal Studies; 29-44.
Smart, C. and Smart, B. (Eds.) (1978); Women, Sexuality and Social Control; London, Henley 
and Boston; Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Smith, R. (1981); Trial By Medicine: Insanity and Irresponsibility in Victorian Trials; 
Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press.
Smith, W. (1993); Medical abortion - widening the choice for women in the UK; in Medical 
Abortion Services: European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; 
International Planned Parenthood Federation; 39-41.
Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B. (1988); Criminal Law; London; Butterworths.
Soderholm, G. (1993); The politics of medical abortion - a Swedish perspective; in Medical 
Abortion Services: European Perspectives on Anti-progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; 
International Planned Parenthood Federation; 36-38.
Spelman, E.V. (1988); Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought; 
Boston; Beacon Press.
Steel, D. (1971); Foreward; in Abortion Law Reformed; Hindell, K. and Simms, M.; London; 
Peter Owen; 7-8.
Steinberg, D.L. (1991) Adversarial politics: the legal construction of abortion; in Off-Centre: 
Feminism and Cultural Studies; Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (Eds.); London; Harper 
Collins Academic; 175-189.
Stewart, P. (1994); Setting up services; in Running an Early Medical Abortion Service; 
London; Birth Control Trust; 16-18.
Stubblefield, P.G. (1985); Some medical considerations; 17 Family Planning Perspectives; no. 
4, July/August; 161-2.
Sumner, C. (1990); Foucault, gender and the censure of deviance; in Feminist Perspectives 
in Criminology; Gelsthorpe, L. and Morris, A. (Eds.); Milton Keynes; Open University Press;
26-40.
Teubner, G. (1983); Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law; 17 Law and Society 
Review; no. 2; 239-85. i
i mum ihm uw ehwwwh hwümiww
236
Thomas, H. (1985); The medical construction of the contraceptive career; in The Sexual 
Politics of Reproduction; Homans, H. (Ed.); Hants; Gower; 45-63.
Thomson, M. (1994); Women as walking wombs; Socialist Lawyer; no. 21 Spring; 12-13.
Thomson, M. (forthcoming 1995); Women, medicine and abortion in the nineteenth century; 
2 Feminist Legal Studies; no. 1.
Thoss, E. (1993); Obstacles to medical abortion provision in Germany; in Medical Abortion 
Services: European Perspectives on Anti~progestins; Furedi, A. (Ed.); London; International 
Planned Parenthood Federation; 30-35.
Todd, A.D. and Fisher, S. (Eds.) (1988); Gender and Discourse: The Power of Talk; Norwood 
and New Jersey; Ablex Publishing Company.
Treichler, P.A. (1990); Feminism, medicine and the meaning of childbirth; in Body Politics: 
Women and the Discourses of Science; Jacobus, M., Fox Keller, E. and Shuttleworth, S. 
(Eds.); New York; Routledge; 113-138.
Tunkel, V. (1974); Modern anti-pregnancy techniques and the criminal law; Criminal Law 
Review; 461-71.
Tunkel, V. (1979); Abortion: how early, how late and how legal?; British Medical Journal; 
28 July; 253-6.
Tunnadine, D, and Green, R. (1978); Unwanted Pregnancy - Accident or Illness?; Oxford; 
Oxford University Press.
Turner, B.S. (1987); Medical Power and Social Knowledge; London; Sage.
Union Suisse Pour Décriminaliser l’Avortement (1990); RU 486: Interruption de grossesse 
précoce: pour le droit de la femme de choisir le méthode; Berne; Union Suisse Pour 
Décriminaliser PAvortement.
United Kingdom Multicentre Trial (1990); The efficacy and tolerance of mifepristone and 
prostaglandin in first trimester termination of pregnancy; 97 British Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology; June; 480-6.
Urquhart, D. R. and Templeton, A.A. (1988); Acceptability of medical pregnancy termination; 
The Lancet; July 9; 106-7.
Urquhart, D. R. and Templeton, A.A. (1991); Psychiatric morbidity and acceptability 
following medical and surgical methods of induced abortion; 98 British Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology; 396-9.
Vance, C. (Ed.) (1984); Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality; Boston, London, 
Melbourne and Henley; Routledge and Kegan Paul.
< u  m : -- ‘n uiwiitritil AilliilkHklfefaiWflfaW'
237
Villmoare, A.H. (1991); Women, differences and rights as practices: an interpretive essay and 
a proposal; 25 Law and Society Review; no. 2; 385-410.
Walsworth-Bell, J.P. (1992); Under-reporting of medical terminations of pregnancy; 99 British 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology; 931-6.
Wamock, M. (1985) A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology; Oxford; Blackwell.
Wells, C. (1993); Maternal versus foetal rights; in Body Politcs: Control v Freedom: the Role 
of Feminism in Women's Personal Autonomy; Feminist Legal Research Unit (University of 
Liverpool) (Ed.); Liverpool; University of Liverpool; 17-30.
Wheeler, S. and McVeigh, S. (Eds.) (1992); Law, Health and Medical Regulation; Aldershot 
and Brookfield, Vermont; Dartmouth Publishing Co.
Williams, G. (1958); The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law; London; Faber and Faber.
Williams, G. (1994); The fetus and the "right to life"; 53 Cambridge Law Journal; no. 1 , 
March; 71-80.
Williams, P. (1988); Alchemical notes: reconstructing ideals from deconstructed rights; in A 
Less than Perfect Union; Lobel, J, (Ed.); New York; Monthly Review Press.
Winn, D. (1988); Experiences of Abortion; London; Macdonald Optima.
Wintow, P. (1990); 24-week limit on abortions; The Guardian; 25 April.
Woodside, M. (1963); Attitudes of women abortionists; 11 Howard Journal of Penology and 
Crime Prevention; no. 2; 93-112.
Young, A. (1993); Decapitation or feticide: the fetal laws of the universal subject; Critical 
Legal Conference; Oxford.
Young, G. (1981); A woman inside medicine: reflections from the inside; in Women, Health 
and Reproduction; Roberts, H. (Ed.); London, Boston and Henley; Routledge and Kegan Paul; 
144-63.
Zola, I.R. (1972); Medicine as an institution of social control; 20 Sociological Review; 4.
Zola, I.R. (1975); Healthism and disabling medicalization; in Disabling Professions; Illich, 





¿ v m m w m h m m b m b ¡gHgWWggg^mMWWWIlM
i
i
)


